Overlapping mental representations of self, ingroup, and outgroup: unraveling self-stereotyping and self-anchoring

Smith and collaborators presented strong response time evidence for overlapping mental representations of the self and relevant ingroups, and they interpreted their findings as reflecting that people define themselves in terms of their ingroups. Besides on inferences from ingroup to self (self-stereotyping) however, self-ingroup overlap could also be based on inferences from the self to the ingroup (self-anchoring). The present research tackled this interpretational ambiguity and empirically distinguished self-anchoring versus self-stereotyping as processes possibly under-lying self-ingroup overlap. Results from three studies revealed stronger evidence for inferences from self to ingroup (selfanchoring) than the other way round (self-stereotyping).     

The meta-contrast technique: relationships with personality traits and cognitive abilities in a healthy male study sample

The relationship between defensive strategies as measured by the Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT) and self-reported trait anxiety, trait aggression and defensiveness, as measured by the Karolinska Scales of Personality (KSP), was investigated in 83 healthy men. Further aims of the study were to describe and document how a healthy and demographically well defined group of subjects responded to the MCT, and to investigate whether age, personality traits and cognitive abilities influenced the reports of picture recognition thresholds in the MCT. The results indicated no agreement between the conceptualization of anxiety as measured by the MCT and anxiety as measured by the KSP inventory. Nor was there any agreement between defensive strategies in the MCT and trait defensiveness as defined with the KSP. However, age, personality traits, and cognitive abilities all contributed to explain the variations in the threshold values of recognition of stimuli pictures, all of which are of central importance in the scoring of MCT protocols.     

Neural correlates of the first-person-perspective

Human self-consciousness depends on the metarepresentation of mental and bodily states as one's own mental and bodily states. First-person-perspective taking is not sufficient, but necessary for human self-consciousness. To assign a first-person-perspective is to center one's own multimodal experiential space upon one's own body, thus operating in an egocentric reference frame. The brain regions involved in assigning first-person-perspective comprise medial prefrontal, medial parietal and lateral temporoparietal cortex. These empirical findings complement recent neurobiologically oriented theories of self-consciousness which focus on the relation between the subject and his/her environment by supplying a neural basis for its key components.     

Multinational data show that conspiracy beliefs are associated with the perception (and reality) of poor national economic performance

While a great deal is known about the individual difference factors associated with conspiracy beliefs, much less is known about the country-level factors that shape people's willingness to believe conspiracy theories. In the current article we discuss the possibility that willingness to believe conspiracy theories might be shaped by the perception (and reality) of poor economic performance at the national level. To test this notion, we surveyed 6723 participants from 36 countries. In line with predictions, propensity to believe conspiracy theories was negatively associated with perceptions of current and future national economic vitality. Furthermore, countries with higher GDP per capita tended to have lower belief in conspiracy theories. The data suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not just caused by intrapsychic factors but are also shaped by difficult economic circumstances for which distrust might have a rational basis.     

Consistent Fragments of Grundgesetze and the Existence of Non-Logical Objects

In this paper, I consider two curious subsystems ofFrege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: Richard Heck's predicative fragment H, consisting of schema V together with predicative second-order comprehension (in a language containing a syntactical abstraction operator), and a theory T in monadic second-order logic, consisting of axiom V and ¹ ₁-comprehension (in a language containing anabstraction function). I provide a consistency proof for the latter theory, thereby refuting a version of a conjecture by Heck. It is shown that both Heck and T prove the existence of infinitely many non-logical objects (T deriving,moreover, the nonexistence of the value-range concept). Some implications concerning the interpretation of Frege's proof of referentiality and the possibility of classifying any of these subsystems as logicist are discussed. Finally, I explore the relation of T toCantor's theorem which is somewhat surprising.     

Quantifiers and 'If'-Clauses

Stephen Barker ( The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 195–211) has presented a new argument for a pure material implication analysis of indicative conditionals. His argument relies crucially on the assumption that general indicatives such as 'Every girl, if she gets a chance, bungee-jumps' are correctly analysed as having the formal structure (for all x)(if x gets a chance, x bungee-jumps). This paper argues that an approach first proposed by David Lewis must be pursued: the 'if'-clause in these sentences restricts the quantifier. Only the Lewis-style analysis can deal with sentences involving non-universal quantifiers such as 'Most letters are answered if they are shorter than 5 pages'. I show that Barker's reasons for rejecting the restrictor analysis are not cogent and that the restrictor analysis connects widely with recent work in natural language semantics.     

英语单词记忆过程中策略的选用和评价的研究

问卷结果表明 :普通大学生和 GRE考生在有关记忆过程的知识方面没有差异 ;绝大多数 GRE考生有选用“较多的”策略趋势 ,且在规定单词记忆量和精细加工策略方面差异显著 ;两类被试在对策略的评价的总体上具有一致性 ,但两类被试在选择比较有效和值得推荐的策略时 ,在一些自我监控策略上的选取比率表现出差异 ,在选择效果不佳和基本无效策略时 ,在某些一般记忆加工策略上选取比率也存在差异 ;绝大多数被试推荐策略是基于经验 ,判定策略无效是源于直觉判断。本文结合前人的研究成果 ,探讨了知识、情景因素与策略的选择和运用的关系 ;提出了实际学习情景下策略有效性意识形成的两个因素及可能途径。     

Easy bayes estimation for rasch-type models

A Bayes estimation procedure is introduced that allows the nature and strength of prior beliefs to be easily specified and modal posterior estimates to be obtained as easily as maximum likelihood estimates. The procedure is based on constructing posterior distributions that are formally identical to likelihoods, but are based on sampled data as well as artificial data reflecting prior information. Improvements in performance of modal Bayes procedures relative to maximum likelihood estimation are illustrated for Rasch-type models. Improvements range from modest to dramatic, depending on the model and the number of items being considered.This research was supported by ORN Contact #00014-86-K0087. We wish to thank Sheng-Hui Chu and Dzung-Ji Lii for providing intelligent and energetic programming support for this article. We also thank one of the reviewers for pointing out several interesting and useful perspectives.     

Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy

With the recent revival of moral intuitionism, the work of W. D. Ross has grown in stature. But if we look at some recent well-regarded histories, anthologies and companions of analytic philosophy, Ross is noticeably absent. This discrepancy of assessments raises the question of Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy. Hans-Johann Glock has recently claimed that Ross is not an analytic philosopher at all, but is instead a ‘traditional philosopher’. In this article, I will identify several undeniable features of analytic philosophy that Ross’s work bears: a focus on linguistic analysis, great respect for pre-theoretical thoughts, the conviction that philosophy is a collaborative, piecemeal enterprise and so on. Such an investigation, I claim, reveals two historically significant results: Ross was the first ethicist to fully draw from commonsense beliefs about morality in light of characteristic analytic considerations to secure his theory. Two, concerning the matter of whether the notions ‘right’ and ‘good’ are reducible to other notions, Ross appears to have been right: ‘right’ and ‘good’ are irreducible notions. The classical analytic metaethicists, who based their entire research programme on the promise of finding suitable reductive semantic analyses of ‘right’ and ‘good’, were wrong. These results, I believe, suffice to secure W. D. Ross a high place in the history of analytic philosophy.