What 4′33″ Is

What is John Cage's 4′33″? This paper disambiguates this question into three sub-questions concerning, respectively, the work's ontological nature, the art form to which it belongs, and the genre it is in. We shall see that the work's performances consist of silence (rather than containing environmental sounds), that it is a work of performance art (rather than music), and that it belongs to the genre of conceptual art. Seeing the work in these ways helps us to understand it better, and promises to assuage somewhat the puzzlement and irritation of those who are at first resistant to its charms.     

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’—at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide- with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires—even in cases where we expect a precise answer.     

Purifying impure virtue epistemology

A notorious objection to robust virtue epistemology—the view that an agent knows a proposition if and only if her cognitive success is because of her intellectual virtues—is that it fails to eliminate knowledge-undermining luck. Modest virtue epistemologists agree with robust virtue epistemologists that if someone knows, then her cognitive success must be because of her intellectual virtues, but they think that more is needed for knowledge. More specifically, they introduce independently motivated modal anti-luck principles in their accounts to amend the problem of eliminating luck—this makes their views instances of impure virtue epistemology. The aim of the paper is to argue, firstly, that such a move lacks adequate motivation; secondly, that the resulting impure accounts equally fail to handle knowledge-undermining luck. On a more positive note, these results bolster a more orthodox virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge that assigns a fundamental explanatory role to the notion of ability. In this sense, the paper also sketches an account of ability and a corresponding account of knowledge that explains how success from ability (of the right kind) is incompatible with success from luck.     

Individual Well-Being,Geographical Heterogeneity and Social Capital

This paper argues the relevance of analysing the origins of contextual effects to explain subjective well-being (SWB). Using the 2012 European Social Survey, the study applies social capital indicators to distinguish between-context and between-individual heterogeneity in three multilevel models of happiness and life satisfaction. Five indicators of social capital at individual and regional level are used to measure the trust, networks and norms dimensions of social capital. Random intercept and random slope hierarchical models are used to control for unexplained regional variability. The possibility of aggregated subjective perceptions conditioning, or interacting with, the effects of individual perceptions is also examined. The results show that the regional means of the social capital indicators are useful in explaining not only average levels of SWB (between-context heterogeneity) but also differences in the importance individuals attribute to their social capital (between-individual heterogeneity). The paper also proposes a research agenda to expand the frontier on contextual effects in the new science of well-being.     

Rumination in Children with Social Anxiety Disorder: Effects of Cognitive Distraction and Relation to Social Stress Processing

According to cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (SAD), both anticipatory processing and post-event processing are core mechanisms in disorder maintenance leading to dysfunctional coping with social situations through negative self-evaluation and increased anxiety. To date, little is known about these processes during late childhood, a critical period for disorder development. Further, it remains unclear if dysfunctional rumination in children can be altered through psychotherapeutic interventions such as cognitive distraction. In the current study, children aged 9 to 13 years with SAD and age- and gender-matched healthy controls (HCs, each: n?=?30) participated in an experimental laboratory social stress task while anticipatory processing, post-event processing, subjective anxiety, self-evaluations, and autonomic arousal (skin conductance level) were assessed. Further, the impact of a brief cognitive distraction intervention on post-event processing was assessed. Children with SAD reported more negative anticipatory and post-event processing compared to HC children. Further, negative anticipatory processing was associated with higher subjective anxiety and reduced subjective performance ratings during the social stress task. In the aftermath of the stressor, distraction led to reduced subjective anxiety in the group with SAD and lower autonomic arousal in all children but did not alter post-event processing. The current study suggests that both anticipatory and post-event processing already play a key role in the maintenance of SAD in childhood. While distraction may be beneficial in reducing prolonged subjective anxiety and autonomic arousal after social situations, more research on interventions targeting ruminative processes is needed.