Conceptualising mental health in the United Arab Emirates: the perspective of traditional healers

Substantial investments in health-care have ensured the widespread availability of allopathic medical services across the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, in spite of this accessibility traditional healers (Mutawa) continue to play a significant, albeit, unofficial role in the UAE's health sector. Citizens routinely consult traditional healers for problems that might, from a western biomedical perspective, be considered psychiatric conditions. This qualitative study explores traditional healers' conceptualisations of mental health problems, discussing their perspectives on phenomenology, aetiology, intervention and outcome. Notably, traditional healers distinguished between biomedical illness and states they attributed to demonological or metaphysical causes. The Islamic spiritual narrative was central to discussions of aetiology, intervention and outcome. Greater integration of traditional healers within the UAE's mental health-care services would, in many cases, improve patient experience and outcomes.     

The Effects of Stress on the Lives of Emerging Adult College Students: An Exploratory Analysis

This study systematically analyzed the personal reports of 20 emerging adult college students with regard to how stress affects their lives. Qualitative analyses revealed that stress influenced students' lives in both positive and negative ways. Implications of these findings for physical and mental health are discussed. Recommendations for counseling practice are provided.     

Elemental representations of stimuli in associative learning

This article reviews evidence and theories concerning the nature of stimulus representations in Pavlovian conditioning. It focuses on the elemental approach developed in stimulus sampling theory (R. C. Atkinson & W. K. Estes, 1963; R. R. Bush & F. Mosteller, 1951b) and extended by I. P. L. McLaren and N. J. Mackintosh (2000, 2002) and contrasts this with models that invoke notions of configural representations that uniquely code for different patterns of stimulus inputs (e.g., J. M. Pearce, 1987, 1994; R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972; A. R. Wagner & S. E. Brandon, 2001). The article then presents a new elemental model that emphasizes interactions between stimulus elements. This model is shown to explain a range of behavioral findings, including those (e.g., negative patterning and biconditional discriminations) traditionally thought to be beyond the explanatory capabilities of elemental models. Moreover, the model offers a ready explanation for recent findings reported by R. A. Rescorla (2000, 2001, 2002b) concerning the way that stimuli with different conditioning histories acquire associative strength when conditioned in compound.     

Individual differences in event-based prospective memory: Evidence for multiple processes supporting cue detection

The multiprocess view proposes that different processes can be used to detect event-based prospective memory cues, depending in part on the specificity of the cue. According to this theory, attentional processes are not necessary to detect focal cues, whereas detection of nonfocal cues requires some form of controlled attention. This notion was tested using a design in which we compared performance on a focal and on a nonfocal prospective memory task by participants with high or low working memory capacity. An interaction was found, such that participants with high and low working memory performed equally well on the focal task, whereas the participants with high working memory performed significantly better on the nonfocal task than did their counterparts with low working memory. Thus, controlled attention was only necessary for detecting event-based prospective memory cues in the nonfocal task. These results have implications for theories of prospective memory, the processes necessary for cue detection, and the successful fulfillment of intentions.     

Can ‘Downward Causation’ Save Free Will?

Recently, Trenton Merricks has defended a libertarian view of human freedom. He claims that human persons have downward causal control of their constituent parts, and that downward causal control of this sort is sufficient for free will. In this paper I examine Merricks’s defense of free will, and argue that it is unsuccessful. I show that having downward causal control is not sufficient for for free will. In an Appendix I also argue that Merricks’s defense of free will, together with assumptions implicit in his broader ontology, commit him to the implausible conclusion that determinism is incompatible with the existence of human persons.