What 4′33″ Is

What is John Cage's 4′33″? This paper disambiguates this question into three sub-questions concerning, respectively, the work's ontological nature, the art form to which it belongs, and the genre it is in. We shall see that the work's performances consist of silence (rather than containing environmental sounds), that it is a work of performance art (rather than music), and that it belongs to the genre of conceptual art. Seeing the work in these ways helps us to understand it better, and promises to assuage somewhat the puzzlement and irritation of those who are at first resistant to its charms.     

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’—at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires—even in cases where we expect a precise answer.     

The effects of varied retrieval cues on reminiscence in eyewitness memory

Eyewitnesses sometimes recall things at later interviews that they did not recall at previous interviews (reminiscence). When these cases are argued in the courtroom, attorneys may claim (and judges may warn jurors) that eyewitnesses who provide reminiscences are necessarily inaccurate witnesses. Consequently, their testimony may be prematurely discredited or dismissed. We examined here the role of varying the retrieval cues across interviews to account for reminiscence. Participants watched a videotaped mock crime and were tested for recall on two occasions using the same or different cues. Results supported the hypothesis that varying retrieval cues increases the amount of reminiscence. Furthermore, nearly all participants exhibited some reminiscence. Finally, reminiscence was not significantly correlated with overall accuracy of testimony. These findings suggest that many of the assumptions underlying legal tactics and judges' instructions regarding reminiscent inconsistencies are erroneous. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. &; Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15(11), 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. &; Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception.     

A randomized clinical trial comparing affect regulation and social problem-solving psychotherapies for mothers with victimization-related PTSD

Addressing affect dysregulation may provide a complementary alternative or adjunctive approach to the empirically supported trauma memory processing models of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A CBT designed to enhance affect regulation without trauma memory processing—trauma affect regulation: guide for education and therapy (TARGET)—was compared to present centered therapy (PCT) and wait-list (WL) conditions in a randomized clinical trial with 146 primarily low-income and ethnoracial minority mothers with PTSD. TARGET achieved statistically and clinically significant improvement on PTSD and affect regulation measures compared to WL, with more consistent and sustained (over a 6-month follow-up period) evidence of improvement than PCT. Drop-out rates (~ 25%) were comparable in TARGET and PCT, similar to those previously reported for trauma memory processing CBTs. Symptom worsening was rare (2–8%) and transient. Affect regulation-based CBT without trauma memory processing warrants further research as a potentially efficacious therapy for victimization-related PTSD.