Age and emotional response to the Northridge earthquake: a longitudinal analysis

Cross-sectional studies have found older adults to have lower levels of emotional distress after natural disasters. The maturation hypothesis suggests that older adults are less reactive to stress events, whereas the inoculation hypothesis argues that prior experience with disaster is protective. One hundred and sixty-six adults aged 30 to 102 were interviewed regarding the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Longitudinal data were available on depressed mood before and after the earthquake. The maturation hypothesis was generally not supported. The young-old were least depressed; however, this age difference was present prior to the earthquake. The old-old showed lowest levels of earthquake-specific rumination, but age did not buffer the relationship between damage exposure and rumination. The inoculation hypothesis was supported for depressed mood. Prior earthquake experience was related to lower postearthquake depression scores.     

Empirical validation and psychometric evaluation of the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale in patients with social anxiety disorder

The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; M. R. Leary, 1983a) is often used to assess fear of negative evaluation, the core feature of social anxiety disorder. However, few studies have examined its psychometric properties in large samples of socially anxious patients. Although the BFNE yields a single total score, confirmatory factor analysis indicated a 2-factor solution to be more appropriate, with the 1st factor consisting of all straightforwardly worded items (BFNE-S) and the 2nd of all reverse-scored items (BFNE-R). Support was obtained for the convergent and discriminant validity of the BFNE and BFNE-S, but not the BFNE-R. These results suggest that standard scoring of the BFNE may not be optimal for patients with social anxiety disorder.     

Infants' enumeration of actions: numerical discrimination and its signature limits

Are abstract representations of number – representations that are independent of the particular type of entities that are enumerated – a product of human language or culture, or do they trace back to human infancy? To address this question, four experiments investigated whether human infants discriminate between sequences of actions (jumps of a puppet) on the basis of numerosity. At 6 months, infants successfully discriminated four‐ versus eight‐jump sequences, when the continuous variables of sequence duration, jump duration, jump rate, jump interval and duration, and extent of motion were controlled, and rhythm was eliminated. In contrast, infants failed to discriminate two‐ versus four‐jump sequences, suggesting that infants fail to form cardinal number representations of small numbers of actions. Infants also failed to discriminate between sequences of four versus six jumps at 6 months, and succeeded at 9 months, suggesting that infants’ number representations are imprecise and increase in precision with age. All of these findings agree with those of studies using visual–spatial arrays and auditory sequences, providing evidence that a single, abstract system of number representation is present and functional in infancy.     

Cognitive behaviour therapy for panic disorder: long-term follow-up

This paper describes a long-term follow-up of patients with panic disorder who received cognitive behaviour therapy within a randomized controlled trial. Of 89 patients eligible for follow-up, 28 (31.5%) were reassessed 6-8 years after commencement of treatment in the trial. No differences were found between those who were followed up and those lost to follow-up on most baseline measures including measures of panic-related psychopathology, or depression. Outcomes at long-term follow-up were significantly better than baseline measures of panic, avoidance and depression. In this sub-sample the effect of cognitive behaviour therapy for panic disorder appears to maintain over the long-term.     

From sensory processes to conscious perception

In recent years, cognitive neuroscientists have began to explore the process of how sensory information gains access to awareness. To further probe this process, event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used while testing subjects with a paradigm known as the "attentional blink." In this paradigm, visually presented information sporadically fails to reach awareness. It was found that the magnitude and time course of activation within the anterior cingulate (BA 32), medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9), and frontopolar cortex (BA 10) predicted whether or not information was consciously perceived during the critical period for the attentional blink. These results are discussed in light of a neural framework for conscious processing.     

Are there capacity limitations in symmetry perception?

Previous researchers have proposed that there are two types of symmetry detection: one based on crude preattentive symmetry judgments and another based on detailed scrutiny of individual parts (Barlow & Reeves, 1979; S. E. Palmer & Hemenway, 1978; Royer, 1981). Four experiments were conducted to examine capacity limits in different symmetry judgments. Observers were required to discriminate between random patterns and approximate symmetry (Experiments 1 and 3) or between perfect and approximate symmetry (Experiments 2 and 4). The patterns were divided into two sets of dots, presented either simultaneously or successively. A comparison of accuracy under these two presentation conditions suggested that symmetry detection involves an analysis that is spatially parallel but coarse, regardless of either task difficulty or task type (detecting symmetry vs. detecting asymmetry).     

Mild hypoxia disrupts recollection,not familiarity

Yonelinas et al. (2002) found that hypoxic patients exhibited deficits in recollection that left familiarity relatively unaffected. In contrast, Manns, Hopkins, Reed, Kitchener, and Squire (2003) studied a group of hypoxic patients who suffered severe and equivalent deficits in recollection and familiarity. We reexamine those studies and argue that the discrepancy in results is likely due to differences in the hypoxic groups that were tested (i.e., differences in amnestic severity, subject sampling methods, and patient etiology). Yonelinas et al. examined memory in 56 cardiac arrest patients who suffered a brief hypoxic event, whereas Manns et al. examined a group of severely amnesic patients that consisted of 2 cardiac arrest patients, 2 heroin overdose patients, 1 carbon monoxide poisoning patient, and 2 patients with unknown etiologies. We also consider an alternative explanation proposed by Wixted and Squire (2004), who argued that the two patient groups suffered similar deficits, but that statistical or methodological artifacts distorted the results of each of Yonelinas et al.'s experiments. A consideration of those results, however, indicates that such an explanation does not account for the existing data. All of the existing evidence indicates that recollection, but not familiarity, is disrupted in mild hypoxic patients. In more severe cases of hypoxia, or those with more complex etiologies such as heroin overdose, more profound deficits may be observed.