In this together: Psychological wellbeing of foreign workers in the United Arab Emirates during the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated infection prevention and control measures (e.g. quarantine, lockdown and isolation), have had an adverse impact on mental health. To date, the mental health status and challenges of foreign workers during the pandemic have been neglected in the literature. This cross-sectional web-based survey assessed levels of post-traumatic stress, depression, anxiety and insomnia among an international sample of foreign workers (n = 319) resident in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The majority of participants were female (76%), European (69%) and highly educated (83% had a bachelor's or higher degree). Results indicate high rates of post-traumatic stress, depression, anxiety, and insomnia, especially among women, younger individuals, and those with a previous diagnosis of a psychological disorder. Additionally, foreign workers' perceptions of pandemic severity in their home nations (mild, moderate, severe) were positively correlated with their symptom levels of depression, anxiety and insomnia. Overall, these findings may help inform future public mental health strategy and pandemic preparedness plans with reference to safeguarding the psychological wellbeing of foreign workers.     

Convention,correlation and consistency

Philosophical Studies - Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice provides a defense of the egalitarian bargaining solution. Vanderschraaf’s discussion of the egalitarian solution invokes...     

The possibility of resurrection by reassembly

It is widely held that the classic reassembly model of resurrection faces intractable problems. (1) What happens to someone if God assembles two individuals at the resurrection which are equally good candidates for being the original person? (2) If two or more people, such as a cannibal and the cannibal’s victim, were composed of the same particles at their respective deaths, can they both be resurrected? If they can, who gets the shared particles? (3) And would an attempt to reassemble a long-gone individual result in a genuine resurrection, or merely an intrinsic duplicate of the original person? In this paper, I argue that the first of these problems has, in effect, been solved by defenders of a rival view; I propose a novel solution to the second problem; and I show that the third can be solved by upgrading the naïve reassembly model to a novel variety of reassembly model.     

Use of the familiarity difference cue in inferential judgments

The familiarity difference cue has been regarded as a general cue for making inferential judgments (Honda, Abe, Matsuks, & Yamagishi in Memory and Cognition, 39(5), 851–863, 2011; Schwikert & Curran in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(6), 2341–2365, 2014). The current study tests a model of inference based on familiarity differences that encompasses the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, Goldstein & Gigerenzer in Psychological Review, 109(1), 75–90, 2002). In two studies, using a large pool of stimuli, participants rated their familiarity of cities and made choices on a typical city-size task. The data were fitted with the r-s model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl in, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 37(4), 827–839, 2011), which was adapted to include familiarity differences. The results indicated that people used the familiarity difference cue because the participants ignored further knowledge in a substantial number of cases when the familiarity difference cue was available. An analysis of reaction-time data further indicated that the response times were shorter for heuristic judgments than for knowledge-only-based judgments. Furthermore, when knowledge was available, the response times were shorter when knowledge was congruent with a heuristic cue than when it was in conflict with it. Differences between the familiarity difference cue and the fluency heuristic (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005, Psychological Review, 112, 610–628) are discussed.     

Technical filmmaking and scientific narratives: Has science overtaken fiction in recent science fiction? An analysis of Gravity,Interstellar, and The Martian

One can view the recent science fiction films Gravity, Interstellar, and The Martian as a three-part dialogue concerning the existential relationship between humanity, technology, and the science employed to create said technologies. Pitched into the deep of space, each film’s protagonist must seek to find technological answers to save their own existence. Each film’s exploration of these themes essentially questions the importance of technology as a product of scientific-calculative thinking and the validity of this thinking as the primary mode of understanding the world. In this article, I explore the existential dialogue crafted between these films through Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger. Through Benjamin, we will see how the medium of film is completely dependent upon technology to present its art and how this transforms the stories it tells, while also transforming the audience and the audience’s reality. Consequently, understanding the popular reception of these films becomes just as important as the films themselves for our present study. Through Heidegger, we will see how technology provides a space where we can find a truth about ourselves and our reality. However, modern technology’s increasing scientific complexity, created by scientists who in turn employ modern technology to further science, also conceals just as much as it reveals. These films provide us with an opportunity to explore a truth about our dependence upon technology even though, as technologically dependent works of art, they may also conceal how dependent upon science we have become when constructing our reality.     

Target—distractor interference in the attentional blink implicates the locus coeruleus—norepinephrine system

We provide evidence that the locus coeruleus—norephinephrine (LC-NE) system is the neurophysiological basis of the attentional blink. The attentional blink refers to decreased accuracy for reporting the second of two targets in a rapid serial visual presentation of distractors. The LC-NE account of the attentional blink posits that targets elicit a facilitative LC-NE system response that is available for the first target but subsequently unavailable to the second, due to the autoinhibitory nature of the LC-NE system. We propose a modification of the LC-NE account, suggesting that the LC-NE system response is elicited by interference between mutually exclusive responses demanded by temporally proximal targets and distractors. We increased the interference between the first target and the following distractor by reducing the time between them. For identifying the second target this high-interference condition yielded a benefit up to 200 msec after onset of the first, followed by a decrease in accuracy. Consistent with our modification of the LC-NE account, this result suggests a temporarily enhanced LC-NE system response to increased target—distractor interference.     

Strawson’s modest transcendental argument

Although Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ was published over fifty years ago and has been widely discussed, its main argument is still notoriously difficult to pin down. The most common – but in my view, mistaken – interpretation of Strawson’s argument takes him to be providing a ‘relentlessly’ naturalistic framework for our responsibility practices. To rectify this mistake, I offer an alternative interpretation of Strawson’s argument. As I see it, rather than offering a relentlessly naturalistic framework for moral responsibility, Strawson actually develops a transcendental argument, which grounds our moral responsibility practices in the practical perspective of social agents. However, the aims of this essay are not purely interpretative. Strawson’s essay continues to have important implications for a number of issues that arise in the contemporary debates that concern free will and moral responsibility. In particular, it puts significant pressure on moral responsibility sceptics like Derk Pereboom [Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] who think that the truth of moral responsibility scepticism has no worrisome implications for our lives with others.