What the family brings: gathering evidence for strengths-based work

Families attending child and adolescent mental health (CAMH) services are often assumed to have problems in key areas such as communication, belonging/acceptance and problem-solving. Family therapy is often directed towards addressing these difficulties. With increasing emphasis in family therapy and human services fields over the last decade on identifying and building from strengths, a different starting point has been advocated. This paper describes a large survey of the self-reported pre-therapy functioning of children and families using a public CAMH service (n=416). Before commencing family therapy parents identified family strengths across a range of key areas, despite the burden of caring for children with moderate to severe mental health problems. This evidence supports theoretical and clinical work that advocates a strengths perspective, and highlights how resilience framed in family (and social) rather than individual terms enables a greater appreciation of how strengths may be harnessed in therapeutic work.     

The moderating effect of private self-consciousness on the stability of vocational interests

This study investigated the potential moderating effect of private self-consciousness on the stability of vocational interest inventory scores and profiles. We hypothesized that participants higher in private self-consciousness would have more stable interest scores and profiles on the Self-Directed Search (SDS; Holland, Fritzsche, & Powell, 1994) across a 12-week time interval than would participants lower in private self-consciousness. Results revealed that private self-consciousness did moderate the stability of SDS Enterprising interest scores. Contrary to our hypothesis, private self-consciousness did not moderate the stability of the other five SDS interest scores or SDS interest profile stability.     

The four P’s of purpose among College Bound students: People,propensity, passion,prosocial benefits

Abstract

College preparation programs, such as College Bound, aim to increase low-income students’ preparation for achieving future goals. Yet, little research has examined the nature of these students’ future goals and purposes from their own perspectives. In this study, in-depth interviews with 10 adolescents (six males and four females) participating in College Bound were analyzed using a qualitative approach informed by grounded theory. Four interrelated themes related to the development of youth purpose emerged: (a) people; (b) propensity; (c) passion; and (d) prosocial benefits. These themes were further categorized across two major dimensions: influences (i.e. capability and motivation) and sources of such influences (i.e. intrinsic and extrinsic). Moreover, ways in which students’ unique social contexts contributed to their experiences of purpose are discussed. Findings inform an understanding of the development of purpose in underrepresented youth, as well as provide insights for programs designed to promote their positive development and post-secondary school success.     

When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?

Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what's wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to remain undebunked.     

Comparing response blocking and response interruption/redirection on levels of motor stereotypy: Effects of data analysis procedures

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is marked by deficits in social communication and the presence of restrictive and/or repetitive behaviors or interests. Motor stereotypy is a form of repetitive behavior that is common in ASD. Response Interruption and Redirection (RIRD) and response blocking (RB) are two interventions found to be efficacious in reducing motor stereotypy. However, the current literature presents with inconsistencies regarding the relative efficacy of these two procedures. Thus, we sought to replicate and extend previous literature by evaluating the efficacy of both interventions on reducing motor stereotypy among 3 individuals with ASD. We also sought to evaluate how variations in data analysis affected the interpretation of treatment outcomes. Results indicated that both interventions were equally efficacious at reducing stereotypy when analyzing data exclusive of treatment‐implementation time. However, when analyzing total session time data, RB produced greater and more sustained reductions in stereotypy across all participants. These results emphasize the importance of data analysis decision‐making in evaluating intervention outcomes.     

Reducing contingent self-worth: A defensive response to self-threats

Previous research shows that people with high self-esteem cope with threats to the self by reducing the extent to which their self-worth is contingent on the threatened domain (Buckingham, Weber, & Sypher, 2012). The present studies tested the hypothesis that this is a defensive process. In support of this hypothesis, Study 1 (N = 160), showed that self-affirmation attenuates the tendency for people with high self-esteem to reduce their contingencies of self-worth following self-threat. Furthermore, Study 2 (N = 286), showed that this tendency was more prevalent among people with defensive self-esteem than among those with secure self-esteem. The present studies imply that reducing contingent self-worth after self-threat is a defensive process. We discuss implications for theories of contingent self-worth.     

Modal Objectivity1

It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non‐rigid designators.² But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real (non‐epistemic, non‐deontic) notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of “necessary”, not necessary in another, and that would be it. The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime. In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer. In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question. I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument. I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility. According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility. Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory.     

Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude

Following P. F. Strawson, a number of philosophers have argued that if hard incompatibilism is true, then its truth would undermine the justification or value of our relationships with other persons. In this paper, I offer a novel defense of this claim. In particular, I argue that if hard incompatibilism is true, we cannot make sense of: the possibility of promissory obligation, the significance of consent, or the pro tanto wrongness of paternalistic intervention. Because these practices and normative commitments are central to our relationships as we currently conceive of them, it follows that hard incompatibilism has radically revisionary conclusions.     

Mereology in Aristotle's Assertoric Syllogistic

How does Aristotle think about sentences like ‘Every x is y’ in the Prior Analytics? A recently popular answer conceives of these sentences as expressing a mereological relationship between x and y: the sentence is true just in case x is, in some sense, a part of y. I argue that the motivations for this interpretation have so far not been compelling. I provide a new justification for the mereological interpretation. First, I prove a very general algebraic soundness and completeness result that unifies the most important soundness and completeness results to date. Then I argue that this result vindicates the mereological interpretation. In contrast to previous interpretations, this argument shows how Aristotle's conception of predication in mereological terms can do important logical work.