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161.
Kai Sassenberg Thomas Kessler Amélie Mummendey 《Journal of experimental social psychology》2003,39(1):48-58
A motivational approach to ingroup favoritism based on regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) is introduced. RFT suggests that individual self-regulation is either more concerned with approaching positive events (promotion focus) or with avoiding negative events (prevention focus). It is suggested that if an individual self-categorizes as a group member, resource allocations to one’s group will be based on these mechanisms of self-regulation. Thus, a promotion focus should engender ingroup favoritism during the distribution of positive resources but not during the distribution of negative resources, whereas a prevention focus should engender ingroup favoritism for negative but not for positive resources. The results of two studies support this prediction based on momentary and chronic regulatory focus. The self-regulation approach to ingroup favoritism provides an explanation for social discrimination in the distribution of positive and negative resources. 相似文献
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Thomas Mussweiler Katja Rüter Kai Epstude 《Journal of experimental social psychology》2004,40(5):689-696
Life provides an endless stream of social comparison information. Because opportunities to compare with others are so abundant, social comparison theory traditionally assumes that people are selective in their comparison activities and primarily compare with deliberately selected standards. Recent research, however, demonstrates that social comparisons often occur spontaneously, even if no standard is explicitly provided or deliberately selected. We examined whether comparisons are so spontaneous that they are even engaged if people are fleetingly exposed to a potential standard—so fleetingly that they remain unaware of the standard. In three studies, participants were subliminally primed with moderate versus extreme, high versus low standards during self-evaluation. Results demonstrate that self-evaluations are influenced by subliminally presented standards. Specifically, self-evaluations are assimilated towards moderate standards and contrasted away from extreme standards. These self-evaluative consequences of subliminal standards, however, were only obtained if participants engaged in self-reflection during standard exposure. These findings emphasize that social comparisons are truly ubiquitous processes that are engaged even for fleeting exposure to standard information. 相似文献
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本文介绍和分析了法兰克福学派内部在如何看待科技的生态功能问题上的两种迥然不同的观点,指出了它们各自论点中存在的误识和留给人们的启迪,论证了科技进步与合理解决环境污染,生态平衡等全球性问题之间密不可分的关系。 相似文献
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Florian Fessel Kai Epstude Neal J. Roese 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2009,110(1):56-64
Four experiments introduced a new conceptual and methodological approach to hindsight bias, traditionally defined as the tendency to exaggerate the a priori predictability of outcomes after they become known. By examining likelihood estimates rooted to specific time points during an unfolding event sequence (videos and short text stories), judged both in foresight and hindsight, we conceptualized hindsight bias as a contrast between two “inevitability curves,” which plotted likelihood against time. Taking timing into account, we defined three new indicators of accuracy: linear accuracy (how well hindsight judgments capture the linear trend of foresight judgments over time), rate accuracy (how well hindsight judgments reflect the slope of foresight judgments over time), and temporal accuracy (how well hindsight judgments specify the overall timing of the full envelope of foresight judgments). Results demonstrated that hindsight judgments showed linear and rate accuracy, but were biased only in terms of lack of temporal accuracy. The oft-used catchphrase “knew it all along effect” was found to be a misnomer, in that participants were well aware in hindsight that their earlier foresight judgments reflected uncertainty. The current research therefore points to one way in which retrospective judgments can be considered biased, yet simultaneously suggests that considerable accuracy exists when people render such judgments. 相似文献
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