Comprehension of sentence structure in anomic and conduction aphasia

Picture-pointing auditory and reading comprehension tests were administered to anomic and conduction aphasics. Subjects responded to active sentences of the present progressive form. The possible errors which a subject could make on these experimental tasks included failure to correctly interpret noun order, number, or lexical meaning. Both groups made significantly more correct responses than error responses. Of their error responses, noun-order errors significantly exceeded number and lexical errors for which no differences were observed. When compared with results previously obtained for agrammatic Broca's aphasics, no differences in the pattern of errors were identified. These results are discussed relative to current theories of syntactic processing and for the mechanisms which account for these syntactic comprehension deficits following aphasia.     

A linguistic deficit resulting from right-hemisphere damage

The ability of right-brain-damaged (RBD) subjects to correctly insert a word into a well-formed stimulus sentence was tested. Subjects also performed three evaluative tasks designed to establish their degree of general cognitive impairment. The performance of RBD subjects on these tasks was compared to that of left-brain-damaged (LBD) and non-brain-damaged (NBD) subjects. Although RBD subjects outperformed LBD subjects on the language-related evaluative tasks, the RBD group was significantly more impaired on a subset of the insertion task. This subset included items which required reassignment of the syntactic status of elements in the stimulus sentence in order for the insertion to be carried out. The results of this study permit refinement of the common characterization of RBD individuals as rigid in their interpretation of meaning and indicate right-hemisphere involvement in aspects of the grammar previously thought to be inaccessible to it.     

The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.     

Powers, causation, and modality

A complex theory concerning powers, natures, and causal necessity has emerged from the writings of P. H. Hare, E. H. Madden, and R. Harré. In the course of rebutting objections that other critics have raised to the power account of causation, I correct three of its genuine difficulties: its attempt to analyze power attributions in terms of conditional statements; its characterization of the relation between something's powers and its nature; and its doctrines concerning conceptual necessity. The resulting interpretation of causal modalities is then subsumed under a more general power account of modality, related at a number of points to considerations concerning powers, and further illustrating their philosophical importance.     

Knowledge and beliefs regarding the consequences of cigarette smoking and their relationships to smoking status in a biracial sample

The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate carefully smoking-related knowledge and beliefs and their relationships to smoking status in a large, heterogeneous sample of smokers and nonsmokers in two settings: (a) a large, biracial southern city and (b) a small midwestern community. Participants were 611 (198 male, 413 female) adult respondents to a random-dialing telephone survey in Fargo, North Dakota (n = 200), and Memphis, Tennessee (n = 411). Each participant was given the Smoking Attitudes Survey, which assesses generalized health beliefs as well as health-related problems associated with smoking. Participants' knowledge of smoking-associated diseases (e.g., lung cancer) and of diseases not associated with smoking (e.g., kidney stones) was assessed. Stepwise regression analysis of composite knowledge scores revealed four independent predictors of the health consequences of smoking: education, race, smoking status, and income. Smokers, compared to nonsmokers, reported less knowledge related to the health consequences of smoking, were more likely to be male, were less concerned with the health consequences of smoking, and were more concerned about the health consequences of cholesterol. The best predictor of smokers who had never attempted cessation was their greater concern over weight control when compared to smokers with a history of smoking cessation attempts. The results are discussed in terms of smoking prevention and intervention efforts.     

Career Indecision: A Summary of the Research and Implications for Counselling

The vocationally-indecisive individual presents a major counselling problem. The theory and research behind career indecision is discussed and a counselling approach based on identity formation is outlined. Four identity statuses — Identity Achievements, Foreclosures, Identity Diffusions, and Moratoriums — are described and counselling approaches for each are explored.     

Estimation of indifference points with an adjusting-delay procedure.

In a series of conditions, pigeons chose between 1.5 s and 3 s of access to grain, each preceded by some delay. The delay that preceded the small reinforcer was constant throughout a condition. The delay that preceded the large reinforcer was increased or decreased a number of times each session in order to estimate an "indifference point," a delay at which the subject chose each alternative about equally often. The experiment was designed to determine whether variations in any of four features of this adjusting-delay procedure would systematically alter the estimated indifference points. The four features were the total trial duration, the number of center-key responses necessary to begin a trial, the number of choice trials that preceded each change in the adjusting delay, and step size--the size of each increment and decrement in the delay. Manipulation of the first three features had no systematic effects on the indifference points. As step size was increased from 0.5 s to 6 s, within-session variability of the adjusting delay steadily increased, and the 6-s step size produced larger indifference-point estimates for some subjects. The results suggest that, within certain limits, these procedural features can be altered without affecting the indifference-point estimates, but that the use of a large step size can distort the estimates. Some theoretical implications of the relative constancy of indifference points across these procedural variations are discussed.     

Self-control in mentally retarded adolescents: choice as a function of amount and delay of reinforcement.

Three severely mentally retarded adolescents were studied under discrete-trial procedures in which a choice was arranged between edible reinforcers that differed in magnitude and, in some conditions, delay. In the absence of delays the larger reinforcer was consistently chosen. Under conditions in which the smaller reinforcer was not delayed, increasing the delay to delivery of the larger reinforcer decreased the percentage of trials in which that reinforcer was chosen. All subjects directed the majority of choice responses to the smaller reinforcer when the larger reinforcer was sufficiently delayed, although the value at which this occurred differed across subjects. Under conditions in which the larger reinforcer initially was sufficiently delayed to result in preference for the smaller one, progressively increasing in 5-s increments the delay to both reinforcers increased percentage of trials with the larger reinforcer chosen. At sufficiently long delays, 2 of the subjects consistently chose the larger, but more delayed, reinforcer, and the 3rd subject chose that reinforcer on half of the trials. These results are consistent with the findings of prior studies in which adult humans responded to terminate noise and pigeons responded to produce food.     

Effects of reinforcement context on choice

Two experiments investigated the effects of successive reinforcement contexts on choice. In the first, concurrent variable-interval schedules of primary reinforcement operated during the initial links of concurrent chains. The rate of this reinforcement arranged by the concurrent schedules was decreased across conditions: When it was higher than the terminal-link rate, preference for the higher frequency initial-link schedule increased relative to baseline. (During baseline, a standard concurrent-schedule procedure was in effect). When the initial-link reinforcement rate was lower than the terminal-link rate, preference converged toward indifference. In the second experiment, a chain schedule was available on a third key while a concurrent schedule was in effect on the side keys. When the terminal link of the chain schedule was produced, the side keys became inoperative. Availability of the chain schedule did not affect choice between the concurrent schedules. These results show that only when successive reinforcement contexts are produced by choice responding do those successive contexts affect choice in concurrent schedules.     

Changes in functional response units with briefly delayed reinforcement

In two experiments, key-peck responding of pigeons was compared under variable-interval schedules that arranged immediate reinforcement and ones that arranged unsignaled delays of reinforcement. Responses during the nominal unsignaled delay periods had no effect on the reinforcer presentations. In Experiment 1, the unsignaled delays were studied using variable-interval schedules as baselines. Relative to the immediate reinforcement condition, 0.5-s unsignaled delays decreased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and increased the overall frequency of short (<0.5-s) interresponse times. Longer, 5.0-s unsignaled delays increased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and decreased the overall frequency of the short interresponse times. In Experiment 2, similar effects to those of Experiment 1 were obtained when the 0.5-s unsignaled delays were imposed upon a baseline schedule that explicitly arranged reinforcement of short interresponse times and therefore already generated a large number of short interresponse times. The results support earlier suggestions that the unsignaled 0.5-s delays change the functional response unit from a single key peck to a multiple key-peck unit. These findings are discussed in terms of the mechanisms by which contingencies control response structure in the absence of specific structural requirements.