The origins of pictorial competence

Pictorial competence , which refers to the many factors involved in perceiving, interpreting, understanding, and using pictures, develops gradually over the first few years of life. Although experience is not required for accurate perception of pictures, it is necessary for understanding the nature of pictures. Infants initially respond to depicted objects as if they were real objects, and toddlers are remarkably insensitive to picture orientation. Only gradually do young children figure out the nature of pictures and how they are used.     

The Psychology of Respite Care for People with Dementia in Australia

Australian health professional bodies promote the use of respite to ease carer burden, following well‐established findings that carers often face physical, mental, social, and financial strain while providing informal care. This narrative review examined the use and impacts of respite for older clients, with a particular focus on Australian research and on dementia respite. It was found that despite reports of high satisfaction from caregivers with respite use, barriers, such as caregiver concerns for the well‐being and safety of the care recipient during respite, limited flexibility for short‐notice respite booking, and low provision of support and education post respite, impacted on the accessibility and efficacy of respite care. It was concluded that respite care needs to move away from a custodial model to a more psychological model of care, and that more natural and flexible models (e.g., host family respite), integrated with increased post‐respite support and psychosocial education, are likely to be beneficial and need further evaluation.     

The screen function of unconscious fantasy

Although being a fundamental concept in psychoanalysis, fantasy is an ambiguous term. It covers a vast field of conscious and unconscious phenomena, from daydreaming, the manifest narration of the patient’s world of imagination to unconscious fantasy and primal fantasy. Further, it introduces the delicate alternatives of imaginary versus real, subject versus object and internal versus external. Following Freud’s reflections on the ambiguity of fantasy, we arrive at an idea introduced by Freud himself, but elaborated years later by Lacan. Fantasy, accordingly, is seen as a screen which both reveals and conceals. Our aim is to demonstrate, theoretical as well as clinical, how unconscious fantasy serves as a window into not only repressed wishes and conflicts, but also the most primary scenes where the subject may not even have a specific place. Simultaneously, it is the site of protection and defence, including projection and denial, but also repetition of what we will call the identical. A clinical case will be presented to illustrate our theoretical ideas and their clinical implications.     

The impact of environmental experiences on symptoms of anxiety and depression across the life span

Symptoms of anxiety and depression are relatively stable over time. Can this stability be explained by genetic influences, or is it caused by the long-lasting effects of accumulating environmental experiences? To address this question, we analyzed longitudinally assessed symptoms of anxiety and depression in eight samples of monozygotic twins of widely varying ages. These samples were drawn from American and European population-based registries. Using hierarchical linear modeling, we examined individual differences and individual changes in the level of symptoms over time. This method enabled us to decompose the variance into the predictable variance shared by both members of each pair of twins, the differences between individuals within pairs, and the residual variance. We then modeled how these components of individual variation changed over time. Within pairs, the twins' predicted levels of symptoms increasingly diverged from childhood until late adulthood, at which point the divergence ceased. By middle adulthood, environmental experiences contributed substantially to stable and predictable interindividual differences in levels of anxiety and depression.     

THE EXTERNAL OBSERVER AND THE LENS OF THE PATIENT-ANALYST MATCH

A focus on the match between patient and analyst places attention on the dynamic effect of the interaction of character and conflict of both participants on the process that evolves between them. Match is neither a predictive nor static concept. Rather it refers to an unfolding transaction that itself shifts and changes during the course of analytic work. The treating analyst's perception of the effect of this match is by necessity limited by the analyst's own blind spots and other countertransference phenomena. Reporting the analyst's clinical experience to an analytically trained observer, external to the dyad, may broaden the analyst's perspective. Using the lens of the match, a colleague in the role of supervisor, consultant or peer can provide feedback from which the analyst may acquire insight. As a result of this process, the influence that the participants' similarities and differences have upon each other becomes clear to the analyst. This awareness, in turn, may lead the analyst to appreciate the effect of the analyst's stance of distance or closeness and to evaluate whether at this phase of treatment it is beneficial or detrimental to the analytic process. Clinical illustrations of the effect of the external observer's feedback in relation to the patient—analyst match are provided.     

The influence of peers on young adult substance use.

Data collected from 294 young adults, ages 19 to 25, and both a same- and an opposite-gender best friend or mate across 3 annual assessments were analyzed to examine the similarity to and influence of the peer on the young adult's substance use. The authors found similarity across time between both peers and the young adult in cigarette use, alcohol use, binge drinking, and, in most cases, marijuana use. In prospective analyses, peer use predicted young adult cigarette use, binge drinking, and problem use by the young adults. Results were generally consistent across gender and for both same- and opposite-gender peers. Findings emphasize peer influence contribution to young adult substance use and suggest the design of interventions that involve both young adults and their peers.     

The Satir Model with Female Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse

Child sexual abuse is a recognized problem in the United States and Canada. There are several approaches to therapy with adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. This article discusses Virginia Satir's model of therapy as it applies to sexual abuse. The emphasis of the Satir model is on transforming the impact of the abuse, no matter how the client chooses to process her relationship with the abuse, and is illustrated through a case study.     

Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move

The idea that our conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a report suggesting that the brain starts to prepare for a movement before the person concerned has consciously decided to move (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Libet et al. claimed that their results show that our actions are not consciously initiated. The current article describes two experiments in which we attempted to replicate Libet et al.'s comparison of participants' movement-related brain activity with the reported times of their decisions to move and also the reported times of their decisions of which hand to move. We also looked at the distribution of participants' reports over time to evaluate an alternative explanation of Libet et al.'s (1983) results. Although the Readiness Potential was usually present before all of the decisions to move, consistent with the findings of Keller and Heckhausen (1990) and Libet et al. (1983), we found that many reported decision times were before the onset of the Lateralized Readiness Potential, which measures hand-specific movement preparation. The latter finding is consistent with the conclusion that the LRP always started after the conscious decision to move. We conclude that even though activity related to movement anticipation may be present before a conscious decision to move, the cortical preparation necessary for the movement to happen immediately may not start until after the conscious decision to move.