Term Kinds and the Formality of Aristotelian Modal Logic

Recent formalizations of Aristotle's modal syllogistic have made use of an interpretative assumption with precedent in traditional commentary: That Aristotle implicitly relies on a distinction between two classes of terms. I argue that the way Rini (2011. Aristotle's Modal Proofs: Prior Analytics A8–22 in Predicate Logic, Dordrecht: Springer) employs this distinction undermines her attempt to show that Aristotle gives valid proofs of his modal syllogisms. Rini does not establish that Aristotle gives valid proofs of the arguments which she takes to best represent Aristotle's modal syllogisms, nor that Aristotle's modal syllogisms are instances of any other system of schemata that could be used to define an alternative notion of validity. On the other hand, I argue, Robert Kilwardby's ca. 1240 commentary on the Prior Analytics makes use of a term-kind distinction so as to provide truth conditions for Aristotle's necessity propositions which render Aristotle's conversion rules and first figure modal syllogisms formally valid. I reconstruct a suppositio semantics for syllogistic necessity propositions based on Kilwardby's text, and yield a consequence relation which validates key results in the assertoric, pure necessity and mixed necessity-assertoric syllogistics.     

Differences in the Evaluation of Generic Statements About Human and Non‐Human Categories

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. Current theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threatening information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non‐human categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories. In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening (vs. a non‐threatening) property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to human categories. Experiment 2 examined an alternative hypothesis for this result, and Experiments 3 and 4 served as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 found that even preschoolers apply generics differently for humans and artifacts. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that these effects reflect differences between human and non‐human categories more generally, as adults showed a negativity bias for categories of non‐human animals, but not for categories of humans. These findings suggest the presence of important, early‐emerging domain differences in people's judgments about generics.     

Well-being vocabulary in media language: An analysis of changing word usage in Norwegian newspapers

Well-being is a widely discussed topic in research, policy, and media. This study was aimed at examining usage patterns of core terminology related to well-being in Norwegian newspapers during the past two decades. Specifically, we investigated occurrence across time of 39 words describing well-being facets from four theoretical perspectives: affective approaches, cognitive or life satisfaction approaches, eudaimonic and humanistic approaches, and character strengths. Four major newspapers were selected in order to capture sociocultural and regional variation. Evidence of significant changes in usage frequency was detected for about half of the search terms. Affective words showed variable trends, while usage of words referring to satisfaction declined. The most notable magnitude of change concerned the increase in eudaimonic words related to mastery, motivation, and self-development. Findings suggest that core vocabulary of well-being belongs to a changeable field of linguistic practice. Implications for positive psychology are proposed.     

Does analysis brevity result in loss of control? A consecutive case series of 26 single‐session interview‐informed synthesized contingency analyses

A believable demonstration of control over problem behavior is a necessary component of the functional analysis process. Control during a functional analysis has traditionally been defined in a binary manner: Differentiated outcomes point to an identifiable function and undifferentiated outcomes do not. However, it might be beneficial to characterize control as strong, moderate, or weak in order to evaluate the strength of evidence for experimental control during an efficient functional analysis format that requires only a single session. We analyzed the levels of control using 26 single‐session interview‐informed synthesized contingency analyses (IISCAs). Although shorter session duration (i.e., first 3 or 5 min of each session) tended to reduce the level of control, the majority of single‐session IISCAs resulted in evidence indicating strong levels of control when data from the full 10‐min session were included in the analysis.     

A note on Dasgupta’s Generalism

Philosophical Studies - Dasgupta (Philos Stud Int J Philos Anal Tradit 145(1):35–67, 2009) has argued that material individuals, such as particles and laptops, are metaphysically...     

Evaluating the boundaries of analytic efficiency and control: A consecutive controlled case series of 26 functional analyses

We conducted this study to determine if the efficiency of the functional analysis could be improved without detrimental effects on control. In Experiment 1, we reanalyzed functional analyses conducted for the problem behavior of 18 children. We analyzed rates of problem behavior during the first 5 min and first 3 min of the original 10-min sessions and evaluated if changes in the level of control over problem behavior by the programmed contingency were evident from the analyses of shorter session duration. In Experiment 2, we conducted 8 consecutive functional analyses with 3-min sessions to further evaluate the utility of brief session durations. We found that control over problem behavior was demonstrated when conducting functional analyses with sessions as brief as 3 min.     

Subjective Importance of Masculinity as a Factor in Understanding Risky Sexual Attitudes and Behaviors among Sexual Minority Men

Sex Roles - In the present study we evaluated relationships among internalized stigma, subjective importance of masculine gender roles, and risky sexual attitudes and behaviors among men who...     

Prioritization within visual working memory reflects a flexible focus of attention

When motivated, people can keep nonrecent items in a list active during the presentation of new items, facilitating fast and accurate recall of the earlier items. It has been proposed that this occurs by flexibly orienting attention to a single prioritized list item, thus increasing the amount of attention-based maintenance directed toward this item at the expense of other items. This is manipulated experimentally by associating a single distinct feature with a higher reward value, such as a single red item in a list of black items. These findings may be more parsimoniously explained under a distinctiveness of encoding framework rather than a flexible attention allocation framework. The retrieval advantage for the prioritized list position may be because the incongruent feature stands out in the list perceptually and causes it to become better encoded. Across three visual working memory experiments, we contrast a flexible attention theory against a distinctiveness of encoding theory by manipulating the reward value associated with the incongruent feature. Findings from all three experiments show strong support in favor of the flexible attention theory and no support for the distinctiveness of encoding theory. We also evaluate and find no evidence that strategy use, motivation, or tiredness/fatigue associated with reward value can adequately explain flexible prioritization of attention. Flexible attentional prioritization effects may be best understood under the context of an online attentional refreshing mechanism.

     

The comparative psychology of same-different judgments by humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e., same) from pairs with any discernible disparity (i.e., different); whereas for monkeys the Same-Different concept is quantitative, continuous, and similarity-based, so that monkeys distinguish small-disparity pairs (i.e., similar) from pairs with a large disparity (i.e., dissimilar). The results supported the hypothesis. Monkeys, more than humans, showed a gradual transition from same to different categories and an inclusive criterion for responding Same. The results have implications for comparing Same-Different performances across species--different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in the same way. In particular, humans may especially apply qualitative, rule-based frameworks to cognitive tasks like Same-Different.     

Effects of amount of information on judgment accuracy and confidence

When a person evaluates his or her confidence in a judgment, what is the effect of receiving more judgment-relevant information? We report three studies that show when judges receive more information, their confidence increases more than their accuracy, producing substantial confidence–accuracy discrepancies. Our results suggest that judges do not adjust for the cognitive limitations that reduce their ability to use additional information effectively. We place these findings in a more general framework of understanding the cues to confidence that judges use and how those cues relate to accuracy and calibration.