The rational side of egocentrism in social comparisons

Prior work has found that when people compare themselves with others they egocentrically focus on their own strengths and achievements more than on the (equally relevant) strengths and achievements of the comparison group. As a consequence, people tend to overestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is high and underestimate their comparative standing when absolute standing is low. The present research investigated a rational discounting explanation of this bias—namely, that people weight the target of the comparison (the self) more than the referent of the comparison (others) because they typically have more knowledge about the former than the latter. In three studies, we found that the tendency to focus on the target in social comparisons—and the over and underestimation of relative standing that tendency engenders—was reduced (but not eliminated) as people’s knowledge about the comparison group increased. These results suggest that there may be a rational side to egocentrism in social comparisons.     

Comparing patterning and biconditional discriminations in humans

In two experiments, human participants performed a causal judgment task that simultaneously comprised two reciprocal patterning discriminations and a biconditional discrimination. They learned both patterning discriminations more quickly than the biconditional discrimination. Postdiscrimination tests were used to identify participants who had, or had not, learned to apply the patterning rules, as well as participants who continued to expect summation when presented with two cues that predicted the same outcome. All groups were faster to learn the patterning than the biconditional discriminations. These results are inconsistent with models of stimulus representation that invoke configural representations (e.g., Pearce, 1987, 1994; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) because these models solve biconditional discriminations more readily than patterning discriminations.     

The comparative psychology of same-different judgments by humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e., same) from pairs with any discernible disparity (i.e., different); whereas for monkeys the Same-Different concept is quantitative, continuous, and similarity-based, so that monkeys distinguish small-disparity pairs (i.e., similar) from pairs with a large disparity (i.e., dissimilar). The results supported the hypothesis. Monkeys, more than humans, showed a gradual transition from same to different categories and an inclusive criterion for responding Same. The results have implications for comparing Same-Different performances across species--different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in the same way. In particular, humans may especially apply qualitative, rule-based frameworks to cognitive tasks like Same-Different.     

Negative patterning is easier than a biconditional discrimination

Two groups of rats were trained for 50 days on different discriminations in a magazine approach paradigm. One group was trained with a negative patterning schedule and a positive patterning schedule concurrently: they received intermixed trials of A+, B+, AB-, C-, D-, CD+ (A, B, C, and D are four distinct stimuli; the plus sign denotes reinforcement with food, and the minus sign denotes nonreinforcement). The second group of rats was trained with the same four stimuli arranged as compounds and reinforced according to the biconditional schedule AB+, CD+, AC-, and BD-. The first group learned the positive patterning schedule much more quickly than the negative patterning schedule, but they learned the negative patterning schedule more effectively than the second group learned the biconditional schedule. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for models of stimulus representation.     

Culpable control and counterfactual reasoning in the psychology of blame

Many counterfactual reasoning studies assess how people ascribe blame for harmful actions. By itself, the knowledge that a harmful outcome could easily have been avoided does not predict blame. In three studies, the authors showed that an outcome's mutability influences blame and related judgments when it is coupled with a basis for negative evaluations. Study 1 showed that mutability influenced blame and compensation judgments when a physician was negligent but not when the physician took reasonable precautions to prevent harm. Study 2 showed that this finding was attenuated when the victim contributed to his own demise. In Study 3, whether an actor just missed arriving on time to see his dying mother or had no chance to see her influenced his blameworthiness when his reason for being late provided a basis for negative evaluations but made no difference when there was a positive reason for the delay. These findings clarify the conditions under which an outcome's mutability is likely to influence blame and related attributions.     

COMMITMENT IN AGE-GAP HETEROSEXUAL ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS: A TEST OF EVOLUTIONARY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL PREDICTIONS

Little research has addressed age-gap romantic relationships (romantic involvements characterized by substantial age differences between partners). Drawing on evolutionary and socio-cultural perspectives, the present study examined normative beliefs and commitment processes among heterosexual women involved in age-gap and age-concordant relationships. Results indicated that woman-older partners were the most satisfied with and committed to their relationships, relative to woman-younger and similarly aged partners, consistent with socio-cultural predictions. Additional analyses revealed that satisfaction, alternatives, investments, and normative beliefs accounted for differing degrees of variance in the prediction of commitment among age-gap and similarly aged partners, with greater explained variance among partners of similar ages. Thus, among female heterosexual age-gap partners, factors beyond traditional predictors of commitment may be important in understanding the maintenance of these relationships.     

The affective regulation of cognitive priming

Semantic and affective priming are classic effects observed in cognitive and social psychology, respectively. The authors discovered that affect regulates such priming effects. In Experiment 1, positive and negative moods were induced before one of three priming tasks; evaluation, categorization, or lexical decision. As predicted, positive affect led to both affective priming (evaluation task) and semantic priming (category and lexical decision tasks). However, negative affect inhibited such effects. In Experiment 2, participants in their natural affective state completed the same priming tasks as in Experiment 1. As expected, affective priming (evaluation task) and category priming (categorization and lexical decision tasks) were observed in such resting affective states. Hence, the authors conclude that negative affect inhibits semantic and affective priming. These results support recent theoretical models, which suggest that positive affect promotes associations among strong and weak concepts, and that negative affect impairs such associations (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Kuhl, 2000).     

A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi?

Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account.     

Beta2 subunit containing acetylcholine receptors mediate nicotine withdrawal deficits in the acquisition of contextual fear conditioning

Acute nicotine enhances contextual fear conditioning, whereas withdrawal from chronic nicotine produces impairments. However, the nicotinic acetylcholine receptors (nAChR) that are involved in nicotine withdrawal deficits in contextual fear conditioning are unknown. The present study used genetic and pharmacological techniques to investigate the nAChR subtype(s) involved in the effects of nicotine withdrawal on contextual fear conditioning. beta2 or alpha 7 nAChR subunit knockout (KO) and corresponding wild-type (WT) mice were withdrawn from 12 days of chronic nicotine treatment (6.3mg/kg/day), and trained with 2 conditioned stimulus (CS; 85 dB white noise)--unconditioned stimulus (US; 0.57 mA footshock) pairings on day 13. On day 14, mice were tested for contextual and cued freezing. beta2 KO mice did not show nicotine withdrawal-related deficits in contextual fear conditioning, in contrast to WT mice and alpha 7 KO mice. A follow-up study investigated if nicotine withdrawal disrupts acquisition or recall of contextual fear conditioning. The high affinity nAChR antagonist dihydro-beta-erythroidine (DH beta E; 3mg/kg) was administered prior to training or testing to precipitate withdrawal in chronic nicotine-treated C57BL/6 mice. Deficits in contextual fear conditioning were observed in chronic nicotine-treated mice when DH beta E was administered prior to training, but not when administered at testing. These results indicate that beta2-containing nAChRs, such as the alpha 4 beta 2 receptor, mediate nicotine withdrawal deficits in contextual fear conditioning. In addition, nicotine withdrawal selectively affects acquisition but not recall or expression of the learned response.