Unprincipled Virtue – Nomy Arpaly

Book reviewed: Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 208 pp., £10.     

Eye movements during repeated reading of a text

The facilitation of eye movements was studied in two experiments involving a repeated reading paradigm. A text was read three times. Initial reading was immediately followed by the first repetition; the second repetition took place one week later. Recall task instructions were used to encourage a detailed reading of the text. The data were analysed sentence by sentence from the 'first pass' readings not including returns to earlier test locations. A general facilitation for all eye movement parameters was found. Repetition decreased the summed fixation time, the average fixation duration, the number of progressive fixations, and the number of regressions. Additionally, repetition increased saccade lengths. Experiment 2 further qualified the general facilitory effect. The middle section of the text, being the most dense of information, was devoted the most visual attention by the readers. Moreover, it was also found to produce the largest degree of facilitation due to repetition. This was true with all other eye movement parameters except saccade length and average fixation duration. Average fixation durations were longer in the beginning of a text than in the end. This was true in all the three readings. Similarly, for each reading, highly important sentences received more visual attention than unimportant sentences.     

Finnish compound structure: experiments with a morphologically impaired patient.

The present study addresses two major aspects of compound processing, namely the issues of access code and structural effects (headedness), with an extensively studied deep dyslexic patient, HH, who has previously been shown to suffer from morphological impairment. In oral reading of compounds, HH preserves their morphological structure and, at the same time, shows additional processing load in increased errors compared to monomorphemic and derived words. Our data suggest that semantically transparent Finnish compounds are decomposed into their constituents at the level of lexical access. Furthermore, there is a processing asymmetry between the constituents, since several qualitative features of HH's reading performance suggest that it is the first constituent which primarily serves as the initial access code.     

Optimism and pessimism as predictors of change in health after death or onset of severe illness in family.

The authors prospectively examined changes in health after a major life event (death or onset of severe illness in family) among 5,007 employees (mean age=44.8 years) whose optimism and pessimism levels were assessed in 1997 and major life events in 2000. Health was indicated by sickness absence days during a period covering 36 months prior to the event and 18 months after the event. Increase in sick days after the event was smaller and returned to the prevent level more quickly among highly optimistic individuals than among their counterparts with low optimism. Parallel changes were not observed in relation to pessimism. These findings suggest that optimism may reduce the risk of health problems and may be related to a faster recovery after a major life event.     

A defence of the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism, thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy. This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter’s objections.

A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism

Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.