Partial reinforcement effects in instrumental escape conditioning

In Experiment I acquisition and extinction of instrumental escape conditioning with rats (N = 64) were studied as a function of reinforcement magnitude under conditions of partial and continuous reinforcement. In Experiment II the effects of partial and continuous reinforcement were studied in rats (N = 96) during acquisition followed by small, medium, and large reductions in reinforcement magnitude. A water-tank escape apparatus was used with temperature as the relevant variable. It was found that (1) with large reinforcement magnitude a continuously reinforced group was superior in acquisition to one that was partially reinforced; there were no differences with small reinforcement; (2) disruptive effects of a nonreinforced trial (a) appear early in learning, (b) are quite strong after each nonreinforced trial, and (c) persist through several succeeding reinforced trials; (3) major competing behaviors persist throughout acquisition for small reinforcement magnitude regardless of schedule, decline with large reinforcement (more so with continuous than with partial), and return to a high level in extinction for all conditions; (4) the partial reinforcement extinction effect occurs after large reinforcement but not after small, and it appears only with large reductions in reinforcement magnitude which approach extinction conditions. Only the first part of the last finding appears to be consistent with the appetitive conditioning literature.     

Developing the Individual: Life Skills and Family Therapy

Two bodies of literature on life skills and on family therapy have developed from different sources but have interesting similarities. Life skills comes from training and educational thinking, and concentrates upon the skills of and strategies for coping. Family therapy focuses upon the disturbance of an individual as symbolic of the dynamics of the family, but has at its roots a more-or-less explicit model of what constitutes an effective family, where the interactions can be readily understood in life-skill terms. The two approaches are compared and contrasted.     

Is philosophy progressive?

Any adequate attempt to discuss progressivity in philosophy should provide some explanation of why philosophy persistently honours the old and the false and deals with original texts in a way in which science does not. An attempt is made to answer this question by appealing to: (1) the aporetic character of philosophy; (2) the semantical solipsism of philosophy; (3) the subjectivity of philosophy, and; (4) poetical continuities in philosophy.     

Ideals of rationality in dialogic

Needed for such dialogue games as dialectic are appropriate standards of fairness and rationality. The rules of procedure of dialectic must describe a game playable by actual human participants. The present paper centers on certain idealizations of the dialectician that are not allowable.     

The contemplation of suicide: Its relationship to irrational beliefs in a client sample and the implications for long range suicide prevention

This study investigated differences in irrational belief systems between clients in psychotherapy who reported they were contemplating suicide and those who reported they were not. The sample included over 95% of all persons aged 16 and over seen for psychotherapy over a six-year period (90 males and 117 females). Those contemplating suicide (N=85) were significantly more irrational on a number of basic dimensions. The general composite picture was that of an individual who sees him/herself as a helpless victim of past and present circumstances who must, nevertheless, perform well, be approved of, and never have anything go wrong; any kind of failure would be awful for it would prove one to be a worthless person. Findings are consistent with other cognitive-behavioral research on suicide. Other approaches to the explanation of suicide are reviewed and criticized, especially those that in Rational-Emotive Therapy terms have made an A-C error.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D., is a Professor of Psychology at Hollins College, an associate fellow and a certified supervisor of training of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York City, and is engaged in part-time private practice in Roanoke, VA.Geri E. Muller is a graduate student in the Master's program in psychology at Hollins College.     

Reductions in type a behavior,anxiety, anger,and physical illness as related to changes in irrational beliefs: Results of a demonstration project in industry

A series of stress management workshops was conducted in a Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) format for an entire department in a large corporation (N=49). The population was rather general, i.e., nonstudent, nonclinical, and nonvolunteer. Measures were obtained before the program began and three to four months following completion on the dependent variables of Type A behavior, anxiety, anger, depression, assertiveness, and physical illness symptoms, and on the cognitive independent variables of irrational beliefs. Major changes were obtained on all dependent measures supporting previous work on the usefulness of an RET approach in reducing various types of distress. Further, these changes were shown to be strongly related to changes in irrational beliefs and changing such irrational beliefs was the major focus of the program. It is concluded, therefore, that a fundamental assumption of Rational-Emotive Therapy and theory is given additional empirical support.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D., co-editor of this Journal, is an associate fellow and an RET training supervisor of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy     

Independence of stimulus discriminability from absolute rate of reinforcement in a signal-detection procedure.

Three experiments are reported in which two pigeons were trained to detect differences in stimulus duration under varying levels of absolute rate of reinforcement. Two red stimuli, differing in duration, were arranged probabilistically on the center key of a three-key chamber. On completion of the center-key duration, the center keylight was extinguished and the two side keys were illuminated white. Correct responses were left-key pecks following the shorter duration and right-key pecks following the longer duration. In Experiment 1, relative rate of reinforcement for correct responses was held constant and absolute rate of reinforcement was varied in seven conditions from continuous reinforcement to a variable-interval 90-second schedule. In Experiment 2, relative rate of reinforcement was manipulated across three different absolute rates of reinforcement (continuous reinforcement, variable-interval 15-second, and variable-interval 45-second). Stimulus discriminability was unaffected by changes in absolute or relative rates of reinforcement. Experiment 3 showed that discriminability was also unaffected by arranging the same consequences (three-second blackout) for unreinforced correct responses and errors.