A semantics-based approach to the "no negative evidence" problem

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great.     

Relationship between heart rate variability and cognitive function during threat of shock

The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between resting heart rate variability (HRV) and cognitive functions during threat of shock. A Continuous Performance Task and a Working Memory Task were used to measure cognitive functions. Sixty-five male participants from the Royal Norwegian Navy participated. HRV was measured during baseline, test conditions and recovery. Participants were randomly assigned into non-threat and threat groups. Based on the median split of the high frequency (HF) spectral power, groups were divided into two additional groups. Overall, the high HRV participants showed superior performance on cognitive tasks independent of non-threat or threat conditions. During threat condition the low HRV group showed improved performance. Thus, individuals with high HRV were more stress tolerant and resilient in the face of environmental changes. The results from the study might have implications with regard to performance in operational settings, but also for other fields of psychological research such as individual differences, anxiety and coping.     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

Self-schematic representation of the type A and B behavior patterns

Past research has established clear behavioral differences between Type A and B individuals. The purpose of our research was to examine how these behavioral differences are represented in the self-definitions of Type As and Bs. We investigated the existence of Type A and B self-schemata by using two tasks designed to measure the influence of these hypothetical structures on speed of processing and memory interference. During an initial task, Type As and Bs made self-relevant decisions (like me, not like me) in response to trait adjectives previously scaled as Type A, Type B, or neutral in content. Reaction times for the decisions were measured, and results indicated that both Type As and Bs made faster decisions for schema-compatible responses than for schema-incompatible responses. On a second task, Type As and Bs were tested for recognition memory after they attempted to memorize half of the aforementioned trait list. Memory errors were examined and indicated that Type As and Bs made more errors that were compatible with their respective self-schemata. Taken together, these results indicate that a Type A and B distinction forms a reliable organizing framework for the self-definitions of Type As and Bs. The existence of stable cognitive structures that parallel the behavioral differences between Type As and Bs has important implications for both theory and application.     

Self-evaluation of abilities: accurate self-assessment versus biased self-enhancement

Past research indicates that individuals are keenly aware of the diagnostic implications of their performance. Theories differ, however, in regard to how this awareness influences task choice. According to the self-assessment view, individuals choose tasks that are maximally informative of abilities, regardless of self-esteem implications. According to the self-enhancement view, task choice is often mediated by a concern for self-esteem protection. In the first study, subjects chose among eight forms of a cognitive abilities test that varied in their diagnosticity of success, diagnosticity of failure, and difficulty. In accordance with the self-assessment view, test choice was found to be positively related to diagnosticity of success and, to a lesser extent, diagnosticity of failure. Test choice was also dependent on the interaction of diagnosticity and difficulty in a manner that was more consistent with the self-assessment view. In a second study that provided more precise measurement of perceived diagnosticity and expected success, results indicated that the motives for self-assessment and self-enhancement were each reliably related to task preference. Of the two, self-assessment motivation was a stronger determinant of task preference. Taken together, these results suggest that task choice is governed largely by a concern for accurate self-appraisal. Additional results, however, indicate that current models may require revisions that take into account the less-than-accurate appraisal of diagnosticity.     

The dilemma of primary prevention in mental health services: Rationalize the status quo or bite the hand that feeds you

That primary prevention has been ‘inappropriately marginalised’ is seen to be an inevitable outcome of reliance on government support. Policy makers and service providers can never be expected to give prevention a higher priority than direct service. Preventionists have developed two strategies for doing their work. One, based on the logical positivist ideal, seeks specific causal models for specific disorders. This sort of prevention research, while it will always remain less well funded than direct services, tends not to challenge the status quo belief in individual responsibility, or the acceptable methods of mainstream science, and thus will tend to be more acceptable than other forms of prevention research and services. An alternative, based on a social constructivist paradigm engages in social action research through collaboration with a variety of grass roots organizations and people outside the mainstream of power. This latter approach, brings to preventionists ideas from feminists, ethnic minority leaders, neighborhood organizers, and self and mutual help group leaders. It is a sensible way to use the resources available to those professionals interested in social change oriented prevention.     

Locus of control, personal control, and the counselling of children with learning and/or behaviour problems

It is widely claimed that locus of control represents an important focus for the counselling of children with learning and/or behaviour difficulties. But the concept is widely misunderstood and often confused with other important control-related constructs. The meaning of a number of key constructs is clarified. An approach to counselling is advocated which recognises the heuristic and therapeutic value of employing these in a discrete, yet integrated fashion.