Ineffability and intelligibility: Towards an understanding of the radical unlikeness of religious experience

Conclusion I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed religious, that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion.To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a qualifier which multiplies models without end than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models.An early draft of this paper was read to a seminar group at the University of St. Andrews during Martinmas term 1984. I am grateful to Dr. Gordon Graham & Mr. Tony Ellis, both of the Department of Moral Philosophy, and to Dr. George Hall, of the Department of Divinity, for remarks which stimulated some subsequent revisions of the argument.

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Individual Marital Therapy: A Critical Reappraisal

The belief that individual marital therapy (IMT) is an ineffective form of treatment for marriage problems and markedly inferior to the conjoint approaches has become almost an article of faith in family therapy circles. This position was originally advanced in the influential reviews of the research literature conducted by Gurman and Kniskern, and their conclusions have been cited in numerous other articles. This paper re-reviews the research studies purportedly supporting this conclusion and finds almost all of them to be invalidated by gross flaws in design and implementation. It is argued that from the highly inadequate evidence available, no conclusions can be reached concerning either the absolute or relative effectiveness of IMT.     

PERCEPTION OF PICTORIAL SPACE BY BUSHMEN*

A new test for measuring the ability to perceive pictorial depth was used with children of two remote Bushman populations (!Xu and Kxoe), as well as with a sample of adult Bushmen drawn from these populations and a sample of urban Zulu children. The results show that subjects of apparently little sophistication are capable of perceiving depth when confronted with a ‘geometric’ figure. They also show surprising inter-group differences which cannot be easily explained by differences of environmental experience.     

Autism and Accuracy in Adolescent Perceptions of Friends' Sexual Attitudes and Behavior

This study uses data from adolescents matched with data from their friends to examine whether reference group effects on adolescent sexuality should be thought of as operating through the sharing of norms or the modeling of behavior. We observe that perception of attitudes has such a trivial reality component and such a strong autistic component that it cannot serve as a mechanism of peer influence. Perception of sexual behavior has a reality component which is as large as its autistic component, and large enough to serve as a route of influence. We reach two conclusions: (1) Reference group effects on adolescent sexual behavior probably work through behavior modeling rather than through normative influence. (2) Studies which infer peer influence on sexual behavior using only perception of peers will arrive at erroneous conclusions.     

Preferences for Individual Video Games as a Function of Their Emotional Effects on Players

Video games vary in terms of the emotional states they elicit from players. These differences in emotional reactions, in turn, help account for differential preferences of individual games. The three independent dimensions of pleasure-displeasure, arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness were used to assess emotional impacts of individual games. In addition, a preference measure was constructed to evaluate attraction toward, versus avoidance of, specific games. In Study One, a group of subjects provided data on emotional responses to 22 common arcade video games and a different group rated their preferences for the same games. The emotional impact of video games was highly unpleasant, moderately arousing, and moderately dominance-inducing; thus, the predominant emotional response to these games was aggression, anger, or hostility. I n Study Two, subjects visiting a video game arcade were recruited and assigned to play two games each and to report their reactions to each game immediately after playing the game. Results showed that greater feelings of pleasure, and separately of arousal, while playing video games resulted in higher preferences for the games and that greater dominance (significant only for males) also led to higher preferences. It may be beneficial, therefore, to experiment with more arousing and more dominance-inducing game designs which are not necessarily unpleasant or which definitely yield high pleasure.     

Superimposition of response-independent reinforcement

Studies that have superimposed response-independent reinforcement (or reinforcers scheduled by contingencies placed on the absence of responding) upon conventional response-dependent schedules are reviewed. In general, providing alternative sources of reinforcement reduced response rates below the levels observed when alternative reinforcement was absent. However, response-rate elevation was sometimes found, particularly when rates of superimposed response-independent reinforcement were low. Superimposition of schedules providing reinforcers contingent on the absence of responding usually produced more severe response-rate decrements than superimposition of response-independent reinforcement. A variant of Herrnstein's equation, which assumes that some of the alternative reinforcers function as if they were delivered by baseline response-dependent source of reinforcement, is in qualitative agreement with the overall body of results obtained, and can predict both increases and decreases in response rate as resulting from superimposed reinforcers.