What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences?

This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations. Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems, consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed.     

Echoic memory processes in good and poor readers

Four experiments were conducted to determine whether echoic memory plays a role in differences between good and poor readers. The first two experiments used a suffix procedure in which the subject is read a list of digits with either a tone control or the word go appended to the list. For lists that exceeded the length of the subjects memory span by one digit (i.e., that avoided ceiling effects), the poor readers showed a larger decrement in the suffix condition than did the good readers. The third experiment was directed at the question of whether the duration of echoic memory is different for good and poor readers. Children shadowed words presented to one ear at a rate determined to give 75-85% shadowing accuracy. The items presented to the nonattended ear were words and an occasional digit. At various intervals after the presentation of the digit, a light signaled that the subject was to cease shadowing and attempt to recall any digit that had occurred in the nonattended ear recently. Whereas good and poor readers recalled the digit equally if tested immediately after presentation, the poor readers showed a faster decline in recall of the digit as retention interval increased. A fourth experiment was conducted to determine whether the differences in echoic memory were specific to speech stimuli or occurred at a more basic level of aural persistence. Bursts of white noise were separated by 9-400 ms of silence and the subject was to say whether there were one or two sounds presented. There were no differences in detectability functions for good and poor readers.     

When the happy victimizer says sorry: Children's understanding of apology and emotion

Previous research suggests that children gradually understand the mitigating effects of apology on damage to a transgressor's reputation. However, little is known about young children's insights into the central emotional implications of apology. In two studies, children ages 4–9 heard stories about moral transgressions in which the wrongdoers either did or did not apologize. In Study 1, children in the no‐apology condition showed the classic pattern of ‘happy victimizer’ attributions by expecting the wrongdoer to feel good about gains won via transgression. By contrast, in the apology condition, children attributed negative feelings to the transgressor and improved feelings to the victim. In Study 2, these effects were found even when the explicit emotion marker ‘sorry’ was removed from the apology exchange. Thus, young children understand some important emotional functions of apology.     

Hope as a Predictor of Interpersonal Suicide Risk

The current study hypothesized that (1) hope would negatively predict burdensomeness, thwarted belongingness, and acquired capability to enact lethal injury; (2) hope would negatively predict suicidal ideation; and (3) the interpersonal suicide risk factors would predict suicidal ideation. Results indicated that hope negatively predicted burdensomeness and thwarted belongingness, but positively predicted acquired capability to enact suicide. Contrary to our second hypothesis, hope did not predict suicidal ideation, but interpersonal risk factors for suicide predicted suicidal ideation. Results are discussed in terms of implications for hope theory and Joiner's (2005) interpersonal risk factors for suicide, and for clinical practice.