Effects of reinforcement magnitude and ratio values on behaviour maintained by a cyclic ratio schedule of reinforcement

In Experiments 1 and 2, lever pressing by rats was reinforced on a cyclic ratio schedule of food reinforcement, comprising a repeated sequence of fixed-ratio component schedules. Reinforcement magnitude was varied, on occasional sessions in Experiment 1 and across blocks of sessions in Experiment 2, from one to two or three 45-mg food pellets. In the one-pellet condition, post-reinforcement pauses increased with component schedule value. At higher magnitudes, post-reinforcement pauses increased, and overall response rates declined. Response rate on component schedules was a decreasing linear function of the obtained rate of reinforcement in all conditions. Plotted against component schedule value, response rate increased exponentially to an asymptote that decreased when reinforcement magnitude increased. These findings are consistent with regulatory accounts of food reinforced behaviour. In Experiment 3, rats were trained under a cyclic ratio schedule comprising fixed-ratio components including higher values, and some inverted U-shaped response functions were obtained. Those rats that did not showthis relationship were trained on cyclic ratios with even higher values, and all showed inverted U-shaped response functions. This suggests that behaviour on cyclic ratio schedules can reflect activating of reinforcement as well as the satiating effects seen in Experiments 1 and 2.     

Macrosocial determinants of social integration: Social class and area effect

Theory and research on social support have paid little attention to the existence of important macrosocial variables determining level and content of social relationships. This study examines variations in social integration as a function of social class and residential area characteristics. Results for 234 subjects living in high and low risk neighbourhoods indicated that differences between higher and lower social class groups follow different patterns in different residential areas. Also, same social class position appeared to have different significance as a function of residential area characteristics. The levels of three social integration measures—community integration and satisfaction, community association and participation, and contribution in community organizations—were significantly higher for lower class in low risk neighbourhoods than in high risk ones. However, significant differences were found in only one measure for higher social class groups, with higher levels of community association and participation in high risk neighbourhoods than in low risk ones. The discussion examines a ‘social impoverishment’ hypothesis for high risk environments, and proposes possible protective factors for higher status residents. Relations between formal and informal sources of support, and implications for social intervention strategies are also considered.     

Dimensions of interpersonal orientation: Cross-cultural studies regarding the structure of the ‘DOI Kit’

The DOI Kit is a four-version instrument (Junior Self and Other-Report, and Adult Self-and Other-Report) developed in Spain to measure ‘Dimensions of Interpersonal Orientation’ (Spanish: ‘Dimensiones de Orientación Interpersonal’ or DOI), which are defined as prevalent postures in interpersonal behaviour. The DOI Kit has six first-level scales that collapse into two broad oblique dimensions: Prosocial versus Antisocial Behaviour, and Sociability versus Unsociability.The aim of this article is to find out whether the first- and second-level structure of the Spanish DOI Kit can also be applied to data gathered in Chile and in Germany. A total of eight groups of data were studied. In order to find the best common structure for Spanish, Chilean, and German samples, Simultaneous Component Analysis (SCA) was applied. SCA shows an excellent replication of the original DOI Kit structure. This is also found when separate factor analyses (varimax and oblimin rotations) are performed.     

The effects of varied retrieval cues on reminiscence in eyewitness memory

Eyewitnesses sometimes recall things at later interviews that they did not recall at previous interviews (reminiscence). When these cases are argued in the courtroom, attorneys may claim (and judges may warn jurors) that eyewitnesses who provide reminiscences are necessarily inaccurate witnesses. Consequently, their testimony may be prematurely discredited or dismissed. We examined here the role of varying the retrieval cues across interviews to account for reminiscence. Participants watched a videotaped mock crime and were tested for recall on two occasions using the same or different cues. Results supported the hypothesis that varying retrieval cues increases the amount of reminiscence. Furthermore, nearly all participants exhibited some reminiscence. Finally, reminiscence was not significantly correlated with overall accuracy of testimony. These findings suggest that many of the assumptions underlying legal tactics and judges' instructions regarding reminiscent inconsistencies are erroneous. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Amending Frege’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grundgesetze der Arithmetik</Emphasis>

Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. This system is, except for minor differences, second-order logic together with an abstraction operator governed by Frege’s Axiom V. A few years ago, Richard Heck showed that the ramified predicative second-order fragment of the Grundgesetze is consistent. In this paper, we show that the above fragment augmented with the axiom of reducibility for concepts true of only finitely many individuals is still consistent, and that elementary Peano arithmetic (and more) is interpretable in this extended system.     

The Ethics of Producing In Vitro Meat

The prospect of consumable meat produced in a laboratory setting without the need to raise and slaughter animals is both realistic and exciting. Not only could such in vitro meat become popular due to potential cost savings, but it also avoids many of the ethical and environmental problems with traditional meat productions. However, as with any new technology, in vitro meat is likely to face some detractors. We examine in detail three potential objections: 1) in vitro meat is disrespectful, either to nature or to animals; 2) it will reduce the number of happy animals in the world; and 3) it will open the door to cannibalism. While each objection has some attraction, we ultimately find that all can be overcome. The upshot is that in vitro meat production is generally permissible and, especially for ethical vegetarians, worth promoting.     

What 4′33″ Is

What is John Cage's 4′33″? This paper disambiguates this question into three sub-questions concerning, respectively, the work's ontological nature, the art form to which it belongs, and the genre it is in. We shall see that the work's performances consist of silence (rather than containing environmental sounds), that it is a work of performance art (rather than music), and that it belongs to the genre of conceptual art. Seeing the work in these ways helps us to understand it better, and promises to assuage somewhat the puzzlement and irritation of those who are at first resistant to its charms.     

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’—at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires—even in cases where we expect a precise answer.