The Influence of Early Efficacy Beliefs on Teams' Reactions to Failing to Reach Performance Goals

Although a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical attention has been devoted to understanding individuals' responses to goal–performance discrepancies (GPDs), little attention has been devoted to examining how teams respond to GPDs. The present research sought to examine how teams responded to negative GPDs. We predicted that failing to reach higher goals would be perceived as less negative than failing to reach lower goals, and we examined the moderating influence of setting higher versus lower goals on how teams responded to performance that fell short of those goals. We also examined the role that efficacy beliefs that were formed early in those teams played in further explaining these effects. Results from 94 teams who all failed to reach self‐set goals revealed that teams that failed to reach higher goals downwardly revised their goals less than teams that failed to reach lower goals. Early efficacy beliefs further explained these effects. High efficacy beliefs lessened the negative effects of failing to reach lower goals on subsequent goals. High efficacy beliefs also lessened the negative effects of failing to reach higher goals while low efficacy beliefs strengthened the negative effects of failing to reach higher goals. The implications of these findings for theory, research, and practice are discussed.     

The medial prefrontal cortex and memory of cue location in the rat

We developed a single-trial cue-location memory task in which rats experienced an auditory cue while exploring an environment. They then recalled and avoided the sound origination point after the cue was paired with shock in a separate context. Subjects with medial prefrontal cortical (mPFC) lesions made no such avoidance response, but both lesioned and control subjects avoided the cue itself when presented at test. A follow up assessment revealed no spatial learning impairment in either group. These findings suggest that the rodent mPFC is required for incidental learning or recollection of the location at which a discrete cue occurred, but is not required for cue recognition or for allocentric spatial memory.     

Reperfusion of Specific Brain Regions by Raising Blood Pressure Restores Selective Language Functions in Subacute Stroke

We report a series of six single subject studies examining the effects of pharmacological blood pressure elevation on regional brain perfusion and language function. Previous reports indicate that hypoperfusion of specific brain regions, as delineated by magnetic resonance perfusion weighted imaging (PWI), is associated with disruption of selective lexical functions. On this basis, we hypothesized that reperfusion of the same regions, in the absence of infarct in that region, would restore the associated lexical function. We present five patients with impaired lexical-semantics associated with poor perfusion, but not infarction, of Brodmann's area 22 (BA 22), and one patient with impaired lexical-semantics and a superimposed deficit in retrieving the phonological representations of words, associated with poor perfusion Brodmann's area 37 (BA 37) as well as BA 22. Each patient was treated with induced blood pressure elevation to increase perfusion of the ischemic and dysfunctional tissue. Daily testing of naming and comprehension, with stimulus sets matched for frequency, familiarity, and length, showed improved lexical-semantics in the patients who showed reperfusion of BA 22 and improved oral naming (but not lexical-semantics) in the patient who showed reperfusion of BA 37. These cases illustrate that loss of function with hypoperfusion of a circumscribed area of the brain, and recovery of the same function with improved perfusion of that brain region, can reveal brain/language relationships prior to reorganization after brain injury.     

A controlled-attention view of working-memory capacity.

In 2 experiments the authors examined whether individual differences in working-memory (WM) capacity are related to attentional control. Experiment 1 tested high- and low-WM-span (high-span and low-span) participants in a prosaccade task, in which a visual cue appeared in the same location as a subsequent to-be-identified target letter, and in an antisaccade task, in which a target appeared opposite the cued location. Span groups identified targets equally well in the prosaccade task, reflecting equivalence in automatic orienting. However, low-span participants were slower and less accurate than high-span participants in the antisaccade task, reflecting differences in attentional control. Experiment 2 measured eye movements across a long antisaccade session. Low-span participants made slower and more erroneous saccades than did high-span participants. In both experiments, low-span participants performed poorly when task switching from antisaccade to prosaccade blocks. The findings support a controlled-attention view of WM capacity.     

Posttraumatic distress and the presence of posttraumatic growth and meaning in life: Experiential avoidance as a moderator

Existing models of trauma suggest that for recovery to occur, trauma related cues and emotions require awareness and openness while survivors continue committing action toward valued life aims (other than regulating emotions). Based on this theoretical framework, an unwillingness to be in contact with distressing thoughts and feelings (experiential avoidance) might operate together with posttraumatic distress to predict when people find benefits and meaning in the aftermath of trauma. We hypothesized that people reporting posttraumatic distress and less reliance on experiential avoidance would report greater posttraumatic growth and meaning in life compared with other trauma survivors. We administered questionnaires to 176 college students reporting at least one traumatic event. Results supported these moderation models. This is the fourth study (with different samples, measures, and methodologies) to provide evidence that a combination of excessive anxiety and a heavy reliance on experiential avoidance leads to attenuated well-being. We discuss the implications for understanding heterogeneous trauma reactions.     

Variations in recollection: the effects of complexity on source recognition

Whether recollection is a threshold or signal detection process is highly controversial, and the controversy has centered in part on the shape of receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) and z-transformed ROCs (zROCs). U-shaped zROCs observed in tests thought to rely heavily on recollection, such as source memory tests, have provided evidence in favor of the threshold assumption, but zROCs are not always as U-shaped as threshold theory predicts. Source zROCs have been shown to become more linear when the contribution of familiarity to source discriminations is increased, and this may account for the existing results. However, another way in which source zROCs may become more linear is if the recollection threshold begins to break down and recollection becomes more graded and Gaussian. We tested the "graded recollection" account in the current study. We found that increasing stimulus complexity (i.e., changing from single words to sentences) or increasing source complexity (i.e., changing the sources from audio to videos of speakers) resulted in flatter source zROCs. In addition, conditions expected to reduce recollection (i.e., divided attention and amnesia) had comparable effects on source memory in simple and complex conditions, suggesting that differences between simple and complex conditions were due to differences in the nature of recollection, rather than differences in the utility of familiarity. The results suggest that under conditions of high complexity, recollection can appear more graded, and it can produce curved ROCs. The results have implications for measurement models and for current theories of recognition memory.     

Drifting from slow to "D'oh!": working memory capacity and mind wandering predict extreme reaction times and executive control errors

A combined experimental, individual-differences, and thought-sampling study tested the predictions of executive attention (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004) and coordinative binding (e.g., Oberauer, Süβ, Wilhelm, & Sander, 2007) theories of working memory capacity (WMC). We assessed 288 subjects' WMC and their performance and mind-wandering rates during a sustained-attention task; subjects completed either a go/no-go version requiring executive control over habit or a vigilance version that did not. We further combined the data with those from McVay and Kane (2009) to (1) gauge the contributions of WMC and attentional lapses to the worst performance rule and the tail, or τ parameter, of reaction time (RT) distributions; (2) assess which parameters from a quantitative evidence-accumulation RT model were predicted by WMC and mind-wandering reports; and (3) consider intrasubject RT patterns--particularly, speeding--as potential objective markers of mind wandering. We found that WMC predicted action and thought control in only some conditions, that attentional lapses (indicated by task-unrelated-thought reports and drift-rate variability in evidence accumulation) contributed to τ, performance accuracy, and WMC's association with them and that mind-wandering experiences were not predicted by trial-to-trial RT changes, and so they cannot always be inferred from objective performance measures.