Neurophysiologic markers of primary motor cortex for laryngeal muscles and premotor cortex in caudal opercular part of inferior frontal gyrus investigated in motor speech disorder: a navigated transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study

Transcranial magnetic stimulation studies have so far reported the results of mapping the primary motor cortex (M1) for hand and tongue muscles in stuttering disorder. This study was designed to evaluate the feasibility of repetitive navigated transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) for locating the M1 for laryngeal muscle and premotor cortical area in the caudal opercular part of inferior frontal gyrus, corresponding to Broca’s area in stuttering subjects by applying new methodology for mapping these motor speech areas. Sixteen stuttering and eleven control subjects underwent rTMS motor speech mapping using modified patterned rTMS. The subjects performed visual object naming task during rTMS applied to the (a) left M1 for laryngeal muscles for recording corticobulbar motor-evoked potentials (CoMEP) from cricothyroid muscle and (b) left premotor cortical area in the caudal opercular part of inferior frontal gyrus while recording long latency responses (LLR) from cricothyroid muscle. The latency of CoMEP in control subjects was 11.75 ± 2.07 ms and CoMEP amplitude was 294.47 ± 208.87 µV, and in stuttering subjects CoMEP latency was 12.13 ± 0.75 ms and 504.64 ± 487.93 µV CoMEP amplitude. The latency of LLR in control subjects was 52.8 ± 8.6 ms and 54.95 ± 4.86 in stuttering subjects. No significant differences were found in CoMEP latency, CoMEP amplitude, and LLR latency between stuttering and control-fluent speakers. These results indicate there are probably no differences in stuttering compared to controls in functional anatomy of the pathway used for transmission of information from premotor cortex to the M1 cortices for laryngeal muscle representation and from there via corticobulbar tract to laryngeal muscles.     

Helping Enemies Communicate

Serbia’s northern province of Vojvodina has historically been home to people of different religions, cultures, and languages. Over the past century, the region experienced three wars and tremendous demographic change, which led to inter-group conflict. Projection and projective identification are dominant mechanisms in these social groups; distrust is prevalent, stemming from a series of transgenerational events and memory transmissions. A large group was formed from members of different ethnic groups with the intention of enabling the participants to gain awareness of their own role in these national/religious conflicts. This article discusses the formation and outcome of this experiment.     

Work Engagement of Dual-Working Couples: Dissimilarity and Its Relation to Both Partners’ Well-Being

Work engagement is a positive, fulfilling, work-related state of mind that is characterized by vigor, dedication, and absorption. Work engaged individuals not only function better at work, but also transfer these benefits to home - research has shown that work engagement crosses over between marital partners. In previous studies on crossover, this phenomenon was evidenced only by significant correlation between self-reports of partners’ work engagement, while measures of dissimilarity between partners were completely ignored. However, work engagement dissimilarity - with one partner being highly enthusiastic and immersed in his/her work and the other one lowly - could be related to some aspects of both partners’ well-being and might improve its prediction. Hence, the goal of this study was to examine work engagement dissimilarity within dual-earning couples. In addition to self-report measures, we collected partners’ ratings of work engagement and its subdimensions as well. The data collected on 178 dual-working Croatian couples showed significant correlation of overall work engagement, vigor, dedication and absorption between various pairs of self- and other-ratings measures (partners’ self-ratings; self-ratings and partner’s ratings; and partner’s self-ratings and his/her ratings of work engagement of the partner). Moreover, difference in self-ratings and ratings of partner’s work engagement showed negative correlation with life satisfaction of both partners, suggesting that work engagement dissimilarity has a potential to be related to some aspects of partners’ well-being.     

Social Desirability Scales as Indicators of Self-Enhancement and Impression Management

This article presents 2 studies testing Paulhus's (2002) assumption that unconscious self-enhancement and conscious impression management represent separate processes of socially desirable responding (SDR) that can be observed within 2 content domains (egoistic and moralistic bias). In Study 1, we devised egoistic and moralistic SDR scales intended to measure self-enhancement in honest responding and impression management under demands for positive self-presentation. In Study 2, we correlated scores on these scales with external indicators of self-enhancement and impression management. In honest responding, both SDR scales most strongly correlated with self-enhancement indicators, whereas under demands for positive self-presentation they correlated more strongly with external measures of impression management.     

The function debate: between “cheap tricks” and evolutionary neutrality

We examine the use of the notion of natural selection in the philosophical debate on functions in biology. This debate has been largely shaped by the way in which different accounts assess various selective pressures in justifying claims about biological functions. Cummins (Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 157–172, 2002), one of the main proponents of the causal role account of biological functions, argues that a correctly understood neo-Darwinian notion of natural selection has nothing to do with functional talk in biology. In this paper, we counter Cummins’ account by showing that progress in the molecular approaches to evolutionary biology—specifically scientific data available in neo-functionalization research—offers valuable support to the etiological selectionist approach to functions in biological and biologically-related sciences. Finally, we use the presented data to build our own account of biological functions, which tries to avoid the wrong turns taken by both major strands in the biological function debate, namely causal role and etiological accounts. According to our account, the function of a certain gene or a protein in the biological system that contains it is a particular causal activity, or a group of causal activities whose manifestation is in a specific way determined by corresponding mechanisms of genetic expression. Also, we argue that in many important cases this particular expression of genetic activity was positively selected at a certain point in evolutionary history. Since we take selection as an important but not the only factor that grounds biological functions, we are committed to a weak etiological account.     

Knowledge‐lies re‐examined

Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ～p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p (in a room full of obvious liars, you will trust no one), which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed.