The bedside manner of homo economicus: How and why priming an economic schema reduces compassion

We investigate how, why and when activating economic schemas reduces the compassion that individuals extend to others in need when delivering bad news. Across three experiments, we show that unobtrusively priming economic schemas decreases the compassion that individuals express to others in need, that this effect is mediated by dampened feelings of empathy and heightened perceptions of unprofessionalism, and that it is circumscribed to bad news that has economic implications. We discuss implications for theory and research on schemas, procedural justice, emotion expression, and prosocial behavior.     

The Three Domains of Disgust Scale: factor structure, psychometric properties, and conceptual limitations

This investigation examined the measurement properties of the Three Domains of Disgust Scale (TDDS). Principal components analysis in Study 1 (n = 206) revealed three factors of Pathogen, Sexual, and Moral Disgust that demonstrated excellent reliability, including test-retest over 12 weeks. Confirmatory factor analyses in Study 2 (n = 406) supported the three factors. Supportive evidence for the validity of the Pathogen and Sexual Disgust subscales was found in Study 1 and Study 2 with strong associations with disgust/contamination and weak associations with negative affect. However, the validity of the Moral Disgust subscale was limited. Study 3 (n = 200) showed that the TDDS subscales differentially related to personality traits. Study 4 (n = 47) provided evidence for the validity of the TDDS subscales in relation to multiple indices of disgust/contamination aversion in a select sample. Study 5 (n = 70) further highlighted limitations of the Moral Disgust subscale given the lack of a theoretically consistent association with moral attitudes. Lastly, Study 6 (n = 178) showed that responses on the Moral Disgust scale were more intense when anger was the response option compared with when disgust was the response option. The implications of these findings for the assessment of disgust are discussed.     

Treatment of PTSD in Older Adults: Do Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions Remain Viable?

The literature examining trauma among older adults is growing, but little is known about the efficacy of empirically supported interventions for PTSD within this population. Clinical writing on this topic often implies that cognitive-behavioral treatments may be ineffective or inappropriate for older adults with PTSD given physical and/or cognitive vulnerabilities. Review of the limited research in this area, however, provides little support for the claim that cognitive-behavioral interventions are ineffective in treating PTSD among the elderly. In an effort to explicate specific issues related to treatment process and outcome among older survivors of trauma, a case series is presented outlining the treatment of three older adults within the context of a structured, cognitive-behavioral group intervention. Observations from this case series suggests that cognitive-behavioral interventions continue to be useful in treating PTSD with this population. Specific treatment issues unique to older adults are explored and recommendations for future research are discussed.     

Adaptations to avoid victimization

From an evolutionary perspective, victims are individuals who incur fitness costs as the result of the actions of external agents. The external agents that inflict the costs are often other humans. In the evolutionary past, there were recurrent contexts of conflict in the fitness interests of different individuals. Evidence suggests that many instances of the infliction of costs on conspecifics are the evolved products of adaptations that function to acquire and control fitness-enhancing resources and goals. We propose that an antagonistic, coevolutionary arms race that has churned through the deep time of human evolutionary history has produced adaptations to strategically exploit others and defenses to avoid the costs of victimization.     

Decision making in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART): Anterior cingulate cortex signals loss aversion but not the infrequency of risky choices

The inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula (IFG/AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are key regions involved in risk appraisal during decision making, but accounts of how these regions contribute to decision making under risk remain contested. To help clarify the roles of these and other related regions, we used a modified version of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 75-84, 2002) to distinguish between decision-making and feedback-related processes when participants decided to pursue a gain as the probability of loss increased parametrically. Specifically, we set out to test whether the ACC and IFG/AI regions correspond to loss aversion at the time of decision making in a way that is not confounded with either reward-seeking or infrequency effects. When participants chose to discontinue inflating the balloon (win option), we observed greater ACC and mainly bilateral IFG/AI activity at the time of decision as the probability of explosion increased, consistent with increased loss aversion but inconsistent with an infrequency effect. In contrast, we found robust vmPFC activity when participants chose to continue inflating the balloon (risky option), consistent with reward seeking. However, in the cingulate and in mainly bilateral IFG regions, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent activation decreased when participants chose to inflate the balloon as the probability of explosion increased, findings that are consistent with a reduced loss aversion signal. Our results highlight the existence of distinct reward-seeking and loss-averse signals during decision making, as well as the importance of distinguishing between decision and feedback signals.     

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition

One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent??s actional processes and states??her goals, needs, intentions, desires, and so on??likely play important roles in and for mindreading processes. If so, a full understanding of mindreading processes and their role in cognition more broadly will require an understanding of how actional mental processes interact with, influence, or take part in mindreading processes.     

Does power corrupt or enable? When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior

Does power corrupt a moral identity, or does it enable a moral identity to emerge? Drawing from the power literature, we propose that the psychological experience of power, although often associated with promoting self-interest, is associated with greater self-interest only in the presence of a weak moral identity. Furthermore, we propose that the psychological experience of power is associated with less self-interest in the presence of a strong moral identity. Across a field survey of working adults and in a lab experiment, individuals with a strong moral identity were less likely to act in self-interest, yet individuals with a weak moral identity were more likely to act in self-interest, when subjectively experiencing power. Finally, we predict and demonstrate an explanatory mechanism behind this effect: The psychological experience of power enhances moral awareness among those with a strong moral identity, yet decreases the moral awareness among those with a weak moral identity. In turn, individuals' moral awareness affects how they behave in relation to their self-interest.     

A five-factor measure of dependent personality traits

This study provides convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity data for a new measure of dependent personality traits from the perspective of the five-factor model (FFM). Dependent personality trait scales were constructed as maladaptive variants of FFM facets (e.g., Gullibility as a maladaptive variant of FFM trust). Based on responses from 383 undergraduates, the convergent validity of the Five-Factor Dependency Inventory (FFDI) scales was tested with respect to 2 measures of the FFM, 6 dependency trait scales, and 4 measures of dependent personality disorder. Discriminant validity was tested with respect to FFM facets from alternative domains. Incremental validity was tested with respect to the ability of the FFM dependent personality trait scales to account for variance in 2 established measures of dependency, after variance accounted for by respective FFM facet scales and other measures of DPD was first removed. The results of this study provided support for the validity of the FFDI assessment of dependency from the perspective of the FFM.     

Measures to assess maladaptive variants of the five-factor model

The five-factor model (FFM) is the predominant dimensional model of general personality structure. A considerable body of research supports the hypothesis that personality disorders can be conceptualized as extreme or maladaptive variants of the domains and facets of the FFM. However, existing measures of the FFM are confined largely to the normal variants. The purpose of this special section of the Journal of Personality Assessment is to provide the development and initial validation of self-report inventory scales to assess obsessive-compulsive, borderline, narcissistic, avoidant, and dependent personality traits from the perspective of the FFM, which complement the similarly constructed existing measures for psychopathic, histrionic, and schizotypal personality traits.