We favor formal models of heuristics rather than lists of loose dichotomies: a reply to Evans and Over

In their comment on Marewski et al. (good judgments do not require complex cognition, 2009) Evans and Over (heuristic thinking and human intelligence: a commentary on Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2009) conjectured that heuristics can often lead to biases and are not error free. This is a most surprising critique. The computational models of heuristics we have tested allow for quantitative predictions of how many errors a given heuristic will make, and we and others have measured the amount of error by analysis, computer simulation, and experiment. This is clear progress over simply giving heuristics labels, such as availability, that do not allow for quantitative comparisons of errors. Evans and Over argue that the reason people rely on heuristics is the accuracy-effort trade-off. However, the comparison between heuristics and more effortful strategies, such as multiple regression, has shown that there are many situations in which a heuristic is more accurate with less effort. Finally, we do not see how the fast and frugal heuristics program could benefit from a dual-process framework unless the dual-process framework is made more precise. Instead, the dual-process framework could benefit if its two “black boxes” (Type 1 and Type 2 processes) were substituted by computational models of both heuristics and other processes.     

Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.     

The Church in an age of human rights

Abstract

This article reviews the complex origins of modern human rights discourse, and the diversity of views hidden within that discourse. It suggests that the Christian Church should locate itself within this complexity by way of four basic categories: as beneficiary of human rights; as object of human rights obligations; as promoter of public justice; and as exemplar of a community of human flourishing. In each case, there needs to be a careful appropriation and critique of the language and reasoning of human rights.     

Traditional and Contemporary Views of Psychological Testing

Using a combination of classical test theory and Rasch item analysis, we developed a short scale designed to measure the effectiveness of mental health treatment across a wide range of mental health services and populations. Item development for the scale was guided by literature review and interviews with senior clinicians and with patients. Using 3 different samples consisting of inpatients, outpatients, and nonpatients, we reduced our initial item pool from 81 to 10 items. The 10-item scale had an alpha of .96 and showed strong correlations with commonly used measures of psychological well-being and distress. Our results suggest that the scale appears to measure a broad domain of psychological health. The scale appeared to lack ceiling and floor effects, and it discriminated between inpatients, outpatients, and nonpatients, suggesting the scale has excellent potential to be broadly responsive to a variety of treatment effects. In addition, the new scale proved to be sensitive to treatment changes in a sample of 20 psychiatric inpatients. Overall, the initial data suggest that we have developed a brief, sensitive outcome measure designed to have wide application across psychiatric and psychological treatments and populations.     

A truth that’s told with bad intent: An ERP study of deception

Human social cognition critically relies on the ability to deceive others. However, the cognitive and neural underpinnings of deception are still poorly understood. Why does lying place increased demands on cognitive control? The present study investigated whether cognitive control processes during deception are recruited due to the need to inhibit a tendency to state the truth, or reflect deceptive intent more generally. We engaged participants in a face-to-face interaction game and examined event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants lied and told the truth with or without deceptive intention. The same medial frontal negative deflection (N450) occurred when participants lied and when they told the truth with deceptive intent. This suggests that the main challenge of lying is not to inhibit a tendency to state the truth. Rather, the challenge is to handle the cognitive conflict resulting from the need to keep others’ mental states in mind while deceiving them.     

A note on a class of probability matching models

Probability matching is shown to be a property of a broad class of models of binary choice behavior.This note is based in part on a section of Feldman's doctoral dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology.     

Doing good by doing nothing? The role of social norms in explaining default effects in altruistic contexts

We explore whether the known preference for default options in choice contexts—default effects—occur in altruistic contexts and the extent to which this can be explained through appeal to social norms. In four experiments, we found that (i) participants were more likely to donate money to charity when this was the default option in an altruistic choice context; (ii) participants perceived the default option to be the socially normative option; (iii) perceptions of social norms mediated the relationship between default status and charitable donations; and (iv) a transfer effect, whereby participants translated social norms they inferred from the default option in one domain into behavior in a second, related domain. Theoretically, our analysis situates default effects within a comprehensive body of social psychological research concerning social norms and the attitude‐behavior relationship, providing novel empirical predictions. Practically, these findings highlight that the way donation policies are framed can have an important impact on donation behavior: in our third study, we found that 81% donated half of their earnings for taking part in the experiment to charity when this was the default option, compared with only 19% when keeping the money was the default. Our work suggests that making use of default effects could be an effective tool to increase altruistic behavior without compromising freedom. © 2014 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.