Ego depletion and its paradoxical effects on ethical decision making

Whereas previous research has shown that ego depletion can lead to an increase in unethical behavior, we suggest that this effect hinges on the social consensus of the unethical behavior. Drawing from theories on social consensus and dual-process decision-making, we hypothesize and confirm that ego depletion is associated with increased unethical behavior of comparatively low social consensus. We then find that, as hypothesized, ego depletion is associated with decreased unethical behavior of high social consensus (Studies 1 and 2). Results further suggest that, controlling for state self-control resources, depleted participants are less likely to engage in unethical behavior of high social consensus as a result of increased subjective fatigue (Study 3). Taken together, our findings challenge a widely-held assumption about the negative effects of ego depletion on ethical decision making.     

The role of moral knowledge in everyday immorality: What does it matter if I know what is right?

In contrast to other well-known cognitive models of moral decision-making, social cognitive theory posits that individuals can disengage from their own moral standards thereby allowing themselves to commit immoral acts. While previous research largely supports the general premise of moral disengagement, we suggest that direct tests of moral disengagement processes and the commensurate diminished role of moral knowledge are conspicuously absent. In five studies, we use multiple methods to capture both knowledge of the immorality of an act and theorized in situ processes of moral disengagement. Ultimately, we find no evidence of the proposed processes associated with moral disengagement. Furthermore, our data suggests that moral knowledge is a key driver of moral behavior in everyday situations and is not easily set aside. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for theory and practice.     

Youth belonging and cognitive engagement in organized activities: A large-scale field study

Numerous studies of organized activities have found that participation is associated with a range of positive outcomes; however, findings from recent randomized trials have been more mixed. Understanding youth's psychological experiences of program involvement – their cognitive and emotional reaction to and participation in activities – may be key to understanding the influence of organized activities. Hierarchical linear modeling was used to investigate correlates of youth belonging and cognitive engagement in a sample of 1160 youth in 123 program offerings in 66 sites. Results revealed that intensity (frequency) of exposure positively predicted belonging and cognitive engagement; however, duration was negatively associated with cognitive engagement. The staff practice of providing a welcoming atmosphere predicted belonging; whereas provision of active skill-building predicted cognitive engagement. These relations were found to vary across content type.     

Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 88

Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is determined entirely by its truth or falsity. The Swamping Problem says that Veritism is incompatible with two pre-theoretic beliefs about epistemic value: (I) a true justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a true unjustified belief; (II) a false justified belief is more (epistemically) valuable than a false unjustified belief. In this paper, I consider the Swamping Problem from the vantage-point of decision theory. I note that the central premise in the argument is what Stefánsson and Bradley call Chance Neutrality in Richard Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework. And I describe their argument that it should be rejected. Using this insight, I respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of the veritist.     

Aging of theory of mind: The influence of educational level and cognitive processing

Previous studies of theory of mind (ToM) in old age have provided mixed results. We predicted that educational level and cognitive processing are two factors influencing the pattern of the aging of ToM. To test this hypothesis, a younger group who received higher education (mean age 20.46 years), an older group with an education level equal to that of the young group (mean age 76.29 years), and an older group with less education (mean age 73.52 years) were recruited. ToM tasks included the following tests: the second‐order false‐belief task, the faux‐pas task, the eyes test, and tests of fundamental aspects of cognitive function that included two background tests (memory span and processing speed) and three subcomponents of executive function (inhibition, updating, and shifting). We found that the younger group and the older group with equally high education outperformed the older group with less education in false‐belief and faux‐pas tasks. However, there was no significant difference between the two former groups. The three groups of participants performed equivalently in the eyes test as well as in control tasks (false‐belief control question, faux‐pas control question, faux‐pas control story, and Eyes Test control task). The younger group outperformed the other two groups in the cognitive processing tasks. Mediation analyses showed that difficulties in inhibition, memory span, and processing speed mediated the age differences in false‐belief reasoning. Also, the variables of inhibition, updating, memory span, and processing speed mediated age‐related variance in faux‐pas. Discussion focused on the links between ToM aging, educational level, and cognitive processing.     

Group-based self-regulation: The effects of regulatory focus

We review a programme of research on responses to group-based feedback—specifically, on how the source, content, and context of feedback intersect to produce individual willingness to accept both criticism and praise and to change one’s actions accordingly. We first explore the conditions under which group-directed criticism is most effective in terms of stimulating willingness to amend group practices. This is followed by the investigation of the effectiveness of different types of group-based praise, and an analysis of the identity-verifying properties of positive feedback. Finally, we consider the effects of feedback delivered simultaneously at group and individual levels, and explore the reciprocal implications of feedback content for source categorisation. Throughout, we focus on the role of identity concerns and group image management in responses to feedback. We discuss how this approach fits with other areas of literature, including research on self-verification and strategic behaviour in intergroup contexts.     

On human needs and moral appraisals

For a large and important range of cases the connection between ‘X needs y’ and ‘X ought to have y’, though not an entailment, is still non‐contingent. Sentences in which ‘needs’ occurs have several uses) one of which is normative; when such sentences are used to make statements, the statements constitute a good reason for asserting that what is needed ought to be done. It must, however, be recognized that such a reason may not be a sufficient reason for the moral appraisal that what is needed ought to be done. It is not self‐contradictory to assert ‘He needs it but he ought not to have it’, though in moral contexts if it is stated that someone needs something or that something is needed we are entitled to infer that, everything else being equal, he should have it or that it should be done. But often there are countervailing considerations which defeat that initial presumption. I attempt to support these contentions by 1) describing several key uses of “need sentences” and 2) by elucidating the relations between the uses of such sentences and moral judgments.     

Mechanism of formation of aligned two-phase microstructure in a Fe-0.25wt%C alloy under high magnetic field gradients

The effect of a magnetic force on creating an aligned two-phase microstructure in a Fe-0.25wt%C alloy under magnetic field gradients has been investigated. Through the changes in the heating temperature, both dipolar interactions and magnetic forces work together during the austenite to ferrite transformation. The results showed that the aligned two-phase microstructure is not observed under the influence of the magnetic force alone. The ferrite grains are elongated due to dipole interactions at the early stages of their nucleation and growth and then the magnetic force turns the elongated ferrite grains, whose major axis is not parallel to the direction of magnetic force, to the direction of the field in the presence of magnetic field gradients.     

对急危重症患者家属签署知情同意书中不同意的病例回顾分析

分析在急危重症患者中签署知情不同意的原因,探讨对策.选择我院2010年6月1日～2011年12月30日在ICU抢救已出院归档的急危重症患者家属签署的600份知情同意书中52份不同意的病例进行分析总结.52份病例的知情同意书签字不同意,原因多方面.知情不同意是患者或家属的权力,如何保障更好行使此权利,同时保障其健康是医务人员努力的目标,也需要对出现的问题进一步探讨.     

Adult Age Differences in the Ability to Mentally Transform Object and Body Stimuli

ABSTRACT

Cognitive neuroscience literature suggests a strong dissociation between the ability to mentally transform object and body stimuli (Hegarty & Waller, 2004 Hegarty, M. and Waller, D. 2004. A dissociation between mental rotation and perspective-taking spatial abilities. Intelligence, 32(2): 175–191. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] ). However, little is known about how this ability changes with age. This dissociation was explored in 20 younger (19–24 years) and 20 older (65–87 years) adults. Mental rotation of object stimuli was demonstrated for both age groups, suggesting that the neuro-cognitive network involved with performing (object-based) mental transformations is relatively preserved in older age. Compared to young adults, older adults displayed the greatest decline in performance efficiency for the whole-body task. The authors propose that an age-related decline in the integrity of body-schema information may account for this change.