Sexual differences in memory in shiny cowbirds

Avian brood parasites depend on other species, the hosts, to raise their offspring. During the breeding season, parasitic cowbirds (Molothrus sp.) search for potential host nests to which they return for laying a few days after first locating them. Parasitic cowbirds have a larger hippocampus/telencephalon volume than non-parasitic species; this volume is larger in the sex involved in nest searching (females) and it is also larger in the breeding than in the non-breeding season. In nature, female shiny cowbirds Molothrus bonariensis search for nests without the male’s assistance. Here we test whether, in association with these neuroanatomical and behavioural differences, shiny cowbirds display sexual differences in a memory task in the laboratory. We used a task consisting of finding food whose location was indicated either by the appearance or the location of a covering disk. Females learnt to retrieve food faster than males when food was associated with appearance cues, but we found no sexual differences when food was associated with a specific location. Our results are consistent with the view that parasitism and its neuroanatomical correlates affect performance in memory tasks, but the effects we found were not in the expected direction, emphasising that the nature of avian hippocampal function and its sexual differences are not yet understood. Received: 30 April 1998 / Accepted after revision: 5 September 1998     

Perceptual reasons

The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear (illusions, broadly speaking) or where there is no perceived object at all (hallucinations). The main problem with Phenomenalism is that it struggles with good cases: cases where everything is perfectly normal and the external object is correctly perceived, so that one’s perceptual beliefs are knowledge. In this paper we show that there is a theory of perceptual reasons that avoids the problems for Factualism and Phenomenalism. We call this view Propositionalism. We use ‘proposition’ broadly to mean the entities that are contents of beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. The key to finding a middle ground between Phenomenalism and Factualism, we claim, is to allow our reasons to be false in bad cases. Despite being false, they are about the external world, not our phenomenal states.     

Is Age Just a Number? Cognitive Reserve as a Predictor of Divergent Thinking in Late Adulthood

The purpose of the study was to test a model of causal relationships among cognitive reserve (CR), personality variables such as Neuroticism and Openness to experience, and divergent thinking (DT), independently evaluating performance in different domains (verbal and graphic). It was hypothesized that CR, Openness, and Neuroticism would each directly influence verbal and graphic DT. A total of 135 subjects between 55 and 84 years old participated in the study and were interviewed in individual sessions. For a correct fit Neuroticism was eliminated from the measurement model. The goodness-of-fit indexes of the measurement model, the adequate composite reliability index and the discriminant validity supported the viability of the structural equation model (SEM). The goodness-of-fit indexes confirmed the existence of a significant effect of CR and Openness to experience in predicting both verbal and graphic DT. The three CR indicators had high loadings in their theoretical factor, with the observed variables study-work and WAIS vocabulary showing the highest loads. In summary, subjects with CR and Openness to experience were more flexible and original when solving verbal problems, and to a lesser degree, graphic problems.     

Differences in false recollection according to the cognitive reserve of healthy older people

We present an associative recognition experiment comparing three samples of healthy people (young people, older people with high cognitive reserve [HCR], and older people with low cognitive reserve [LCR], with each sample consisting of 40 people), manipulating stimuli repetition during the study phase. The results show significant differences among the three samples in their overall performance. However, these differences are not due to a different use of familiarity, but rather due to a different way of using recollection: although there are no differences in the hit rates between the HRC and LRC samples, the LCR group makes significantly more recollective false alarms than the HCR group. Moreover, repetition provokes an increase in the recollective false alarms in the LCR group, but this does not occur in the group of young people or in the HCR group. These findings are explained in terms of recollection-based monitoring errors and seem to provide support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis.     

Source Monitoring and Executive Function in 2.5- to 3-Year-Olds

Hala, Brown, McKay, and San Juan (2013) found that children as young as 2.5 years of age demonstrated high levels of accuracy when asked to recall whether they or the experimenter had carried out a particular action. In the research reported here, we examined the relation of early-emerging source monitoring to executive function abilities. Participants were children aged 2.5- to 3-years old. For the source-monitoring procedure, we used the Hala et al. (2013) task in which children and the experimenter took turns placing a total of 20 items on a model farm (encoding phase). For the source memory test, children were asked who had placed each item (retrieval phase). Executive function measures included assessments of working memory, delay-inhibitory control, and conflict-inhibitory control. The main finding was that inhibitory control measures were significantly related to performance on the source-monitoring task. This relation held for the conflict-inhibitory control measures even when controlling for age and vocabulary. The findings of this research suggest that even at the early age of 2.5 years, development of executive control is linked to the emergence of source-monitoring ability.     

Mental Attention, Consciousness, and the Progressive Emergence of Wisdom

I discuss the mental–attentional mechanisms of consciousness, meditation, and the emergence of wisdom. A developmental (neoPiagetian), dynamic flash-light model of mental attention is used. I model the initial stages of consciousness in infancy, showing that the growth of consciousness is influenced by the number of schemes that attention can coordinate. I discuss ordinary consciousness in adults and the stages/levels of adult development in consciousness. Wisdom is defined as an expectable but often missed outcome of adult development. To accelerate access to wisdom, two complementary paths are mentioned: a natural life-experience path and a meditation path. Maturational organismic factors and the role of mental attentional mechanisms in these two paths are discussed, and a constructivist neuropsychological model of what happens in the brain during meditation, and in higher consciousness, is sketched. Processes involved in higher stages of consciousness are then examined from this perspective.     

Different faces of (un)controllability: Control restoration modulates the efficiency of task switching

Uncontrollability has been often associated with impaired or rigid cognitive processing. However, perceived stability of uncontrollable events modulated some of these detrimental effects on cognition. We investigated whether the experience of sequential control loss and restoration can enhance cognitive flexibility. We manipulated uncontrollability using a concept formation procedure that entailed either only unsolvable tasks (control deprivation condition), unsolvable tasks followed by solvable ones (control restoration condition) or only solvable tasks (control condition). To assess cognitive flexibility, we used a task-switching procedure that incorporated social categories. In Experiment 1 participants categorized people based on gender or age, and in Experiment 2 and 3 based on gender or social roles. Participants showed more flexibility in control restoration than in control deprivation condition. Additionally, in Experiments 2 and 3 this effect was mainly pronounced in the condition where the task evoked more cognitive conflict. We discuss the motivational underpinnings of unstable experiences of control loss and restoration.