Is Imagination Introspective?

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.     

Lasting effects of alcohol: Subliminal alcohol cues,impairment expectancies,and math performance

Many people believe that drinking alcohol reduces cognitive performance, and prior research has shown such expectancy‐related impairment even when people merely thought that the (non‐alcoholic) drink they consumed contained alcohol. This study tested whether subliminal priming with alcohol‐related cues would similarly result in expectancy‐consistent cognitive performance decrements. Additionally, the moderating role of alcohol use was examined. After assessing participants' baseline math performance, participants were primed with alcohol‐related or neutral words and then completed a post‐treatment math task. Whereas impairment expectancies had no influence on math performance in control participants, expectancies predicted math performance for participants primed with alcohol‐related words. As hypothesized, expectancy‐consistent impairment in performance was only observed among high alcohol users. The current findings suggest that, in the presence of alcohol‐related cues in the environment, some people may perform less on cognitive tasks even in the absence of actual or assumed alcohol consumption and without being aware of it. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Linking self and ingroup: Self‐anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social identification

The present paper investigates how cognitive projection processes instigate social identification. We complement the classical self‐stereotyping approach (i.e., conforming to prototypical group norms) by investigating self‐anchoring (i.e., projection from self to group) as a distinct cognitive route to social identification. Self‐anchoring has mainly been investigated as predictor of intergroup differentiation. Surprisingly, no reliable link has been provided yet between self‐anchoring and social identification. In Study 1, we provide first evidence for this positive link. In Study 2, we add self‐stereotyping to our model and show that self‐anchoring is still positively related to social identification when controlling for self‐stereotyping. Additionally, we show that self‐anchoring is positively related to affective components of identification, while self‐stereotyping is positively related to cognitive components. Moreover, we examined the impact of self‐concept stability on self‐anchoring. Self‐concept stability was positively related to self‐anchoring, and hence to social identification (Study 1), independently from self‐stereotyping (Study 2). In the discussion, we argue that disentangling self‐anchoring from self‐stereotyping is important as it increases our insight in how people identify, and how this may vary depending on self‐concept and group context. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Quine on Hume and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.     

Biased allocation of faces to social categories

Three studies show that social categorization is biased at the level of category allocation. In all studies, participants categorized faces. In Studies 1 and 2, participants overallocated faces with criminal features--a stereotypical negative trait--to the stigmatized Moroccan category, especially if they were prejudiced. On the contrary, the stereotype-irrelevant negative trait stupid did not lead to overallocation to the Moroccan category. In Study 3, using the stigmatized category homosexual, the previously used negative trait criminal--irrelevant to the homosexual stereotype--did not lead to overallocation, but the stereotype-relevant positive trait femininity did. These results demonstrate that normative fit is higher for faces with stereotype-relevant features regardless of valence. Moreover, individual differences in implicit prejudice predicted the extent to which stereotype-relevant traits elicited overallocation: Whereas more negatively prejudiced people showed greater overallocation of faces associated with negative stereotype-relevant traits, they showed less overallocation of faces associated with positive stereotype-relevant traits. These results support our normative fit hypothesis: In general, normative fit is better for faces with stereotypical features. Moreover, normative fit is enhanced for prejudiced individuals when these features are evaluatively congruent. Social categorization thus may be biased in itself.