On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task

This investigation examines the extent to which intelligent young adults seek (i) confirming evidence alone (enumerative induction) or (ii) confirming and discontinuing evidence (eliminative induction), in order to draw conclusions in a simple conceptual task. The experiment is designed so that use of confirming evidence alone will almost certainly lead to erroneous conclusions because (i) the correct concept is entailed by many more obvious ones, and (ii) the universe of possible instances (numbers) is infinite.

Six out of 29 subjects reached the correct conclusion without previous incorrect ones, 13 reached one incorrect conclusion, nine reached two or more incorrect conclusions, and one reached no conclusion. The results showed that those subjects, who reached two or more incorrect conclusions, were unable, or unwilling to test their hypotheses. The implications are discussed in relation to scientific thinking.     

The processing of positive and negative information

An affirmative statement which is known to be false and the complementary negative statement which is known to be true, provide the same information, i.e. that something is not the case. Similarly, an affirmative statement which is known to be true and the complementary negative statement which is known to be false, both imply that something is the case. (If P is false, not-P is true and if P is true, not-P is false.) Hence there are four kinds of statement (“conditions”): true affirmatives, false affirmatives, true negativee and false negatives, but only two kinds of information: positive and negative.

This experiment investigates the times taken to process information presented in these ways. The task was to select two alternative words which would make affirmative or negative conjunctive statements agree or conflict with given situations. The four conditions were presented six times in different serial orders, so that each occurred once in every block of four trials. The mean response times were: true affirmatives 8-99 sec, false affirmatives 11 19 sec., true negatives 12-58 sec, false negatives 15-17 sec. This order was the same at each of the six presentations of the conditions, the differences being significant at the 0 001 level in each case. There was a pronounced decline in errors (without knowledge of results) for three of the conditions. These results are discussed in relation to (i) the assumption of a positive set, established through a long learning process; (ii) the inferential nature of negative information in relation to experience; and (iii) the possible emotional effects of negative terms.     

Reasoning in the hooded rat

A problem situation was devised to test Deutsch's (1956) theory of reasoning. In this situation various problems can be set the rat and these problems admit of various equally rational solutions. Predictions from the theory were made, not only that the animals would solve the problems, but also which particular solution they would adopt. These predictions are confirmed. The rats were trained to run to two goal-boxes, one near, the other more distant. The near one had two paths of equal length leading to it, the more distant goal only one. After training, the animals chose the near goal-box on the first trial of the day. On the test trials the near goal-box was left empty, or the chosen path blocked, or a mesh placed across the goal-box, with the food accessible via the other short path.     

SOCIETAL MEMBERSHIP,SCORE STATUS,AND GAME BEHAVIOR

Appartenance sociale, bilan relatif des gains acquis et comportement de jeu. Analyse phénoménologique. — Etude des preférénces, des raisons et du comportement reel de choix de sujets belges et américains dans une tâche qui laisse la possibilité de se comporter coopérativement ou compétitivement. La tâche utilisée est un jeu à somme non-nulle dont la matrice est structuréd de telle sorte que l'on puisse différencier deux objectifs parmi trois possibles : maximiser son propre gain (ou le gain conjoint des deux partenaires) ou bien maximiser la différence entre son propre gain et celui de l'autre. Les Auteurs ont comparé 15 dyades de sujets belges et 15 dyades de sujets américains, jouant en 100 essais. Les résultats montrent que le choix réel des sujets est trés semblable d'une culture à l'autre et que, dans chaque culture, il varie selon que les gains déjà acquis par un sujet sont supérieurs, inférieurs ou égaux à ceux du partenaire, au moment du choix. Enfin, on note que, bien qu'aucune différence marquée n'apparaisse dans le comportement réel, il y a des différences sensibles d'une culture à l'autre dans les raisons invoquées par les sujets pour justifier leurs préférences : ces différences sont encore plus apparentes si on tient également compte de l'état relatif des gains déjà acquis par un sujet par rapport à son partenaire. En général, les sujets belges ont tendance à justifier leur préférence pour la compétition par des raisons de compétition; les sujets américains, surtout quand ils ont l'avantage, par des raisons relatives à leur gain personnel. Cette dernière réaction est “irrationnelle” dans la présente tâche puisque la préférence pour une attitude coopérative permet de maximiser son propre gain.