基于语义错觉效应的句子加工探索

“语义错觉效应”是指读者在加工某些语义违例句子时,会暂时性地产生语义合理错觉,而只有通过继续加工或者再加工才能辨别出错误的现象,在脑电成分上表现为没有出现N400效应,却出现P600效应。“语义错觉效应”对传统的句子加工理论模型以及N400和P600的特异性功能意义提出了质疑。研究者在讨论此效应的基础上提出了多个句子加工模型,各模型对语义和句法加工的过程进行了探索,对语义和句法通道的关系做出了新的阐述,并对N400和P600的功能意义做出了新的解读。目前研究对N400功能的解释存在语义整合观和词汇激活观的分歧,而对P600功能的解释则从传统的句法功能转换到了更宽泛的加工过程。未来研究应关注词汇语义关系和跨语言差异,以期进一步揭示句子加工的认知及神经机制。     

Less negative=more positive? Social discrimination as avoidance or approach

A motivational approach to ingroup favoritism based on regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) is introduced. RFT suggests that individual self-regulation is either more concerned with approaching positive events (promotion focus) or with avoiding negative events (prevention focus). It is suggested that if an individual self-categorizes as a group member, resource allocations to one’s group will be based on these mechanisms of self-regulation. Thus, a promotion focus should engender ingroup favoritism during the distribution of positive resources but not during the distribution of negative resources, whereas a prevention focus should engender ingroup favoritism for negative but not for positive resources. The results of two studies support this prediction based on momentary and chronic regulatory focus. The self-regulation approach to ingroup favoritism provides an explanation for social discrimination in the distribution of positive and negative resources.     

The man who wasn't there: Subliminal social comparison standards influence self-evaluation

Life provides an endless stream of social comparison information. Because opportunities to compare with others are so abundant, social comparison theory traditionally assumes that people are selective in their comparison activities and primarily compare with deliberately selected standards. Recent research, however, demonstrates that social comparisons often occur spontaneously, even if no standard is explicitly provided or deliberately selected. We examined whether comparisons are so spontaneous that they are even engaged if people are fleetingly exposed to a potential standard—so fleetingly that they remain unaware of the standard. In three studies, participants were subliminally primed with moderate versus extreme, high versus low standards during self-evaluation. Results demonstrate that self-evaluations are influenced by subliminally presented standards. Specifically, self-evaluations are assimilated towards moderate standards and contrasted away from extreme standards. These self-evaluative consequences of subliminal standards, however, were only obtained if participants engaged in self-reflection during standard exposure. These findings emphasize that social comparisons are truly ubiquitous processes that are engaged even for fleeting exposure to standard information.     

技术文明社会的生态危机意识--评法兰克福学派的科技决定论

本文介绍和分析了法兰克福学派内部在如何看待科技的生态功能问题上的两种迥然不同的观点,指出了它们各自论点中存在的误识和留给人们的启迪,论证了科技进步与合理解决环境污染,生态平衡等全球性问题之间密不可分的关系。     

Hindsight bias redefined: It’s about time

Four experiments introduced a new conceptual and methodological approach to hindsight bias, traditionally defined as the tendency to exaggerate the a priori predictability of outcomes after they become known. By examining likelihood estimates rooted to specific time points during an unfolding event sequence (videos and short text stories), judged both in foresight and hindsight, we conceptualized hindsight bias as a contrast between two “inevitability curves,” which plotted likelihood against time. Taking timing into account, we defined three new indicators of accuracy: linear accuracy (how well hindsight judgments capture the linear trend of foresight judgments over time), rate accuracy (how well hindsight judgments reflect the slope of foresight judgments over time), and temporal accuracy (how well hindsight judgments specify the overall timing of the full envelope of foresight judgments). Results demonstrated that hindsight judgments showed linear and rate accuracy, but were biased only in terms of lack of temporal accuracy. The oft-used catchphrase “knew it all along effect” was found to be a misnomer, in that participants were well aware in hindsight that their earlier foresight judgments reflected uncertainty. The current research therefore points to one way in which retrospective judgments can be considered biased, yet simultaneously suggests that considerable accuracy exists when people render such judgments.