Do different metamemory judgments tap the same underlying aspects of memory?

We compared the predictions from several kinds of metamemory judgments (on the same set of items), both in terms of their predictive accuracy and in terms of the commonality of predictions. Undergraduates made judgments about the ease with which they could learn each item in a list (ease-of-learning judgments); then they learned every item, either to a minimal criterion of learning or with overlearning, and made judgments about how well they knew each item (judgments of knowing); finally, they returned 4 weeks later for a retention session and made feeling-of-knowing judgments on every time they could not recall, after which a recognition test assessed predictive accuracy. Ease-of-learning judgments had the least predictive accuracy. Surprisingly, however, the recognition of nonrecalled items was predicted equally well by judgments of knowing (made 4 weeks earlier) as by feeling-of-knowing judgments (made immediately prior to recognition). Moreover, those two kinds of judgments were only weakly correlated with each other, which implies that they do not tap memory in the same way.     

Is there implicit memory without attention? A reexamination of task demands in Eich’s (1984) procedure

The relation between memory and attention has been of long-standing interest. Eich (1984) made an important discovery of implicit but not explicit memory for contextually determined homophones (e.g., taxi-FARE) presented in a channel to be ignored within a selective listening procedure. However, his slow rate of presentation of shadowing task materials may have allowed frequent attention shifts to the allegedly ignored channel. With a direct replication of Eich’s timing parameters, we reproduced his results, but when the attended channel was presented twice as fast as Eich’s, implicit memory for the to-be-ignored words vanished. Our results contradict claims of extensive semantic processing of unattended auditory information in this task.     

Evaluating the decay gradient for collinearity bias with lateral displacement from the axis of induction

The misperception of alignment which is found in many geometric illusions can be quantified using relatively simple stimulus configurations. Perceived collinearity of one segment (designated as the test segment) is biased by a second segment (designated as the induction segment), with the size of effect being a function of the relative angle between the two segments. The process can be described as angular induction. The strength of bias is greatest when the induction segment is centered at the tip of the test segment. Tong and Weintraub have reported that lateral displacement from the tip, i.e., at right angles to the axis of the induction segment, produces a sharp drop in the strength of effect. This decline is described as a decay gradient for the angular induction. One experiment replicates and provides better quantification of this decay gradient. Two other experiments examine the decay gradient using a pair of induction segments, one on each side of the tip of the test segment. Displacement of the segments (either in the same direction or in opposite directions) produces substantially the same gradient of effect. Therefore, previous evidence of tandem boosting of effect for segment pairs does not depend on collinearity among the stimulus components. Finally, a fourth experiment finds that an induction segment which is at a fixed position and orientation differentially affects the influence of a variable induction segment. At some angles the influence of the variable segment is augmented, and at others it is suppressed. These findings are discussed in a neuroreductionist context, and a simple model for angular induction is presented.     

How are scientific corrections made?

This paper provides examples drawn from the author’s experience that support the conclusion that errors and deceptions in archival science are often not easily or quickly corrected. The difficulty in correcting errors and deceptions needs wider recognition if it is to be overcome. In addition, the paper discusses how subtle abuses introduce errors into the archival literature.     

Timed reactions to an object in apparent motion: Evidence on Cartesian and non-Cartesian perceptual hypotheses

In three experiments on apparent motion, subjects were to press a computer key as quickly as possible either when the apparently moving stimulus passed the midpoint of its trajectory or when it reached the endpoint. If motion is perceived as a trajectory through a series of spatial locations, and if this type of percept is the basis of deliberate responding (assumptions that can be considered Cartesian in origin), then reaction times should be faster to the midpoint than to the endpoint. In contrast to these assumptions, there was no difference between reaction times to these two points. Alternative accounts of the results are discussed.     

Teaching the Rescorla-Wagner model using STELLA-II

Although the Rescorla-Wagner model is widely taught in learning courses, most textbooks present a simplified version that does not contain all of its parameters. On the basis of Rescorla and Wagner 1972) and the Turbo PASCAL program by Lachnit, Schneider, Lipp, and Kimme! (1988), we created a simulation using STELLA-II, an icon-based program by High Performance Systems, Inc. We argue that this simulation facilitates teaching the complete Rescorla-Wagner model. Using trans-switching (Kimmel & Ray, 1978; Lachnit, 1986; Murrin & Kimmel, 1986) as an example, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the STELLA-II version of the Rescorla-Wagner model as a heuristic tool.     

Rehabilitating care

The feminist ethic of care has often been criticized for its inability to address four problems--the problem of exploitation as it threatens care givers, the problem of sustaining care-giver integrity, the dangers of conceiving the mother-child dyad normatively as a paradigm for human relationships, and the problem of security social justice on a broad scale among relative strangers. We argue that there are resources within the ethic of care for addressing each of these problems, and we sketch strategies for developing the ethic more fully.