Familial patterns and the origins of individual differences in synaesthesia

The term synaesthesia has been applied to a range of different sensory-perceptual and cognitive experiences, yet how these experiences are related to each other is not well understood. Not only are there disparate types of synaesthesia, but even within types there are vast individual differences in the way that stimuli induce synaesthesia and in the subjective synaesthetic experience. An investigation of the inheritance patterns of different types of synaesthesia is likely to elucidate whether a single underlying mechanism can explain all types. This study is the first to systematically survey all types of synaesthesia within a familial framework. We recruited 53 synaesthetes and 42% of these probands reported a first-degree relative with synaesthesia. We then directly contacted as many first-degree relatives as possible and collected complete data on synaesthetic status for all family members for 17 families. We found that different types of synaesthesia can occur within the same family and that the qualitative nature of the experience can differ between family members. Our findings strongly indicate that various types of synaesthesia are fundamentally related at the genetic level, but that the explicit associations and the individual differences between synaesthetes are influenced by other factors. Synaesthesia thus provides a good model to explore the interplay of all these factors in the development of cognitive traits in general.     

The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?

The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interacting effects of worry and anxiety on attentional disengagement from threat

Recent work suggests that the ability to disengage attention from threatening information is impaired in people who suffer from anxiety and dysphoria. It has been suggested that this impaired ability to disengage from threat might specifically be associated with the tendency to perseverate about threat (i.e., worry), which is a main characteristic of anxiety disorders and a wide range of other psychopathologies. However, no studies have yet addressed this issue. The present study examined whether trait worry as well as worry intensity after experimental worry induction are associated with impaired ability to disengage attention from threatening cues (angry faces), independently from or in conjunction with anxiety. Sixty-one participants performed a visual cueing experiment that required detection of a target stimulus at one of two possible locations. Prior to the target neutral, happy or angry facial cues appeared at one of these two locations; when there is a relatively long period between the cue and the target (>300 ms), an overall faster responding to invalidly cued trials relative to validly cued trials is believed to indicate inhibition of return (IOR) to a recently attended location. A reduced IOR for angry faces was only found when both trait worry and anxiety were high. When anxiety was kept constant, both trait worry and state worry were associated with enhanced IOR for neutral faces instead. The results seem to suggest that specific threat-related deficiencies in IOR may be a function of the co-occurrence of worry and anxiety.     

The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same old stew?

Computer simulations are an exciting tool that plays important roles in many scientific disciplines. This has attracted the attention of a number of philosophers of science. The main tenor in this literature is that computer simulations not only constitute interesting and powerful new science, but that they also raise a host of new philosophical issues. The protagonists in this debate claim no less than that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding of scientific ontology, the epistemology and semantics of models and theories, and the relation between experimentation and theorising, and submit that simulations demand a fundamentally new philosophy of science in many respects. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate these claims. Our conclusion will be sober. We argue that these claims are overblown and that simulations, far from demanding a new metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and methodology, raise few if any new philosophical problems. The philosophical problems that do come up in connection with simulations are not specific to simulations and most of them are variants of problems that have been discussed in other contexts before. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Distributing Responsibility in the Debate on Sustainable Biofuels

In the perception of technology innovation two world views compete for domination: technological and social determinism. Technological determinism holds that societal change is caused by technological developments, social determinism holds the opposite. Although both were quite central to discussion in the philosophy, history and sociology of technology in the 1970s and 1980s, neither is seen as mainstream now. They do still play an important role as background philosophies in societal debates and offer two very different perspectives on where the responsibilities for an ethically sound development of novel technologies lie. In this paper we will elaborate on these to two opposing views on technology development taking the recent debate on the implementation of biofuels as a case example.     

Folk theory of social change

People have a folk theory of social change (FTSC). A typical Western FTSC stipulates that as a society becomes more industrialized, it undergoes a natural course of social change, in which a communal society marked by communal relationships becomes a qualitatively different, agentic society where market‐based exchange relationships prevail. People use this folk theory to predict a society's future and estimate its past, to understand contemporary cross‐cultural differences, and to make decisions about social policies. Nonetheless, the FTSC is not particularly consistent with the existing cross‐cultural research on industrialization and cultural differences, and needs to be examined carefully.     

Integrating Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Substance Use Disorder

Historically, administrators and clinicians have been hesitant to address posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the treatment of substance use disorders (SUDs). However, research shows that SUD treatment recruitment and outcomes may be adversely affected if co‐occurring PTSD is left untreated. The authors provide guidelines for screening and assessment, treatment services, and workforce and organizational development that are designed to facilitate integrated PTSD–SUD treatment. Case examples illustrate the necessary precautions related to and the potential benefits of integrating treatment of PTSD and SUD.     

Muslim–Christian Relations in Tanzania with Particular Focus on the Relationship between Religious Instruction and Prejudice

The article evaluates religious education strategies in view of the need to cope adequately with prejudices between Muslims and Christians in Tanzania against the historical background of the two traditions and contemporary events. It shows that religious prejudice is the result of religious instruction provided within both communities, and is due either to negative stereotypes or ignorance of the tradition of the other. The challenge is to critically analyse the teaching contents, aims and methods of religious instruction of each tradition in order to unearth prejudicial elements, and to recommend ways and means of coping with them.     

Night-time thoughts in high and low worriers: reaction to caffeine-induced sleeplessness

There is ample evidence for the existence of an association between sleeplessness and worry. Not much is known, however, concerning the nature of this relationship. Therefore, a study was conducted investigating the causal relationship between sleeplessness and nocturnal worry. A 2 x 2 (Worry x Induced sleeplessness) analysis of covariance design was used. The first factor consisted of a subject variable defined by scoring either high or low on a trait measure of worry (the Penn State Worry Questionnaire) and the second factor consisted of 300 mg caffeine or placebo. A total of 96 female undergraduate students participated. The dependent variables comprised measures of nocturnal worry (the Night-Time Thoughts Questionnaire) and subjective and objective sleep parameters. Overall, caffeine caused an increase in nocturnal worry and sleeplessness. A significant interaction effect occurred between Worry and Induced sleeplessness on one of the objective sleep parameters, but no other interaction effects were significant. The results suggest that worry may occur as an epiphenomenon of sleeplessness.