Cognitive decline in old age: separating retest effects from the effects of growing older

Repeated administration of cognitive tests improves test performance, making it difficult for researchers to gauge the true extent of age-related cognitive decline. The authors examined this issue using data from the Rush Religious Orders Study and linear mixed-effects models. At annual intervals for up to 8 years, more than 800 older Catholic clergy members completed the same set of 19 cognitive tests from which previously established composite measures of cognitive domains were derived. Retest effects on some measures were substantial and continued to accumulate even after 8 annual test readministrations, but effects on other measures were minimal. Across cognitive measures, retest effects were not related to age, sex, or education. Individual differences in retest effects were substantial but not consistent across cognitive measures. The results suggest that retest-based improvement in cognitive test performance can be substantial and persistent.     

The automatic orienting of attention to goal-relevant stimuli

It is often assumed that attention is automatically allocated to stimuli relevant to one’s actual goals. However, the existing evidence for this idea is limited in several ways. We investigated whether words relevant to a person’s current goal influence the orienting of attention even when an intention to attend to the goal-relevant stimuli is not present. In two experiments, participants performed a modified spatial cueing paradigm combined with a second task that induced a goal. The results of the experiments showed that the induced goal led to the orientation of attention to goal-relevant words in the spatial cueing task. This effect was not found for words semantically related to the goal-relevant words. The results provide evidence for motivational accounts of attention, which state that the automatic allocation of attention is guided by the current goals of a person.     

What is learned when concept learning fails?—A theory of restricted-domain relational learning

Two matching-to-sample (MTS) and four same/different (S/D) experiments employed tests to distinguish between item-specific learning and relational learning. One MTS experiment showed item-specific learning when concept learning failed (i.e., no novel-stimulus transfer). Another MTS experiment showed item-specific learning when pigeons’ novel-stimulus transfer decreased because they chose familiar training comparisons instead of matching novel comparisons. In 8-item and 3-item S/D tasks, pigeons and monkeys were accurate with unfamiliar training-stimulus pairings, stimulus inversions, and distorted stimuli, suggesting relational learning within a domain restricted to the training stimuli (i.e., no novel-stimulus transfer). In 32-item S/D tasks, pigeons with previous 8-item training showed less transfer than those without prior training, suggesting a carryover of restricted-domain relational learning. Pigeons shifted from 1024-item to 8-item S/D tasks showed reinstatement of restricted-domain relational learning. These findings are important in specifying which types of learning occur in these tasks, showing that subjects failing novel-stimulus transfer are not required to switch from item-specific to relational learning as a training set is expanded, and demonstrating that concept learning failure is not proof of item-specific learning.     

Selective exposure: The impact of framing information search instructions as gains and losses

Previous research has found that people prefer information that supports rather than conflicts with their decisions (selective exposure). In the present paper, we investigated whether selective exposure was influenced by the method of information collection. Based on Prospect Theory we hypothesized that the method of selection (MOS), where simply selected pieces of information are considered, would lead to a higher selective exposure compared to the method of elimination (MOE), where pieces of information are rejected and the remaining pieces of information are considered. In fact, we found that participants collected information more selectively when they were instructed to use the MOS compared to the MOE. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Depression and Social Anxiety in Children: Differential Links with Coping Strategies

Strategies that children use for coping with stressors are known to be related to emotional adjustment, but not enough is understood about specific links with social anxiety and depression. The present investigation tested differentiated associations of social anxiety and depression with specific types of coping strategies, and evaluated the direction of these associations over time. In Study 1, 404 children aged 8–13 years completed a coping scale modified from Kochendefer-Ladd and Skinner (Developmental Psychology 38:267-278, 2002) in order to evaluate factor structure and subscale internal consistency. In Study 2, 270 8–11-year-old children completed depression and social anxiety scales, a sociometric survey, and the coping scale from Study 1, with a follow-up timepoint 9 months later. In Study 1, factor analysis revealed six internally consistent coping subscales. In Study 2, social anxiety and depression were found to have distinctive longitudinal associations with subsequent coping strategies. Decreased problem-solving, social support-seeking, and distraction were uniquely predicted by depression but not by social anxiety. Internalising coping was a stronger outcome of social anxiety, and increased externalising was uniquely predicted by depression. There was also some evidence for a moderating role of peer relations. However, none of the coping strategies predicted changes in depression or social anxiety over the two timepoints. These results highlight the impact that emotional adjustment may have on children’s coping strategies, and clarify important distinctions between social anxiety and depression in relation to coping.     

Book reviews

John Christian Laursen (ed.). Religious Toleration: ‘The Variety of Rites’ from Cyrus to Defoe. New York, St Martin's Press, 1999. xx + 252 pp. $45.00. ISBN 0–312–22233–5.

Daniel Garber. Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, £40.00 hb; £14.95 pb. xii + 337 pp. ISBN 0–521–00337–7 pb. 0–521–80279–2 hb.

Olli Koistinen and John Biro (eds). Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. x + 255 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0–19–512815‐X.

Paul Abela. Kant's Empirical Realism. Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 2002. vii + 303 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0–19–924274–7.

Bruce L. Kinzer. England's Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish Question. Toronto, Buffalo, and London, University of Toronto Press, 2001. 292 pp. $60. ISBN 0–8020–4862–5.

Maria Dimova‐Cookson. T. H. Green's Moral and Political Philosophy: A Phenomenological Perspective. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001. £40.00. xiii + 175 pp. ISBN 0–333–9144–7.

Stephen Mulhall. Inheritance &; Originality. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001. £40.00. xii + 448 pp. ISBN 0–19–924390–5.

Paul Gorner. Twentieth‐Century German Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. iii + 225 pp. £12.99. ISBN 0–19–289309–2.

Karen Green. Dummett: Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001. xi + 236 pp. £55.00 (hb), £14.99 (pb). ISBN 0–7456–2294–1 (hb) 0–7456–2295‐X (pb).     

Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions.     

Peer influence on event reports among adolescents and young adults

When two or more people witness an event together, the event report from one person can influence others’ reports. In the current study we examined the role of age and motivational factors on peer influence regarding event reports in adolescents and young adults. Participants (N=249) watched a short video of a robbery then answered questions with no co-witness information or with information believed to be from a co-witness. Public and private response conditions were included to explore motivations for peer influence. Co-witness information influenced participants’ responses, although the effect was equally strong in the private and the public co-witness conditions. Peer influence on event reports was steady across a large age range (11- to 25-year-olds).     

Flashbulb memories: Conceptual and methodological issues

Abstract

Although flashbulb memory research is now well established, it is still not clear exactly what researchers are referring to as flashbulbs, and what is the best way to address the phenomenon. There are at least two ways in which the term “flashbulbs” is used, and at least two conceptual approaches that can be used to research them. The first usage corresponds to the bold theoretical conjectures put forward by Brown and Kulik (1977). The second results from empirical classification and intuitively lacks the essence conveyed by the first meaning. The two approaches concentrate on the cognitive and societal aspects, respectively. Although these are not incompatible, they make different assumptions and use different methodologies. We argue that research should be directed towards more unified theorising, and we describe methodologies appropriate for this approach.