Expectancy bias mediates the link between social anxiety and memory bias for social evaluation

Social anxiety (SA) involves a multitude of cognitive symptoms related to fear of evaluation, including expectancy and memory biases. We examined whether memory biases are influenced by expectancy biases for social feedback in SA. We hypothesised that, faced with a socially evaluative event, people with higher SA would show a negative expectancy bias for future feedback. Furthermore, we predicted that memory bias for feedback in SA would be mediated by expectancy bias. Ninety-four undergraduate students (55 women, mean age = 19.76 years) underwent a two-visit task that measured expectations about (Visit 1) and memory of (Visit 2) feedback from unknown peers. Results showed that higher levels of SA were associated with negative expectancy bias. An indirect relationship was found between SA and memory bias that was mediated by expectancy bias. The results suggest that expectancy biases are in the causal path from SA to negative memory biases for social evaluation.     

On the genesis of inflated (and deflated) judgments of responsibility

Prior research has found that people tend to overestimate their relative contribution to joint tasks [e.g., Ross, M., & Sicoly, F. (1979). Egocentric biases in availability and attribution. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,37, 322–336]. The present research investigates one source of this bias, and in doing so, identifies an important moderator of the effect. Three studies demonstrate that when people estimate their relative contribution to collective endeavors they focus on their own contribution and give less consideration to the contribution of their collaborators. This can cause overestimation for tasks in which total contributions are plentiful, but underestimation for tasks in which total contributions are few—despite the fact that both tasks reflect positively on the person who performs them. These results extend Ross and Sicoly’s (1979) original analysis of bias in responsibility judgments, but also suggest that the tendency to overestimate one’s relative contribution to collaborations is not as ubiquitous as once thought.     

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

Infants chunk object arrays into sets of individuals

Research suggests that, using representations from object-based attention, infants can represent only 3 individuals at a time. For example, infants successfully represent 1, 2, or 3 hidden objects, but fail with 4 (Developmental Science 6 (2003) 568), and a similar limit is seen in adults' tracking of multiple objects (see Cognitive Psychology 38 (1999) 259). In the present experiments we used a manual search procedure to ask whether infants can overcome this limit of 3 by chunking individuals into sets. Experiments 1 and 2 replicate infants' failure to represent a total of 4 objects. We then show that infants can exceed this limit when items are spatiotemporally grouped into two sets of 2 prior to hiding, leading infants to successfully represent a total of 4 objects. Experiment 3 demonstrates that infants tracked the 4 objects as two sets of 2, searching for each set in its correct hiding location. That infants represented the number of individuals in each set is demonstrated by their reaching for the correct number of objects in each location. These results suggest that by binding individuals into sets, infants can increase their representational capacity. This is the first evidence for chunking abilities in infants.     

Counterfactual thinking and the first instinct fallacy

Most people believe that they should avoid changing their answer when taking multiple-choice tests. Virtually all research on this topic, however, has suggested that this strategy is ill-founded: Most answer changes are from incorrect to correct, and people who change their answers usually improve their test scores. Why do people believe in this strategy if the data so strongly refute it? The authors argue that the belief is in part a product of counterfactual thinking. Changing an answer when one should have stuck with one's original answer leads to more "if only . . ." self-recriminations than does sticking with one's first instinct when one should have switched. As a consequence, instances of the former are more memorable than instances of the latter. This differential availability provides individuals with compelling (albeit illusory) personal evidence for the wisdom of always following their 1st instinct, with suboptimal test scores the result.     

Principles of forensic mental health assessment: implications for neuropsychological assessment in forensic contexts

Forensic mental health assessment (FMHA) is a form of evaluation performed by a mental health professional to provide relevant clinical and scientific data to a legal decision maker or the litigants involved in civil or criminal proceedings. Such FMHA evaluations can be further specialized when the clinical and scientific data are primarily neuropsychological. This paper provides an adaptation of 29 recently derived principles of FMHA (Heilbrun, 2001) that have been described in two forms: general guidelines for application in FMHA, and guidelines for application to neuropsychological assessment in forensic contexts. Each principle is described, and the general guideline is compared with the highly specialized neuropsychological guideline. In this way, the applicability of such FMHA principles to forensic neuropsychological assessment is described.     

The effects of mutual concern on joint welfare

Previous studies attempting to assess the impact of concern for an opponent bargainer's welfare (orientation) upon the integrativeness of the agreements reached have produced differing conclusions. The design of an earlier experiment by Kelley and Schenitzki was replicated using a different negotiation method and task. Participants took the role of either the buyer or the seller in a two-party negotiation. Bargainers received instructions emphasizing either a Team Orientation (i.e., concern for mutual profit) or an Individualistic Orientation (i.e., concern for only one's own profit) and bargained under either a Free Communication or a Restricted Communication condition. The Team Orientation produced more integrative agreements (i.e., higher joint outcomes) than the Individualistic Orientation, regardless of the communication condition. Process data suggested that distinct processes may promote the development of integrative solutions in the two communication conditions.     

Escalating schedules of incentives increase physical activity with no differences between deposit and no-deposit groups: A systematic replication

Physical inactivity has increasingly affected public health in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic as it is associated with chronic diseases such as arthritis, cancer, and heart disease. Contingency management has been shown to increase physical activity. Therefore, the present study sought to evaluate the effects of an escalating schedule of monetary reinforcement with a reset contingency on physical activity, as compared between 2 counterbalanced groups in which a monetary deposit of $25 was either required (deposit group) or not (no-deposit group). Twenty-five adults wore Fitbit accelerometers to monitor step counts. An ABA reversal design was used; in the 2 baseline phases, no programmed contingencies were in place for step counts. During intervention, step goals were set using a modified 70^th percentile schedule with a 7-day window: Reaching the first goal would result in $0.25, and incentives increased by $0.25 for each subsequent day in which the goal was met. Failure to reach a goal resulted in a reset of the monetary incentive value to $0.25. Ten out of 12 participants from the deposit group were determined to be responders to intervention, whereas 8 out of 13 participants from the no-deposit group were determined to be responders to intervention. Overall, there were no significant differences between the groups' step counts. However, the deposit group's intervention was cheaper to implement, which suggests that deposit contracts are a viable modification for physical activity interventions.     

Criteria of identity without sortals

Many philosophers believe that the criteria of identity over time for ordinary objects entail that such objects are permanent members of certain sortal kinds. The sortal kinds in question have come to be known as substance sortal kinds. But in this article, I defend a criterion of identity that is suited to phasalism, the view that alleged substance sortals are in fact phase sortals. The criterion I defend is a sortal-weighted version of a change-minimizing criterion first discussed by Eli Hirsch. I present this criterion and then argue that it withstands attempts to show that it is inferior to non-phasalist rivals.