Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons

Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people will be motivated by any reason they have of which they are aware. Goldman himself embraces (I), and deploys it frequently in his criticisms of orthodox externalism. But there is logical space for an externalist view that includes a commitment to (O) and (E), but that denies (I). The resulting “hyperexternalist” view holds that some reasons need not motivate us, even if we are rational. In this paper I argue that Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism leave hyperexternalism untouched, and that his specific criticisms of my own version of hyperexternalism do not work. In light of Goldman’s criticisms of orthodox externalism and my own criticisms of Goldman’s view, hyperexternalism emerges as the favored option.     

Exploring negative emotion in women experiencing intimate partner violence: shame, guilt, and PTSD

This study explored the association of shame and guilt with PTSD among women who had experienced intimate partner violence (IPV). Sixty-three women were assessed by a research clinic serving the mental health needs of women IPV survivors. Results indicated that shame, guilt-related distress, and guilt-related cognitions showed significant associations with PTSD but global guilt did not. When shame and guilt were examined in the context of specific forms of psychological abuse, moderation analyses indicated that high levels of both emotional/verbal abuse and dominance/isolation interacted with high levels of shame in their association with PTSD. Neither guilt-related distress nor guilt-related cognitions were moderated by specific forms of psychological abuse in their association with PTSD. These data support the conceptualization of shame, guilt distress, and guilt cognitions as relevant features of PTSD. Results are discussed in light of proposed changes to diagnostic criteria for PTSD.     

Multidimensional body image comparisons among patients with eating disorders,body dysmorphic disorder,and clinical controls: A multisite study

Body image disturbance is considered a core characteristic of eating disorders and body dysmorphic disorder (BDD), however its definition has been unclear within the literature. This study examined the multidimensional nature of body image functioning among individuals with either anorexia nervosa (AN; n = 35), bulimia nervosa (BN; n = 26), or BDD (n = 56), relative to female (n = 34) and male (n = 36) psychiatric controls. Participants were recruited from 10 treatment centers in the United States and England and completed psychometrically validated and standardized self-report measures of body image. Overall, the AN, BN, and BDD groups were characterized by significantly elevated disturbances in most body image dimensions relative to their gender-matched clinical controls. There was variability, however, in the comparisons among the three groups of interest, including foci of body dissatisfaction and body image coping patterns. On omnibus indices of body image disturbance and body image quality of life, patients with BDD reported more body image impairment than those with eating disorders. Although AN, BN, and BDD are characterized by body image disturbances, similar and partially distinctive cognitive, behavioral, and emotional elements of body image functioning exist among these groups. The study's empirical and clinical implications are considered.     

The five-factor narcissism inventory: a five-factor measure of narcissistic personality traits

This study provides convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity data for a new measure of narcissistic personality traits created from the perspective of the Five-factor model (FFM) of general personality structure. Fifteen scales were constructed as maladaptive variants of respective facets of the FFM (e.g., Reactive Anger as a narcissistic variant of angry hostility), with item selection made on the basis of a criterion-keying approach using results from 167 undergraduates. On the basis of data from 166 additional undergraduates, the convergent validity of these 15 scales was tested with respect to 8 established measures of narcissism (including measures of both grandiose and vulnerable narcissism) and the respective facets of the FFM. Discriminant validity was tested with respect to facets from other FFM domains. Incremental validity was tested with respect to the ability of the FFM narcissism trait scales to account for variance in 2 alternative measures of narcissism, after variance accounted for by respective NEO PI-R facet scales and other established measures of narcissism were first removed. The findings support the validity of these new scales as measures of narcissistic personality traits and as maladaptive variants of the FFM.     

Do extraverts get more bang for the buck? Refining the affective-reactivity hypothesis of extraversion

One of the most robust observations in personality and emotion research is the finding that extraverts are happier than introverts. Some theorists have attributed this to differential reactivity of the brain reward system, which is central to many biologically inspired models of extraversion. This affective-reactivity hypothesis, which suggests that extraverts should be more susceptible to the induction of positive affect, has so far received very mixed empirical support. In this article, we consider a more biologically plausible account of extraverts' affective-reactivity. Over 5 experiments, we demonstrate that extraverts show greater affective-reactivity only in response to clearly appetitive stimuli and situations (e.g., where rewards are being pursued). Conversely, after merely pleasant stimuli and situations (without any reward-approach element), extraverts and introverts respond similarly. We also show that it is specifically activated affect (e.g., feelings of alertness), rather than pleasantly valenced affect (e.g., feelings of contentment), that characterizes the affective-reactivity of extraverts. Such reactions may potentially facilitate the reward-seeking behavior associated with extraversion, but they seem unlikely to explain the broadly happy disposition of extraverts.     

Problematic standard errors and confidence intervals for skewness and kurtosis

Many statistics packages print skewness and kurtosis statistics with estimates of their standard errors. The function most often used for the standard errors (e.g., in SPSS) assumes that the data are drawn from a normal distribution, an unlikely situation. Some textbooks suggest that if the statistic is more than about 2 standard errors from the hypothesized value (i.e., an approximate value for the critical value from the t distribution for moderate or large sample sizes when α = 5%), the hypothesized value can be rejected. This is an inappropriate practice unless the standard error estimate is accurate and the sampling distribution is approximately normal. We show distributions where the traditional standard errors provided by the function underestimate the actual values, often being 5 times too small, and distributions where the function overestimates the true values. Bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals are more accurate than the traditional approach, although still imperfect. The reasons for this are discussed. We recommend that if you are using skewness and kurtosis statistics based on the 3^rd and 4^th moments, bootstrapping should be used to calculate standard errors and confidence intervals, rather than using the traditional standard. Software in the freeware R for this article provides these estimates.     

Beyond the Academic Journal: Unfreezing Misconceptions About Mental Illness and Gun Violence Through Knowledge Translation to Decision-Makers

In a policy arena characterized by polarized debate, such as the consideration of legal interventions to prevent gun violence, research evidence is an important tool to inform decision-making processes. However, unless the evidence is communicated to stakeholders who can influence policy decisions, the research will often remain an academic exercise with little practical impact. The Educational Fund to Stop Violence's process of “unfreezing” individual perceptions and conventional interpretations of the relationship between mental illness and gun violence, forming a consensus, and translating this knowledge to stakeholders through state discussion forums is one way to inform policy change. The recent passage of gun violence prevention legislation in California provides an example of successfully closing the knowledge translation gap between research and decision-making processes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ANIMAL SUFFERING,EVOLUTION, AND THE ORIGINS OF EVIL: TOWARD A “FREE CREATURES” DEFENSE

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability.     

Despair and the determinate negation of Brandom’s Hegel

In this paper, I contend that Brandom’s interpretive oversights leave his inferentialist program vulnerable to Hegelian critique. My target is Brandom’s notion of “conceptual realism,” or the thesis that the structure of mind-independent reality mimics the structure of thought. I show, first, that the conceptual realism at the heart of Brandom’s empiricism finds root in his interpretation of Hegel. I then argue that conceptual realism is incompatible with Hegel’s thought, since the Jena Phenomenology, understood as a “way of despair,” includes a critique of the philosophical framework upon which conceptual realism relies. Finally, I offer the Hegelian critique of Brandom that results from these textual infidelities.