Teaching social perception skills to adolescents with autism and intellectual disabilities using video‐based group instruction

Few interventions focus on teaching social skills to adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and intellectual disabilities (ID) that are consistently used during interactions with peers ( Carter et al., 2014). The present study evaluated the effects of video‐based group instruction (VGI) on the acquisition of social perception skills of five adolescents with ASD or ID in a public school setting. Social perception involves observing affective behaviors of others, discriminating relevant environmental stimuli, and differentially reinforcing the affective behavior of another person. Typically developing peers supported VGI implementation as social partners for participants. A multiple probe design across behaviors demonstrated the effectiveness of VGI for teaching social perception skills. Four of five participants acquired and maintained the targeted social perception skills, and we observed some transfer to a nontreatment setting. Results of this study suggest VGI may support the acquisition of social perception among adolescents with ASD or ID.     

Spiritual Openness,Revisiting a Potentially Important Aspect of Spirituality: Scale Review and Revision

Religiousness and spirituality (R/S) exert important influences on individuals across a range of domains. Spiritual Openness is theoretically linked with the personality trait of Openness to Experience, suggesting promise for future research. Using responses from 366 undergraduates on the Spiritual Experience Index-Revised (SEI-R: subscales of Spiritual Openness and Spiritual Support), analyses evaluated and revised the SEI-R, deleting poor items and generating a 10-item measure. The new SEI-S exhibits better psychometric properties and reduced participant burden, and subscales displayed a curvilinear relationship in which increases in Spiritual Openness showed a trade-off in levels of Spiritual Support.     

Intuitions about declining marginal utility

In two studies, subjects judged the desirability of distributions of life expectancy or money. Their judgments showed declining marginal utility. That is, they were less sensitive to changes at the high end of each scale. Subjects also made utility ratings of the outcomes of individuals. And they made ratings of the distributions when these were described in terms of utility ratings rather than goods (years or dollars). The judgments of utility ratings showed equivalent declining marginal utility, even though they were based on utilities that themselves declined marginally. People extend their intuition about declining marginal utility to utility itself, as if utility had utility that declined marginally. In one experiment, a similar result was found with gambles: people are risk averse for utility as well as for money. We argue that this is an overextension of a reasonable heuristic and that this heuristic may account for one classic objection to utilitarian distributions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

A MODEST MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

We formulate a new modal ontological argument; specifically, we show that there is a possible world in which an entity that has at least the property of omnipotence exists. Then we argue that if such an entity is possible, it is necessary as well.     

Why do narcissists take more risks? Testing the roles of perceived risks and benefits of risky behaviors

Much prior research demonstrates that narcissists take more risks than others, but almost no research has examined what motivates this behavior. The present study tested two potential driving mechanisms of risk-taking by narcissists (i.e., heightened perceptions of benefits and diminished perceptions of risks stemming from risky behaviors) by administering survey measures of narcissism and risk-taking to a sample of 605 undergraduate college students. Contrary to what might be expected, the results suggest that narcissists appreciate the risks associated with risky behaviors just as much as do less narcissistic individuals. Their risk-taking appears to instead be fueled by heightened perceptions of benefits stemming from risky behaviors. These results are consistent with a growing body of evidence suggesting that narcissists engage in some forms of potentially problematic behaviors, such as risk-taking, because of a surplus of eagerness rather than a deficit of inhibition.     

Multiple cognitive control effects of error likelihood and conflict

Recent work on cognitive control has suggested a variety of performance monitoring functions of the anterior cingulate cortex such as errors, conflict, error likelihood, and others. Given the variety of monitoring effects, a corresponding variety of control effects on behavior might be expected. This paper explores whether conflict and error likelihood produce distinct cognitive control effects on behavior, as measured by response time. A Change signal task (Brown & Braver, Science 307:1118–1121, 2005) was modified to include conditions of likely errors due to tardy as well as premature responses in conditions with and without conflict. The results discriminate between competing hypotheses of independent versus interacting conflict and error likelihood control effects. Specifically, the results suggest that the likelihood of premature versus tardy response errors can lead to multiple distinct control effects, which are independent of cognitive control effects driven by response conflict. As a whole, the results point to the existence of multiple distinct cognitive control mechanisms and challenge existing models of cognitive control that incorporate only a single control signal.     

An Examination of the Glover Numbing Scale: Expanding the Content Validity of Posttraumatic Numbing

Quantification of posttraumatic numbing (PTN) has largely been limited to the assessment of a small number of items taken directly from the DSM. The current study takes steps to expand the content validity of PTN through examination of the Glover Numbing Scale (GNS), one of the few available measures specific to PTN. Specifically, the factor structure of the GNS and its convergence with DSM-based indices of PTN were examined in a sample of motor vehicle accident survivors (MVA; N = 288). Whereas the 5-factor structure originally proposed by Glover et al. Anxiety 1:70–79 (1994) evidenced a poor fit to the sample data, exploratory analysis suggested a 1-factor structure underlying data collected from the sample. Furthermore, GNS scores derived from this solution evidenced a strong convergent relationship with DSM-based PTN. These data suggest that alternative indicators contained within the GNS may be used to expand current conceptualizations of PTN.