On the need of fundaments in psychoanalytic thinking

The questions concerning the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge have been pressing from the beginning. Beside as a therapeutic practice, Freud conceived psychoanalysis as a science, maintaining that like other sciences psychoanalysis should have sound empirical and conceptual fundaments. Freud claimed that there is an inseparable bond (ein Junktim) between cure and acquiring knowledge in psychoanalysis. One of his aims in developing a metapsychology (analogously to metaphysics) was to explicate the conceptual structure of psychoanalytic knowledge. After Freud psychoanalysts have not reached a consensus in the questions concerning the foundations. What kind of foundations does psychoanalytic knowledge need? Are they to be found from the psychoanalytic practice and research on the couch, or rather from metapsychological constructions? In what way should psychoanalysis rely on external scientific research? The article addresses these questions, arguing that even though psychoanalytic work and knowledge do gain justification from various external sources, in the end psychoanalysis stands on its own foundations. It is further argued that especially under the prevailing plurality of theoretical and clinical approaches, psychoanalysis does not have – and does not need – a foundation that could not be further questioned. Thus a coherentist picture of psychoanalysis is defended.     

SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM AND A PRIORI SELF‐KNOWLEDGE

The argument known as the ‘McKinsey Recipe’ tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and a priori self‐knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know a priori that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of ‘natural kind concept’: (i) a concept which in fact denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which aims to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a Dry Earth scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian’s argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two‐dimensional semantics, using the notion of ‘considering a possible world as actual’, I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian’s question: which concept would ‘water’ express on Dry Earth?¹     

Unprincipled Virtue – Nomy Arpaly

Book reviewed: Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 208 pp., £10.     

Money for microbes—Pathogen avoidance and out‐group helping behaviour

Humans have evolved various adaptations against pathogens, including the physiological immune system. However, not all of these adaptations are physiological: the cognitive mechanisms whereby we avoid potential sources of pathogens—for example, disgust elicited by uncleanliness—can be considered as parts of a behavioural immune system (BIS). The mechanisms of BIS extend also to inter‐group relations: Pathogen cues have been shown to increase xenophobia/ethnocentrism, as people prefer to keep their societal in‐group norms unaltered and “clean.” Nonetheless, little is known how pathogen cues influence people's willingness to provide humanitarian aid to out‐group members. We examined how pathogen cues affected decisions of providing humanitarian aid in either instrumental (sending money) or non‐instrumental form (sending personnel to help, or accepting refugees), and whether these effects were moderated by individual differences in BIS sensitivity. Data were collected in two online studies (Ns: 188 and 210). When the hypothetical humanitarian crisis involved a clear risk of infection, participants with high BIS sensitivity preferred to send money rather than personnel or to accept refugees. The results suggest that pathogen cues influence BIS‐sensitive individuals' willingness to provide humanitarian aid when there is a risk of contamination to in‐group members.     

Optimism and pessimism as predictors of change in health after death or onset of severe illness in family.

The authors prospectively examined changes in health after a major life event (death or onset of severe illness in family) among 5,007 employees (mean age=44.8 years) whose optimism and pessimism levels were assessed in 1997 and major life events in 2000. Health was indicated by sickness absence days during a period covering 36 months prior to the event and 18 months after the event. Increase in sick days after the event was smaller and returned to the prevent level more quickly among highly optimistic individuals than among their counterparts with low optimism. Parallel changes were not observed in relation to pessimism. These findings suggest that optimism may reduce the risk of health problems and may be related to a faster recovery after a major life event.