Mean Streets and Mental Health: Depression and Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder at Crime Hot Spots

This study explores the relationship between mental health and place at microgeographic units of analysis. We examine self‐reported symptomology for depression and PTSD for 2,724 survey respondents interviewed in three types of randomly selected street segments: violent crime hot spots, cool spots, and cold spots. We find that the mean symptomology score is 61% higher for depression in violent crime hot spots than cold spots, and 85% higher for PTSD. Overall, we estimate that 14.8% of residents of violent crime hot spots meet thresholds for moderate depression or a diagnosis of PTSD. This can be compared to only 6.5% of residents at the cold spots. Using PSM and weighted negative binomial regression approaches we show that observable selection factors are not responsible for the relationships identified. Examining geographic influences, we find an important area effect of violent crime for both mental health measures, and an additional impact of the specific street of residence for PTSD.     

I,Me, You & Us: can a psychodynamic model provide a relational perspective on psychosis?

The concept of psychosis existed long before the current diagnostic definitions we have today. However, current opinion and treatment of psychosis is often dominated by a narrow psychiatric discourse. As a result of this conceptualisation, a diagnosis of psychosis can often feel limiting and disempowering for the individual, especially if he or she holds an alternative perspective. A psychodynamic model may therefore provide a method to examine psychosis from a relational perspective; this may, in turn, broaden one’s understanding and experience of a psychotic episode. In this article, two case examples from different cultural perspectives are used to highlight and explore the potential benefit of psychodynamic theory in the formulation and treatment of psychosis. A psychodynamic model using object relations theory is used for the exploration of both internal and external relational experiences. Both psychodynamic and psychiatric rationales are thus challenged to reflect on the impact of rigid perspectives and how they may limit treatment efficacy. Current research and literature around the use of psychodynamic theory in the treatment of psychosis is reviewed in light of this perspective.     

Mind the gap: evolutionary psychological perspectives on human thriving

The amount of psychological literature focusing on human thriving and flourishing has grown in recent years, but this topic is currently subject to much conceptual ambiguity. Evolutionary psychology, though often not included in discussions on optimal human development, provides a framework that benefits considerations of human thriving. Humans exhibit a high degree of niche construction by which they alter their environment, in turn affecting their offspring. Such niche construction is enabled by unique human capacities, but these same capacities are then required to ‘mind the gap’ between human nature and the altered environmental niche. As such, thriving may in part be understood as the ability of the individual to navigate difficulties resulting from a mismatch between their nature and niche. Three unique features of the human species that are used to both create and navigate this gap are considered as they relate to the existing literature on human thriving.     

The many-property problem is your problem,too

Philosophical Studies - The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted...     

3-D bone models to improve treatment initiation among patients with osteoporosis: A randomised controlled pilot trial

Objective: To investigate the efficacy of 3-D printed bone models as a tool to facilitate initiation of bisphosphonate treatment among individuals who were newly diagnosed with osteoporosis.

Design: Fifty eight participants with estimated fracture risk above that at which guidelines recommend pharmacological intervention were randomised to receive either a standard physician interview or an interview augmented by the presentation of 3-D bone models.

Main outcome measures: Participants’ beliefs about osteoporosis and bisphosphonate treatment, initiation of bisphosphonate therapy assessed at two months using self-report and pharmacy dispensing data.

Results: Individuals in the 3-D bone model intervention condition were more emotionally affected by osteoporosis immediately after the interview (p = .04) and reported a greater understanding of osteoporosis at follow-up (p = .04), than the control group. While a greater proportion of the intervention group initiated an oral bisphosphonate regimen (alendronate) (52%) in comparison with the control group (21%), the overall initiation of medication for osteoporosis, including infusion (zoledronate), did not differ significantly (intervention group 62%, control group 45%, p = .19).

Conclusion: The presentation of 3-D bone models during a medical consultation can modify cognitive and emotional representations relevant to treatment initiation among people with osteoporosis and might facilitate commencement of bisphosphonate treatment.     

Affect,Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation

Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.     

The crutch of context-dependency: Effects of contextual support and constancy on acquisition and retention

Paired associates (Tagalog–English word pairs) were studied and practiced with pairs superimposed over pictorial contexts, and tested with no context cues. On every retrieval practice (RP) incidental or conceptually supportive contexts were repeatedly shown with the same pair (constant context condition), or else new contexts were shown on every RP trial (varied context condition). Incidental contexts in the constant condition and supportive contexts in both constant and varied context conditions facilitated practice scores, but left learning susceptible to forgetting when context cues were not provided. In contrast, varying incidental contexts during practice resulted in slower acquisition, but greater retention in the absence of context cues. The results show that varying incidental contexts during practice can be a desirable difficulty.     

Tiger salamanders’ (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Ambystoma tigrinum</Emphasis>) response learning and usage of visual cues

We explored tiger salamanders’ (Ambystoma tigrinum) learning to execute a response within a maze as proximal visual cue conditions varied. In Experiment 1, salamanders learned to turn consistently in a T-maze for reinforcement before the maze was rotated. All learned the initial task and executed the trained turn during test, suggesting that they learned to demonstrate the reinforced response during training and continued to perform it during test. In a second experiment utilizing a similar procedure, two visual cues were placed consistently at the maze junction. Salamanders were reinforced for turning towards one cue. Cue placement was reversed during test. All learned the initial task, but executed the trained turn rather than turning towards the visual cue during test, evidencing response learning. In Experiment 3, we investigated whether a compound visual cue could control salamanders’ behaviour when it was the only cue predictive of reinforcement in a cross-maze by varying start position and cue placement. All learned to turn in the direction indicated by the compound visual cue, indicating that visual cues can come to control their behaviour. Following training, testing revealed that salamanders attended to stimuli foreground over background features. Overall, these results suggest that salamanders learn to execute responses over learning to use visual cues but can use visual cues if required. Our success with this paradigm offers the potential in future studies to explore salamanders’ cognition further, as well as to shed light on how features of the tiger salamanders’ life history (e.g. hibernation and metamorphosis) impact cognition.