Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk.

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.     

On Making and Keeping Promises

Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise-keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary for either valid or justified promise-making. In the second place, promises need not meet such conditions in order to create moral obligations. In general, such analyses of promising fail because they suffer from a confusion between promise-making and promise-keeping. Philosophers have wrongly supposed that obligations to keep promises are dependent upon, or derivable from, the quality of the promises themselves, at the time they are made, instead of focusing on conditions that must be satisfied at the time when promises are supposed to be kept. It is not the quality of a promise that determines an obligation to keep it but the rightness or wrongness of performing the promised act.     

Evidence for clinical smoking cessation for adolescents.

OBJECTIVE: This report reviews the evidence that informs the role of health and mental health care providers in addressing youth smoking cessation. DESIGN: Qualitative literature review. RESULTS: Physicians do not consistently screen adolescents for tobacco use and fail to provide recommended cessation advice. Challenges to addressing smoking cessation include the need for procedures to ensure confidentiality and the existence of competing demands to provide other services. Few published studies have specifically addressed the effectiveness of clinical interventions. Interventions that require return visits or follow-up phone contacts are technically difficult to implement in this population. Successful interventions may require resources not available in nonresearch settings. Most studies have used brief clinical intervention as a control condition, making it impossible to evaluate its effectiveness. CONCLUSION: There is little evidence that supports current clinical smoking cessation guidelines for adolescents. More research is needed to develop inexpensive, efficient clinical interventions that can provide youths access to smoking cessation help. Future challenges include reorganizing clinical systems to offer greater counseling by support staff or in electronic formats and to provide effective booster messages and follow-up care in a population that is difficult to track.     

TWO STRAINS IN BUDDHIST CAUSALITY

This essay will focus on the Buddhist metaphysics of experience which is generally glossed over due to the excessive concern for the ultimate goal in Buddhism, nirvīna , and in consequence of which the emphasis has been on the practice of; meditative discipline in aspiration for that goal. Yet neither nirvana nor meditative discipline can be understood properly without examining the full dimension of our ordinary experience. Such an examination should reveal to us the unique ways in which the Buddhist refers to the bounded and unbounded conditions of existence. All this is novel insofar as metaphysics goes and indeed it would have to be a unique form of metaphysics in order to accommodate the dual aspect of existence. The key to this metaphysics lodges in the Buddhist concept of experiential process,¹ technically known as pratītyasamutpāda which is variously translated as relational origination, interrelational origination or dependent origination. It refers to the Buddhist concept of causality but, as we shall see, it is a unique concept with more than the usual Western connotation.