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421.
    
People have a folk theory of social change (FTSC). A typical Western FTSC stipulates that as a society becomes more industrialized, it undergoes a natural course of social change, in which a communal society marked by communal relationships becomes a qualitatively different, agentic society where market‐based exchange relationships prevail. People use this folk theory to predict a society's future and estimate its past, to understand contemporary cross‐cultural differences, and to make decisions about social policies. Nonetheless, the FTSC is not particularly consistent with the existing cross‐cultural research on industrialization and cultural differences, and needs to be examined carefully.  相似文献   
422.
The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
423.
    
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424.
    
Eyewitnesses sometimes recall things at later interviews that they did not recall at previous interviews (reminiscence). When these cases are argued in the courtroom, attorneys may claim (and judges may warn jurors) that eyewitnesses who provide reminiscences are necessarily inaccurate witnesses. Consequently, their testimony may be prematurely discredited or dismissed. We examined here the role of varying the retrieval cues across interviews to account for reminiscence. Participants watched a videotaped mock crime and were tested for recall on two occasions using the same or different cues. Results supported the hypothesis that varying retrieval cues increases the amount of reminiscence. Furthermore, nearly all participants exhibited some reminiscence. Finally, reminiscence was not significantly correlated with overall accuracy of testimony. These findings suggest that many of the assumptions underlying legal tactics and judges' instructions regarding reminiscent inconsistencies are erroneous. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
425.
    
Two topics figure prominently in recent discussions of mathematical structuralism: challenges to the purported metaphysical insight provided by sui generis structuralism and the significance of category theory for understanding and articulating mathematical structuralism. This article presents an overview of central themes related to these topics.  相似文献   
426.
    
Historically, administrators and clinicians have been hesitant to address posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in the treatment of substance use disorders (SUDs). However, research shows that SUD treatment recruitment and outcomes may be adversely affected if co‐occurring PTSD is left untreated. The authors provide guidelines for screening and assessment, treatment services, and workforce and organizational development that are designed to facilitate integrated PTSD–SUD treatment. Case examples illustrate the necessary precautions related to and the potential benefits of integrating treatment of PTSD and SUD.  相似文献   
427.
    
Julian Dodd 《Ratio》2002,15(2):176-193
John R. Searle (1995; 1998, Ch. 9) claims that P.F. Strawson's well known objections to correspondence theories of truth (Strawson 1950) can be side-stepped, if we regard the correspondence theorist's facts as 'conditions in the world' (1998, p. 392) rather than as complex objects. In response, I claim both that Searle's notion of a 'condition in the world' is obscure, and that such conditions cannot be the facts of a correspondence theorist on account of their being unsuited for truthmaking.
The failure of Searle's attempt to come up with a correspondence theory which evades Strawson's objections does not indicate that we should seek to formulate a correspondence theory in some other way. I argue that that the correspondence theorists's truthmaker axiom is improperly motivated, and, in the light of this, suggest that facts be treated as true propositions rather than as items which make propositions true. The article ends with a defence of this position against two recent objections.  相似文献   
428.
    
Julian Wolfe 《Theoria》1968,34(1):62-65
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429.
The evidence regarding effectiveness of family interventions for psychosis (FIP) is strong and consistent. However, there is a gap in the research on the process of these interventions, and little is known about their active ingredients. This review aims to identify the active ingredients of FIP. We conducted a systematic literature review, focusing on qualitative research, and analyzed 22 papers in total. We found a single study comprehensively exploring the process of FIP. All other studies focused on particular aspects of process‐related variables. The key elements of FIP seem to be the so‐called “common therapeutic factors”, followed by education about the illness and coping skills training. This review supports the value of a stepped model of intervention according to the needs of the families. However, the evidence reviewed also reveals a gap in the research findings based on the limited research available. FIP are complex, psychosocial interventions with multiple components, and more intensive, qualitative research is needed to establish linkages between process and outcome.  相似文献   
430.
    
This is the first instalment of a two‐part paper on the counterfactual theory of causation. It is well known that this theory is ridden with counterexamples. Specifically, the following four features of the theory suffer from problems:
  • it understands causation as a relation between events;
  • counterfactual dependence is understood using a metric of similarity among possible worlds;
  • it defines a non-discriminatory concept of causation; and
  • it understands causation as transitive.
A number of philosophers have recently proposed that causation is contrastive because making contrasts explicit defuses counterexamples. A contrastive causal claim has the following form: C rather than C* causes E rather than E*, where C* and E* are alternative or contrast events. In this paper, I show that making contrasts explicit does indeed defuse some counterexamples. However, I also argue that the examples discussed in the literature all share a common feature, viz. that the original causal judgement is ambiguous in one way or another. Contrasting does not help with counterexamples that do not have this feature. Part II of this paper then takes up the hard cases.  相似文献   
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