Cognition and belief in paranormal phenomena: gestalt/feature-intensive processing theory and tendencies toward ADHD, depression, and dissociation

Belief in paranormal phenomena and cryptids--unknown animals such as Bigfoot--may predispose individuals to interpret real-world objects and events in the same way that eyewitness identification can be biased by unrelated information (P. James and N. Thorpe, 1999). Psychological tendencies toward attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), dissociation, and depression, even at subclinical levels, may be associated systematically with particular paranormal or cryptozoological beliefs. The authors evaluated these psychological tendencies using the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales (C. K. Conners, D. Erhardt, and E. Sparrow, 1999), the Dissociative Experiences Scale (L. Coleman & J. Clark, 1999), and the Beck Depression Inventory-II (A. T. Beck, 1996). They performed regression analyses against beliefs in ghosts, unidentified flying objects (UFOs), extrasensory perception (ESP), astrology, and cryptids. ADHD, dissociation, and depression were associated with enhanced tendencies toward paranormal and cryptozoological beliefs, although participants who believed in each of the phenomena differed from one another in predictable and psychologically distinguishable ways. Cognitively biasing influences of preexisting psychological tendencies may predispose individuals to specific perceptual and cognitive errors during confrontation of real-world phenomena.     

Exemplar similarity, study list homogeneity, and short-term perceptual recognition

Kahana and Sekuler (2002) conducted short-term perceptual recognition experiments and modeled the data with a noisy exemplar similarity model. They found model-based evidence that list homogeneity (i.e., the degree to which exemplars on a study list are similar to one another) exerted a significant impact on recognition performance--a finding that is not predicted by standard global familiarity models. A potential limitation of their experiments is that they tested complex stimuli in which psychological similarities among exemplars may have been misspecified. Also, the relative importance of list homogeneity was not compared with that of alternative forms of parametric variation in the model. We conducted conceptual replications of their experiments, using a simpler set of stimuli in which interexemplar similarities could be more precisely measured. Extensive model-based comparisons reveal, in accord with the results of Kahana and Sekuler, strong evidence for a role of listhomogeneity on old-new recognition performance. We suggest that subjects systematically adjust their response criteria on the basis of the homogeneity of the study list items.     

Reinstatement of fear to an extinguished conditioned stimulus: two roles for context

The authors studied the role of context in reinstatement. Freezing was reinstated when the conditioned stimulus (CS) was extinguished in 1 context and rats moved to another context for reexposure to the shock unconditioned stimulus (US) and test. It was also reinstated (rather than renewed) when rats were shocked in the extinction context and moved to another context for test. This reinstatement was CS specific and reduced by nonreinforced exposures to the extinction context. Rats shocked in the context in which a stimulus had been preexposed froze when tested in another context. These findings suggest 2 roles for context in reinstatement: conditioning of the test context (M. E. Bouton, 1993) and mediated conditioning by the extinction context (P. C. Holland, 1990).     

An Examination of the Adlerian Construct of Social Interest With Criminal Offenders

The present study addressed the utility of the construct of social interest as related to the behaviors of criminal offenders. Social interest involves concern for others and optimism regarding one's view of the world. Offender scores on the Sulliman Scale of Social Interest (J. R. Sulliman, 1973) were examined along with demographic and criminal history predictors of parolee outcomes following release from a medium security correctional institution. The results indicated significant relationships between social interest scores and offender outcome as demonstrated by employment status, new felony arrests, and reincarceration status. The results have implications for those involved in predictive and rehabilitative efforts with criminal offenders.     

MRI-Assessed Volume of Cerebellum Correlates with Associative Learning

Richard F. Thompson's cerebellar model of classical eyeblink conditioning highlights Purkinje cells in cerebellar cortex and principal cells in the deep cerebellar nucleus as the integrating cells for acquisition of conditioned responses (CRs). CR acquisition is significantly slower in rabbits with lesions to cerebellar cortex and in Purkinje cell-deficient mice that lose all cerebellar cortical Purkinje cells. Purkinje cells are the largest neurons in the cerebellum and contribute significantly to cerebellar volume. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) was used to assess cerebellar volume in humans. Cerebellar volume was related to eyeblink conditioning (400-ms delay procedure) in 8 adults (21-35 years) and compared to 8 older adults (77-95 years) tested previously (Woodruff-Pak, Goldenberg, Downey-Lamb, Boyko, & Lemieux, 2000). In the young adult sample, there was a high correlation between percentage of CRs in a session and cerebellar volume (corrected for total intracranial volume [TIV], r =.58, p =.066). There were statistically significant age differences in cerebellar volume, t(14) = 8.96, p <.001, and percentage of CRs, t(14) = 3.85, p <.002, but no age difference in TIV. Combining the young and older adult sample, the correlation between percentage of CRs and cerebellar volume (corrected for TIV) was.832 (p <.001). Cerebellar volume showed age-related deficits likely due to Purkinje cell loss. Individual differences in classical eyeblink conditioning are associated with differences in cerebellar volume, supporting Thompson's model of a cerebellar cortical role in facilitating this form of associative learning.     

Process Reliabilism,Virtue Reliabilism,and the Value of Knowledge

The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problem for knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as the swamping objection. Virtue reliabilism (i.e., agent reliabilism), on the other hand, is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes the swamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist (in two different forms), I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge.     

Visual working memory for observed actions

Human society depends on the ability to remember the actions of other individuals, which is information that must be stored in a temporary buffer to guide behavior after actions have been observed. To date, however, the storage capacity, contents, and architecture of working memory for observed actions are unknown. In this article, the author shows that it is possible to retain information about only 2-3 actions in visual working memory at once. However, it is also possible to retain 9 properties distributed across 3 actions almost as well as 3 properties distributed across 3 actions, showing that working memory stores integrated action representations rather than individual properties. Finally, the author shows that working memory for observed actions is independent from working memory for object and spatial information. These results provide evidence for a previously undocumented system in working memory for storing information about actions. Further, this system operates by the same storage principles as visual working memory for object information. Thus, working memory consists of a series of distinct yet computationally similar mechanisms for retaining different types of visual information.     

From the interpersonal to the international: understanding commitment to the "war on terror"

Applying constructs from the investment model used traditionally to understand interpersonal commitment, the present investigation seeks to elucidate social cognitive antecedents of commitment to the war on terror waged by the United States. In Study 1, satisfaction with, investments in, and alternatives to the war on terror predict levels of commitment to the war beyond several important control variables. In Study 2, levels of satisfaction with, investments in, and alternatives to the war are experimentally manipulated. The highest levels of commitment to the war are observed among participants exposed to a high satisfaction, high investment, and low alternatives scenario, and the lowest levels are among those exposed to a low satisfaction, low investment, and high alternatives scenario. These results support broadening the targets of commitment normally considered within the context of the investment model and suggest applying relational models to understanding broader societal concerns.     

Colour, world and archimedean metaphysics: stroud and the quest for reality

This paper proposes a fundamentally opposite conception of the possibility of metaphysics to that of Barry Stroud in The Quest for Reality and other writings. I discuss Stroud’s views on everyday ‚truth’ and metaphysics (Section 1), on interpretation (Section 2 – replying with a theory of ‚quasi-understanding’), and his ‚no threat’ claim (Section 3). But the main argument (Section 4) is a response to Stroud’s claim that we have no right either to affirm or to deny the metaphysical reality of colours. Stroud’s view resembles Carnap’s (1950, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 20–40), that experience can in some sense never settle the metaphysical issue between e.g. materialism, idealism and phenomenalism; though we can allow everyday ‚knowledge’ e.g. that there is a fallen tree in the garden outside, as something available on all three views. (Carnap takes the undecidability as a sign that the metaphysical issue is a pseudo-question; Stroud insists it is factual, but places it beyond our ken, ‚external’.) I argue, instead, that metaphysical argument is possible from within our conceptual scheme and epistemic situation (as in Gareth Evans’s arguments for realism over phenomenalism); that ‚external’ and ‚internal’ questions cannot be separated as Stroud wishes; and that if we really were denied knowledge on ‚metaphysical’ matters, that would infect our right to claim knowledge of ‚observational’ matters too. And I sketch a theory of colour that would allow us to conclude (at once ‚metaphysically’ and ‚internally’) that things are indeed ‚really’ coloured. For all his expressions of sympathy for Wittgenstein, Stroud’s metaphysics is remarkably Cartesian.