The evidential relevance of self-locating information

Philosophical interest in the role of self-locating information in the confirmation of hypotheses has intensified in virtue of the Sleeping Beauty problem. If the correct solution to that problem is 1/3, various attractive views on confirmation and probabilistic reasoning appear to be undermined; and some writers have used the problem as a basis for rejecting some of those views. My interest here is in two such views. One of them is the thesis that self-locating information cannot be evidentially relevant to a non-self-locating hypothesis. The other, a basic tenet of Bayesian confirmation theory, is the thesis that an ideally rational agent updates her credence in a non-self-locating hypothesis in response to new information only by conditionalization. I argue that we can disprove these two theses by way of cases that are much less puzzling than Sleeping Beauty. I present two such cases in this paper.     

兴趣对文章理解的作用

研究兴趣对文章理解的作用,其主要目的是：（１）提出一种新的兴趣理论;（２）研究兴趣对文章理解的作用效果;（３）探讨阅读过程中兴趣和背景知识之间的关系。二项实验研究基本证实下列假设：（１）兴趣对文章的理解具有显著的促进作用;（２）兴趣高的读者对所读内容表现出更强的推理能力;（３）兴趣高的读者在阅读中会表现出更高的元认知水平;（４）兴趣对文章理解的促进作用相对独立于背景知识的影响。     

丁亥年内地正一道授篆活动在江西龙虎山天师府隆重举行

为加强道风建设、完善教制建设和培养道教人才,中国道教协会决定于2007年12月举办内地正一道授篆活动.12月3日,在北京召开了授篆活动协调会议.会议宣布成立授篆活动领导小组,由中国道教协会会长任法融担任顾问,中国道教协会副会长张继禹担任组长,中国道教协会副会长张金涛、秘书长袁炳栋担任副组长.12月21日至24日,授篆活动在江西龙虎山天师府隆重举行.来自全国22个省、自治区、直辖市的263名箓生参加了授箓活动.     

The "sense of agency" and its underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms

The sense of agency is a central aspect of human self-consciousness and refers to the experience of oneself as the agent of one’s own actions. Several different cognitive theories on the sense of agency have been proposed implying divergent empirical approaches and results, especially with respect to neural correlates. A multifactorial and multilevel model of the sense of agency may provide the most constructive framework for integrating divergent theories and findings, meeting the complex nature of this intriguing phenomenon.     

The functional theory of counterfactual thinking.

Counterfactuals are thoughts about alternatives to past events, that is, thoughts of what might have been. This article provides an updated account of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, suggesting that such thoughts are best explained in terms of their role in behavior regulation and performance improvement. The article reviews a wide range of cognitive experiments indicating that counterfactual thoughts may influence behavior by either of two routes: a content-specific pathway (which involves specific informational effects on behavioral intentions, which then influence behavior) and a content-neutral pathway (which involves indirect effects via affect, mind-sets, or motivation). The functional theory is particularly useful in organizing recent findings regarding counterfactual thinking and mental health. The article concludes by considering the connections to other theoretical conceptions, especially recent advances in goal cognition.     

Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered

The sense of agency ("I did that") is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects (the "I" of "I did that") or on its motoric aspects (the "did" aspect of "I did that"). Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002a). Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance (Vol. XIX, pp. 266-285). Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects, but did directly not study the relation between them. In three experiments, time estimates of an interval between an action and its subsequent sensory effect were obtained. The actions were either voluntary key press actions performed by the participant or kinematically identical movements applied passively to the finger. The effects were either auditory or visual events or a passive movement induced to another finger. The results first indicated a shortening of the interval between one's own voluntary action and a subsequent effect, relative to passive movement conditions. Second, intervals initiated by observed movements, either of another person or of an inanimate object, were always perceived like those involving passive movements of one's own body, and never like those involving active movements. Third, this binding effect was comparable for auditory, somatic and visual effects of action. Our results provide the first direct evidence that agency involves a generalisable relation between actions and their consequences, and is triggered by efferent motor commands.     

Spirituality and Subjective Religiosity among African Americans, Caribbean Blacks and Non-Hispanic Whites

Patterns and correlates of self-perceptions of spirituality and subjective religiosity are examined using data from the National Survey of American Life, a nationally representative study of African Americans, Caribbean Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites. Demographic and denominational correlates of patterns of subjective religiosity and spirituality (i.e., religious only, spiritual only, both religious/spiritual and neither religious/spiritual) are examined. In addition, the study of African Americans and Caribbean Blacks permits the investigation of possible ethnic variation in the meaning and conceptual significance of these constructs within the U.S. Black population. African Americans and Caribbean Blacks are more likely than Non-Hispanic Whites to indicate that they are "both religious and spiritual" and less likely to indicate that they are "spiritual only" or "neither spiritual nor religious." Demographic and denominational differences in the patterns of spirituality and subjective religiosity are also indicated. Study findings are discussed in relation to prior research in this field and noted conceptual and methodological issues deserving further study.     

Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self—and other selves

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one’s own and to other’s intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions.