Rapid volitional control of apparent motion during percept generation

How rapidly can one voluntarily influence percept generation? The time course of voluntary visual–spatial attention is well studied, but the time course of intentional control over percept generation is relatively unknown. We investigated the latter question using “one-shot” apparent motion. When a vertical or horizontal pair of squares is replaced by its 90º-rotated version, the bottom-up signal is ambiguous. From this ambiguous signal, it is known that people can intentionally generate a percept of rotation in a desired direction (clockwise or counterclockwise). To determine the time course of this intentional control, we instructed participants to voluntarily induce rotation in a precued direction (clockwise rotation when a high-pitched tone was heard, and counterclockwise rotation when a low-pitched tone was heard), and then to report the direction of rotation that was actually perceived. We varied the delay between the instructional cue and the rotated frame (cue-lead time) from 0 to 1,067 ms. Intentional control became more effective with longer cue-lead times (asymptotically effective at 533 ms). Notably, intentional control was reliable even with a zero cue-lead time; control experiments ruled out response bias and the development of an auditory–visual association as explanations. This demonstrates that people can interpret an auditory cue and intentionally generate a desired motion percept surprisingly rapidly, entirely within the subjectively instantaneous moment in which the visual system constructs a percept of apparent motion.     

Biopsychosocial correlates of weight status perception in Australian adolescents

This study examined the utility of the biopsychosocial model to predict accuracy of weight status perception among Australian adolescents. The factors included in this framework were: age, gender, and BMI-z (biological factors); satisfaction with body weight and shape (psychological factors); socioeconomic status, peer weight (social factors). Cross-sectional data, including measured height and weight, and self-reported weight status, was obtained from 2954 adolescents (mean age = 14.6, 56% male) who participated in the It's Your Move! study. Accuracy of weight status perception was associated with gender, BMI-z, SES, and weight and shape satisfaction. Gender differences in weight status perception were moderated by satisfaction with weight. In boys, weight satisfaction was associated with perceived healthy weight; in girls, it was associated with perceived healthy weight and underweight. Moderately overweight adolescents are most at risk of underestimating their weight status and could benefit from education about the boundaries of the healthy weight range.     

Postural Asymmetries in Response to Holding Evenly and Unevenly Distributed Loads During Self-Selected Stance

The authors examined postural asymmetries during quiet stance and while holding evenly or unevenly distributed loads. Right-hand dominant subjects preferentially loaded their right lower limb when holding no load or a load evenly distributed in both hands, but no differences in center of pressure (CoP) were observed between the left and right limbs. However, longer CoP displacement was observed under the preferentially loaded limb, which may reflect a functional asymmetry that allows quick movement of one limb in response to a potential perturbation. When a load was held only in the nondominant hand, sample entropy decreased in the left (loaded) limb but increased in the right (unloaded) limb, suggesting the unloaded foot compensated for a loss of control flexibility in the loaded foot.     

The German Adaptation and Standardization of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI)

An attempt was made to evaluate the relationship between left-handedness and oppositional tendencies through the use of the White Space (S) response on the Rorschach. Right and left-handed males were administered the Rorschach, and it was found that the left-handed subjects gave significantly more S responses than did the right-handed males. It was felt that the results of this study indicated the existence of a relationship between hand-preference and oppositional tendency. Caution was raised concerning the assumption that oppositional tendencies foster left-handedness. It was pointed out that opposition could also be produced by being left-handed.     

Critique of the Premises and Statistical Methodology of Parapsychology

A city-wide campaign involving various channels of communication was conducted to obtain high school seniors for a survey. Of the 102 seniors who telephoned to make appointments, 56 later attended their assigned questionnaire session. The rate of attendance differed for the communication channels. Newspaper advertisements attracted the most telephone calls but had the lowest attendance rate; notices on bulletin boards in city recreation centers produced the fewest telephone calls but had the highest attendance rate. Other channels, including personal contact, were intermediate in effectiveness. Additional findings were that nonpersonal channels differed in influence, and that exposure through multiple channels resulted in more influence than exposure through only one. The implications of the findings, especially for conceptualizations of channel influence, were noted.     

Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?

In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees of belief play a role in real agents’ reasoning processes. On the other hand, the philosophical literature on reasoning, which relies much less heavily on idealizing assumptions about reasoners than Bayesianism, is almost exclusively concerned with outright belief. One possible explanation for why no philosopher has yet developed an account of reasoning with degrees of belief is that reasoning with degrees of belief is not possible for humans. In this paper, I will consider three arguments for this claim. I will show why these arguments are flawed, and conclude that, at least as far as these arguments are concerned, it seems like there is no good reason why the topic of reasoning with degrees of belief has received so little attention.