Stop talking about fake news!

Since 2016, there has been an explosion of academic work that fixes its subject matter using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. In this paper, I argue that this terminology is not up to scratch, and that academics and journalists ought to completely stop using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. I set out three arguments for abandonment. First, that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ do not have stable public meanings, entailing that they are either nonsense, context-sensitive, or contested. Secondly, that these terms are unnecessary, because we already have a rich vocabulary for thinking about epistemic dysfunction. Thirdly, I observe that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ have propagandistic uses, meaning that using these terms legitimates anti-democratic propaganda, and risks smuggling bad ideology into conversations.     

Color constancy and dispositionalism

This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of the most challenging objections that have been pressed against it. It explains why colors do not seem to “come on” when the lights come on, and why the right thing to say seems to be that the light causes the objects to reveal their colors. It explains why the content of visual experience need not be problematically circular. It eliminates the problem of intrapersonal variation in color appearance. And it even provides resources for dealing with the problem of interpersonal variation. It is true that in moving to the more complex view, the dispositionalist becomes subject to a new objection, which has been called “the problem of unity.” The paper offers a solution to this problem as well.     

Ideomotor perception modulates visuospatial cueing

The ideomotor theory of action posits that the cognitive representation of an action includes the learned perceptual effects of the action. Support for this theory has come from studies demonstrating how perceptual features that match the outcome of a response can facilitate selection of that response. We investigated another, complementary implication of ideomotor theory: would a bias toward selecting a response result in a perceptual bias toward the known effect of the response? In other words, would an action tendency direct attention to the anticipated perceptual features? Through an initial acquisition phase, participants learned that two possible responses (left/right keypress) consistently produced two distinct colors. Next, in a test phase, we manipulated response bias at the beginning of each trial, using an uninformative spatial prime presented at the left or right periphery. We then examined the extent to which color transients that either matched or mismatched the induced response bias can orient participants’ visual attention. Results revealed a perceptual bias toward the color effect of the primed response, manifested in a stronger visual orienting toward this color. Thus, biasing response selection can bias perception. These findings extend the scope of the ideomotor theory to visual perceptual processes.     

Pigeons' discrimination of Michotte's launching effect

We trained four pigeons to discriminate a Michotte launching animation from three other animations using a go/no-go task. The pigeons received food for pecking at one of the animations, but not for pecking at the others. The four animations featured two types of interactions among objects: causal (direct launching) and noncausal (delayed, distal, and distal & delayed). Two pigeons were reinforced for pecking at the causal interaction, but not at the noncausal interactions; two other pigeons were reinforced for pecking at the distal & delayed interaction, but not at the other interactions. Both discriminations proved difficult for the pigeons to master; later tests suggested that the pigeons often learned the discriminations by attending to subtle stimulus properties other than the intended ones.     

Toward Mapping Daily Challenges of Living with ADHD: Maternal and Child Perspectives Using Electronic Diaries

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has an impact on the family as well as the affected child. This study developed and tested an electronic diary for mapping the challenges of everyday family life in a sample of children with ADHD being treated with pharmacotherapy. Across 7 days, mothers and children (27 ADHD; 25 non-ADHD) independently reported their moods, behaviors, and social contexts every 30 min during nonschool hours. Symptomatic behaviors and negative moods were elevated in the ADHD group, combined with maternal perceptions of lower parenting effectiveness and quality of life. Differences in the contexts of maternal anger were salient, with mothers in the ADHD group more often angry when with their children and comparison mothers more often angry when not. Although mothers' diaries were more informative, children's diaries also distinguished the two groups, especially during mornings and weekends. The need for family-wide interventions, the utility of child self-reports, and the promise of electronic diaries are discussed.     

Optimal predictions in everyday cognition

Human perception and memory are often explained as optimal statistical inferences that are informed by accurate prior probabilities. In contrast, cognitive judgments are usually viewed as following error-prone heuristics that are insensitive to priors. We examined the optimality of human cognition in a more realistic context than typical laboratory studies, asking people to make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday phenomena such as human life spans and the box-office take of movies. Our results suggest that everyday cognitive judgments follow the same optimal statistical principles as perception and memory, and reveal a close correspondence between people's implicit probabilistic models and the statistics of the world.     

They all look the same to me (unless they're angry): from out-group homogeneity to out-group heterogeneity

People often find it more difficult to distinguish ethnic out-group members compared with ethnic in-group members. A functional approach to social cognition suggests that this bias may be eliminated when out-group members display threatening facial expressions. In the present study, 192 White participants viewed Black and White faces displaying either neutral or angry expressions and later attempted to identify previously seen faces. Recognition accuracy for neutral faces showed the out-group homogeneity bias, but this bias was entirely eliminated for angry Black faces. Indeed, when participants' cognitive processing capacity was constrained, recognition accuracy was greater for angry Black faces than for angry White faces, demonstrating an out-group heterogeneity bias.     

Investigating different factor structures of the psychopathy checklist: youth version: confirmatory factor analytic findings

There has been a recent push to extend the construct of psychopathy into adolescence, primarily as a result of the impressive reliability, validity, and utility of this construct in samples of adults. The value of this work rests, however, on creating an equally reliable and valid assessment tool for adolescents. One promising measure is the Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version (A. E. Forth, D. S. Kosson, & R. D. Hare, 2003). The current study uses a large, diverse sample of serious adolescent offenders to assess the overall fit of various underlying factor structures of this measure and to test the equivalence of these models across sex and race/ethnicity. The results suggest that either a 3- or 4-factor model provides the best overall fit and that these models are invariant across sex and race/ethnicity. The decision to use the 3- or 4-factor model will likely hinge on researchers' underlying conceptualization of psychopathy, specifically whether antisocial behavior is viewed as a core feature of this construct.     

Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning

Inductive inference allows humans to make powerful generalizations from sparse data when learning about word meanings, unobserved properties, causal relationships, and many other aspects of the world. Traditional accounts of induction emphasize either the power of statistical learning, or the importance of strong constraints from structured domain knowledge, intuitive theories or schemas. We argue that both components are necessary to explain the nature, use and acquisition of human knowledge, and we introduce a theory-based Bayesian framework for modeling inductive learning and reasoning as statistical inferences over structured knowledge representations.