MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTION

One of the primary motivations behind moral anti‐realism is a deep‐rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non‐secondary, natural properties; or non‐natural properties. 1     

Why some women can feel more,and others less,attractive after exposure to attractive targets: The role of social comparison orientation

As the tendency to compare oneself with others may be associated with the tendency to focus on similarities, we hypothesized that individual differences in social comparison orientation (SCO) may moderate the consequences of upward and downward comparisons. In Study 1, high comparers were found to focus more on similarities than low comparers, suggesting that high comparers are more likely to assimilate in general. In Study 2, SCO was found to be positively associated with mood following exposure to an attractive target, and negatively associated with mood following exposure to a less attractive target. In Studies 2 and 3, SCO was found to be positively associated with self‐evaluations of attractiveness following exposure to an attractive target and negatively associated with self‐evaluations of attractiveness following exposure to a less attractive target. These results indicate that research on the consequences of social comparison must attend to individual differences in SCO. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A One-to-One Bias and Fast Mapping Support Preschoolers' Learning About Faces and Voices

A multimodal person representation contains information about what a person looks like and what a person sounds like. However, little is known about how children form these face-voice mappings. Here, we explored the possibility that two cognitive tools that guide word learning, a one-to-one mapping bias and fast mapping, also guide children's learning about faces and voices. We taught 4- and 5-year-olds mappings between three individual faces and voices, then presented them with new faces and voices. In Experiment 1, we found that children rapidly learned face-voice mappings from just a few exposures, and furthermore spontaneously mapped novel faces to novel voices using a one-to-one mapping bias (that each face can produce only one voice). In Experiment 2, we found that children's face-voice representations are abstract, generalizing to novel tokens of a person. In Experiment 3, we found that children retained in memory the face-voice mappings that they had generated via inference (i.e., they showed evidence of fast mapping), and used these newly formed representations to generate further mappings between new faces and voices. These findings suggest that preschoolers' rapid learning about faces and voices may be aided by biases that are similar to those that support word learning.     

The fallacy of intimacy: sexual risk behaviour and beliefs about trust and condom use among men who have sex with men in South Africa

The objective of this study is to assess (1) whether beliefs about trust and condom use affect sexual risk behaviour, and (2) if beliefs about trust and condom use impact sexual risk behaviour directly or if this relationship is mediated by other determinants. The Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills model was used as a framework for the mediation analysis. A diverse cohort of three hundred 18-40 year old men who have sex with men (MSM) residing in Pretoria, South Africa, were recruited and surveyed for this project. Findings indicate that men who report a high frequency of past unprotected anal intercourse are more likely to believe that it is not necessary to use condoms with a trusted or steady partner regardless of their current partnership status. This fallacy of intimacy appears to affect sexual risk behaviour through intentions and attitudes regarding safer sex practices. Based on these findings, we recommend that more attention be given in gaining a better understanding of how beliefs about trust and condom use are formed and how they can be changed among MSM in South Africa.     

Cognition at risk: Gestalt/feature-intensive processing and cigarette smoking in college students

Although previous research has shown the importance of feature-intensive processing of relevant information in the staving off of addictive behaviors, the present study examined the possibility that a more global, gestalt rejection of cigarette smoking may be operating to reduce smoking behavior. The present study addressed this possibility through the use of a decision efficacy rating procedure, in which smoking and nonsmoking respondents were asked to determine whether an individual was justified in smoking in a variety of given situations. Nonsmokers tended to reject smoking under any circumstances, whereas smokers tended to entertain mitigating circumstances more favorably in justifying smoking, especially when smoking could be construed as providing some perceived positive gains in serious situations. Results are discussed in terms of the gestalt/feature-intensive processing theory of cognition, and in terms of the importance of cognitive approaches to the understanding of addictive behaviors.     

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

High-Stakes Testing Case Study: A Latent Variable Approach for Assessing Measurement and Prediction Invariance

Psychometrika - The existence of differences in prediction systems involving test scores across demographic groups continues to be a thorny and unresolved scientific, professional, and societal...     

The science of religious beliefs

Why have humans, throughout history and across cultures, shown a strong tendency to believe in the existence of superhuman intentional agents and attached this belief to notions of morality, misfortune, and the creation of the world? The answer emerging from the cognitive science of religion appears to be that explicit beliefs are informed and constrained by the natural and cross-culturally recurrent operation of implicit cognitive systems. Successful god concepts resonate with the expectations of these implicit systems but also have attention-demanding and inferentially-rich properties that allow their integration into various areas of human concern. Theological concepts may deviate from these natural cognitive moorings but require special cultural scaffolding, such as Whitehouse's two Modes of Religiosity, to do so and constitute additions to, rather than replacements of the religious beliefs supported by implicit cognitive systems.