Associations of trait positive emotion regulation with everyday emotions: An experience sampling approach

Positive emotion regulation is important for enhancing psychological well-being. Previous studies have adopted a cross-sectional design to examine the relationships between positive emotion regulation strategies and psychological functioning. Relatively little is known about the role of positive emotion regulation strategies in positive and negative emotions in everyday life. This study examines associations between perceived capability of savoring and trait positive rumination and everyday emotions. Among 300 Hong Kong Chinese (age 18–77 years), perceived capability of savoring the moment and positive rumination predicted higher positive emotions during positive-valenced events. Perceived capability of savoring the moment predicted lower negative emotions during positive-valenced events and higher positive emotions during negative-valenced events. Positive links between positive valence ratings of events and positive emotions were stronger among individuals who reported higher levels of perceived capability of savoring through reminiscence and greater trait emotion-focused rumination. Positive links between negative valence ratings of events and negative emotions were significant only among individuals who reported low/medium levels of perceived capability of savoring through anticipation. These findings suggest that: (a) perceived capability of savoring and trait positive rumination are key mechanisms for increasing positive emotions and (b) perceived capability of savoring fosters adaptive adjustment to stress during negative events.     

龙虎山天师府隆重举行建府九百周年庆典

2005年10月23日,天师府隆重举行道教正一派祖庭龙虎山天师府建府九百周年庆典活动。中央统战部副部长朱维群,国家宗教局一司副司长杨伯明,中国道教协会会长任法融、副会长林舟、张凤林、秘书长袁炳栋、副秘书长袁志鸿、李兆彩、张明心;江西省政协副主席、省委统战部部长王林森,     

Still motion? Motion illusions and luminance contrast

The influence of different luminance contrasts and equiluminance on illusory motion in four inducing patterns was studied: enigma, rotating snakes, pinna, and rotating-tilted-lines. At high luminance contrast the Pinna and the rotating-tilted-lines illusions are significantly stronger than at low luminance contrast, whereas the Enigma and Rotating Snakes illusions are stronger at low luminance contrast. At equiluminance along the L-M axis the strength of all illusions is greatly reduced. Data suggest that luminance contrast constitutes one important factor for their occurrence.     

Group-based self-regulation: The effects of regulatory focus

We review a programme of research on responses to group-based feedback—specifically, on how the source, content, and context of feedback intersect to produce individual willingness to accept both criticism and praise and to change one’s actions accordingly. We first explore the conditions under which group-directed criticism is most effective in terms of stimulating willingness to amend group practices. This is followed by the investigation of the effectiveness of different types of group-based praise, and an analysis of the identity-verifying properties of positive feedback. Finally, we consider the effects of feedback delivered simultaneously at group and individual levels, and explore the reciprocal implications of feedback content for source categorisation. Throughout, we focus on the role of identity concerns and group image management in responses to feedback. We discuss how this approach fits with other areas of literature, including research on self-verification and strategic behaviour in intergroup contexts.     

Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 88

Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value: (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage-point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stefánsson and Bradley call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.     

On human needs and moral appraisals

For a large and important range of cases the connection between ‘X needs y’ and ‘X ought to have y’, though not an entailment, is still non‐contingent. Sentences in which ‘needs’ occurs have several uses) one of which is normative; when such sentences are used to make statements, the statements constitute a good reason for asserting that what is needed ought to be done. It must, however, be recognized that such a reason may not be a sufficient reason for the moral appraisal that what is needed ought to be done. It is not self‐contradictory to assert ‘He needs it but he ought not to have it’, though in moral contexts if it is stated that someone needs something or that something is needed we are entitled to infer that, everything else being equal, he should have it or that it should be done. But often there are countervailing considerations which defeat that initial presumption. I attempt to support these contentions by 1) describing several key uses of “need sentences” and 2) by elucidating the relations between the uses of such sentences and moral judgments.     

Aging of theory of mind: The influence of educational level and cognitive processing

Previous studies of theory of mind (ToM) in old age have provided mixed results. We predicted that educational level and cognitive processing are two factors influencing the pattern of the aging of ToM. To test this hypothesis, a younger group who received higher education (mean age 20.46 years), an older group with an education level equal to that of the young group (mean age 76.29 years), and an older group with less education (mean age 73.52 years) were recruited. ToM tasks included the following tests: the second‐order false‐belief task, the faux‐pas task, the eyes test, and tests of fundamental aspects of cognitive function that included two background tests (memory span and processing speed) and three subcomponents of executive function (inhibition, updating, and shifting). We found that the younger group and the older group with equally high education outperformed the older group with less education in false‐belief and faux‐pas tasks. However, there was no significant difference between the two former groups. The three groups of participants performed equivalently in the eyes test as well as in control tasks (false‐belief control question, faux‐pas control question, faux‐pas control story, and Eyes Test control task). The younger group outperformed the other two groups in the cognitive processing tasks. Mediation analyses showed that difficulties in inhibition, memory span, and processing speed mediated the age differences in false‐belief reasoning. Also, the variables of inhibition, updating, memory span, and processing speed mediated age‐related variance in faux‐pas. Discussion focused on the links between ToM aging, educational level, and cognitive processing.