Assessing the Incremental Algorithm: A Response to Krahmer et al.

This response discusses the experiment reported in Krahmer et al.’s Letter to the Editor of Cognitive Science. We observe that their results do not tell us whether the Incremental Algorithm is better or worse than its competitors, and we speculate about implications for reference in complex domains, and for learning from ‘‘normal” (i.e., non‐semantically‐balanced) corpora.     

Managing motivational conflict: How self-esteem and executive resources influence self-regulatory responses to risk

This article explores how self-esteem and executive resources interact to determine responses to motivational conflict. One correlational and 3 experimental studies investigated the hypothesis that high and low self-esteem people undertake different self-regulatory strategies in "risky" situations that afford opportunity to pursue competing goals and that carrying out these strategies requires executive resources. When such resources are available, high self-esteem people respond to risk by prioritizing and pursuing approach goals, whereas low self-esteem people prioritize avoidance goals. However, self-esteem does not influence responses to risk when executive resources are impaired. In these studies, risk was operationalized by exposing participants to a relationship threat (Studies 1 and 2), by using participants' self-reported marital conflict (Study 3), and by threatening academic competence (Study 4). Executive resources were operationalized as cognitive load (Studies 1 and 2), working memory capacity (Study 3), and resource depletion (Study 4). When executive resources were ample, high self-esteem people responded to interpersonal risk by making more positive relationship evaluations (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and making more risky social comparisons following a personal failure (Study 4) than did low self-esteem people. Self-esteem did not predict participants' responses when executive resources were impaired or when risk was absent. The regulatory function of self-esteem may be more resource-dependent than has been previously theorized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Perceptions of unconditional and conditional worth among college students

Self-esteem scales tend to represent conditional perceptions of self-esteem. The Worth Index has been previously validated as an effective measure for identifying both conditional and unconditional perceptions of worth. We administered the Worth Index to 1,161 college-aged students at Brigham Young University to assess their current perceptions of unconditional and conditional worth. Both men and women agreed more strongly with items involving unconditional worth than conditional worth. A negative correlation was found between ratings of unconditional and conditional worth. Women had lower unconditional worth scores than men, which was related to being more likely to wish they were someone else, desire to have a better body, and to being concerned about weight. Agreement with two overview measures of self-esteem involving a "good" sense of self and stability of self-esteem was positively associated with agreement on statements about unconditional worth. This research shows the importance of incorporating unconditional worth into self-esteem measures.     

An Expected Error: An Essay in Defence of Moral Emotionism

Axiomathes - This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional...     

Is There Cross-format Transfer in Implicit Invariance Learning?

Three experiments investigated cross-form transfer in the invariance learning paradigm introduced by McGeorge and Burton (1990). The results suggest that the transfer observed by McGeorge and Burton depended on subjects' ability to use a response strategy discovered by Wright and Burton (1995). When that strategy was denied to subjects (Experiments 1 and 2), no cross-form transfer was observed; when the strategy was made available (Experiment 3), cross-form transfer re-emerged. These results suggest that this form of learning, like many other forms of implicit learning and memory, is hyperspecific.     

Understanding spatial transformations: similarities and differences between mental rotation and mental folding

Mental rotation and mental folding, two widely used measures of spatial ability, both require the dynamic spatial transformation of objects with respect to their internal spatial structure. Traditionally, however, these two skills have been considered quite distinct, based primarily on factor analyses of psychometric data. This paper reviews the similarities and differences between mental rotation and mental folding from a variety of perspectives, including their definitions, component cognitive processes, neurological bases, developmental trajectories, malleability, predictive validity, and psychometric properties. We conclude that mental rotation and mental folding are similar in many respects. However, the tasks differ in whether they require rigid or non-rigid transformations of objects. In addition, mental rotation shows robust sex-related differences whereas mental folding does not. We also identify specific questions for which research is lacking.     

Emotion-specific and emotion-non-specific components of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD): implications for a taxonomy of related psychopathology

Many cognitive theories of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including our own SPAARS model, propose that one basis of the disorder is the cognitive system's persistent failure to resolve discrepancies between trauma-related information and the content of pre-existing mental representations, such as schemas. This leads to the characteristic PTSD symptom pattern of re-experiencing and avoidance of trauma-related material. Furthermore, the nature of this unresolved discrepancy revolves around appraisals of threat and the corresponding emotion profile in PTSD is therefore predominantly intense fear and anxiety. This paper argues that this general framework can be extended to discrepancies around other appraisal dimensions such as loss, and consequently to other emotions such as sadness. A localized taxonomy is therefore proposed comprising emotional disorders that resemble PTSD in their basic patterns of re-experiencing and avoidance symptoms--what we call their 'emotion-non-specific component'--but that differ from PTSD in terms of the core emotions involved--what we call their 'emotion-specific component'. The clinical and nosological implications of this argument are discussed.