Explanation and Manipulation1

I argue that manipulationist theories of causation fail as accounts of causal structure, and thereby as theories of “actual causation” and causal explanation. I focus on two kinds of problem cases, which I call “Perceived Abnormality Cases” and “Ontological Dependence Cases.” The cases illustrate that basic facts about social systems—that individuals are sensitive to perceived abnormal conditions and that certain actions metaphysically depend on institutional rules—pose a challenge for manipulationist theories and for counterfactual theories more generally. I then show how law‐based accounts of causal structure can answer such challenges. The moral of the story is that the basic manipulationist idea that our interest in causal structure is driven by our interest in manipulating our environment faces decisive problems in a central domain of application, the social sciences.     

An eye‐tracking study on information processing in risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes

Many everyday decisions have to be made under risk and can be interpreted as choices between gambles with different outcomes that are realized with specific probabilities. The underlying cognitive processes were investigated by testing six sets of hypotheses concerning choices, decision times, and information search derived from cumulative prospect theory, decision field theory, priority heuristic and parallel constraint satisfaction models. Our participants completed 40 decision tasks of two gambles with two non‐negative outcomes each. Information search was recorded using eye‐tracking technology. Results for choices, decision time, the amount of information searched for, fixation durations, the direction of the information search, and the distribution of fixations conflict with the prediction of the non‐compensatory priority heuristic and indicate that individuals use compensatory strategies. Choice proportions are well in line with the predictions of cumulative prospect theory. Process measures indicate that individuals thereby do not rely on deliberate calculations of weighted sums. Information integration processes seem to be better explained by models that partially rely on automatic processes such as decision field theory or parallel constraint satisfaction models. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Assimilation and contrast effects: The role of self‐construal and regulatory focus as moderators in collectivistic cultures of honour

Human judgments are context dependent. When answering a question about one's overall satisfaction with life, a previous question about one's romantic life might pose redundancy problems influencing one's judgment of life satisfaction, something known as item order effects. However, in order to detect such redundancy, one needs to pay attention to the context of the conversation. Any variable that influences the amount of attention given the context of the conversation can determine whether the presumed redundancy is detected or not. In three studies, two experiments and one correlational study, we tested the influence of induced self‐construal (study 1) and self‐regulatory focus (study 2) and self‐regulatory focus measured as an individual difference variable (study 3) as moderators of context effects among college students from Mexico. In study 1, participants induced to have an independent mindset were less likely to detect the redundancy posed by two questions, resulting, as predicted, in a contrast effect. In study 3, participants with lower levels of prevention focus were less likely to detect the redundancy posed by the same two questions as study 1, resulting, as predicted, in an assimilation effect. The implications of the results were discussed within the framework of the inclusion/exclusion model.     

Introspection,Anton's Syndrome,and Human Echolocation

Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don't know it, and people who echolocate, but don't know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton's syndrome, human echolocation, and ‘facial vision’ suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.