The prevalence of false confessions in experimental laboratory simulations: A meta‐analysis

We assessed experimental false confession studies using a meta‐analysis to evaluate the prevalence of false confessions across methodologies and several moderator variables. False confessions were more likely in typing task studies than in collaborative or individual cheating studies. In typing studies, speed of typing did not affect false confession rates, but placement of the forbidden key in locations that rendered errors less plausible lowered the false confession rates. False‐evidence ploys increased the likelihood of false confessions. We explore implications for courts, expert witnesses, scholars, and police interrogators.     

The comparative psychology of same-different judgments by humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e., same) from pairs with any discernible disparity (i.e., different); whereas for monkeys the Same-Different concept is quantitative, continuous, and similarity-based, so that monkeys distinguish small-disparity pairs (i.e., similar) from pairs with a large disparity (i.e., dissimilar). The results supported the hypothesis. Monkeys, more than humans, showed a gradual transition from same to different categories and an inclusive criterion for responding Same. The results have implications for comparing Same-Different performances across species--different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in the same way. In particular, humans may especially apply qualitative, rule-based frameworks to cognitive tasks like Same-Different.     

Effects of amount of information on judgment accuracy and confidence

When a person evaluates his or her confidence in a judgment, what is the effect of receiving more judgment-relevant information? We report three studies that show when judges receive more information, their confidence increases more than their accuracy, producing substantial confidence–accuracy discrepancies. Our results suggest that judges do not adjust for the cognitive limitations that reduce their ability to use additional information effectively. We place these findings in a more general framework of understanding the cues to confidence that judges use and how those cues relate to accuracy and calibration.     

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.     

Inductive reasoning about causally transmitted properties

Different intuitive theories constrain and guide inferences in different contexts. Formalizing simple intuitive theories as probabilistic processes operating over structured representations, we present a new computational model of category-based induction about causally transmitted properties. A first experiment demonstrates undergraduates’ context-sensitive use of taxonomic and food web knowledge to guide reasoning about causal transmission and shows good qualitative agreement between model predictions and human inferences. A second experiment demonstrates strong quantitative and qualitative fits to inferences about a more complex artificial food web. A third experiment investigates human reasoning about complex novel food webs where species have known taxonomic relations. Results demonstrate a double-dissociation between the predictions of our causal model and a related taxonomic model [Kemp, C., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2003). Learning domain structures. In Proceedings of the 25th annual conference of the cognitive science society]: the causal model predicts human inferences about diseases but not genes, while the taxonomic model predicts human inferences about genes but not diseases. We contrast our framework with previous models of category-based induction and previous formal instantiations of intuitive theories, and outline challenges in developing a complete model of context-sensitive reasoning.     

1/f noise and effort on implicit measures of bias

Phenomena that vary over time can often be represented as a complex waveform. Fourier analysis decomposes this complex wave into a set of sinusoidal component waves. In some phenomena, the amplitude of these waves varies in inverse relation to frequency. This pattern has been called 1/f noise and, unlike white noise, it reflects nonrandom variation. Latencies in simple computer tasks typically reveal 1/f noise, but the magnitude of the noise decreases as tasks become more challenging. The current work hypothesizes a correspondence between 1/f noise and effort, leading to the prediction that increasing effort will reduce 1/f noise. In 2 studies, the author examined the relationship between an individual's attempts to avoid bias (measured in Study 1, manipulated in Study 2) and 1/f noise in implicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice. In each study, participants who made an effort to modulate the use of racial information showed less 1/f noise than did participants who made less effort. The potential value of this analytic approach to social psychology is discussed.     

Beyond Strategy,Towards the Kingdom of God: The Post‐Critical Reconstructionist Mission of the Emerging Church

Abstract : The Emerging Church is a diverse global phenomenon which envisions a radical reforming of the theology and praxis of the broader Christian church in light of the philosophical and cultural shift from modernism to post‐modernism. Differing from the evangelical New Paradigm seeker‐sensitive Church's generational focus, and the organizational unity and routines of Mainline Protestant denominations the Emerging Church conversation endeavors to create committed, authentic, day‐to‐day communities that embrace ecumenical and ancient Christian theology and practices in order to live out the reality of the in‐breaking kingdom of God. Though precise systemic theological unity within the Emerging movement is recognized as an elusive goal that is generally not even sought, the movement as a whole finds much in common with post‐conservative and post‐liberal theology, and shares a joint mission with those who have been called to the task of post‐critical reconstruction.     

Vague terms,indexicals, and vague indexicals

Jason Stanley has criticized a contextualist solution to the sorites paradox that treats vagueness as a kind of indexicality. His objection rests on a feature of indexicals that seems plausible: that their reference remains fixed in verb phrase ellipsis. But the force of Stanley’s criticism depends on the undefended assumption that vague terms, if they are a special sort of indexical, must function in the same way that more paradigmatic indexicals do. This paper argues that there can be more than one sort of indexicality, that one term might easily have both sorts, and that therefore, and despite Stanley’s worries, vagueness might easily be assimilated to one form.

Eliminating the memory blocking effect

Six experiments investigated the memory blocking effect (MBE) in which exposure to orthographically similar words (e.g., BALLOON) impairs one's ability to complete a similar fragment (e.g., BAL_ON_, solution is BALCONY). Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that blocking is not observed after a 72-hour delay; however, repetition priming was observed after the same delay. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that presenting unrelated semantic information during the fragment completion test eliminates blocking. Experiment 5 demonstrated that the MBE persists despite directed-forgetting instructions, and Experiments 5 and 6 demonstrated that activating both the solutions and blocking words for a particular fragment at study eliminates blocking. Collectively, the data demonstrate that reading orthographically similar primes automatically triggers retrieval of the blocking word and an executive control process works to manage this interference. A working framework that describes how an executive control mechanism could govern memory retrieval in the memory-blocking paradigm is presented to stimulate development of more advanced theoretical models that can explain blocking.     

The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy scale: an examination of the personality traits and disorders associated with the LSRP factors

There are several self-report measures of psychopathy, most of which use a two-factor structure. There is debate regarding the convergence of these factors, particularly with regard to Factor 1 (F1), which is related to the interpersonal and affective aspects of psychopathy; Factor 2 (F2) is related to the social deviance associated with psychopathy. This study examines the relations between the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy (LSRP) factors and personality traits and disorders (PDs) in an undergraduate sample (n = 271). LSRP Factor 1 is related to an antagonistic interpersonal style (i.e., low Agreeableness; high Narcissistic PD and ratings of prototypical psychopathy), whereas Factor 2 is more strongly related to negative emotionality (i.e., Neuroticism), disinhibition (i.e., low Conscientiousness) and a broad array of PD symptoms. The authors interpret these findings in the context of alternative measures of psychopathy and suggest that the LSRP is a reasonable, albeit imperfect, measure of psychopathy.