MORAL REFORM,MORAL DISAGREEMENT,AND ABORTION

Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.     

In Search of True Causes:

The present investigation sought to obtain empirical data that either directly supports or refutes the popular assumption that communication is an essential element of effective decision making. Specifically, it reports three phases of study that attempt to determine whether the variance in group decision making is best accounted for by noninteraction or interaction sources. Phase 1 examines the relationship among group member ability, communication opportunity, and decision performance. Phase 2 examines the relationship among group member ability, qualities of group communication, and decision performance. Phase 3 examines the relationship among fulfillment of communication functions requisite to decision-making efficacy, group member ability, and decision performance. In Phase 1, a strong independent main effect for communication opportunity was found; whereas in Phase 2 we discovered classification and explanatory effects for three facets of interaction quality—“evaluation of task-relevant issues,”“goal-directed communication,” and “idea development”—and in Phase 3 no classification or explanatory effects for either of the communication functions examined was found. Open channels of communication and high quality task-oriented discussion that focused on issue evaluation and task accomplishment facilitated group performance in light of the effects of group potential.     

Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment

A traditional association of judgment with “reason” has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments.     

Frustration in organizations: Relationships to role stress,climate, and psychological strain

A measure of environmental frustration was constructed and administered to 401 young graduate engineers working in industry. Self-reported frustration was associated with the dependent variables of anger reactions, latent hostility, job dissatisfaction and, to a lesser extent, work-related anxiety. Evidence from multiple regression analysis indicated that organizational climate, role stress, and social support all contributed to the level of environmental frustration. These variables were also associated with the dependent variables, but frustration was still associated with anger reactions and latent hostility when their effects were controlled for statistically. The strongest predictors of dissatisfaction were organizational climate and qualitative underload.