ANIMAL SUFFERING,EVOLUTION, AND THE ORIGINS OF EVIL: TOWARD A “FREE CREATURES” DEFENSE

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability.     

Despair and the determinate negation of Brandom’s Hegel

In this paper, I contend that Brandom’s interpretive oversights leave his inferentialist program vulnerable to Hegelian critique. My target is Brandom’s notion of “conceptual realism,” or the thesis that the structure of mind-independent reality mimics the structure of thought. I show, first, that the conceptual realism at the heart of Brandom’s empiricism finds root in his interpretation of Hegel. I then argue that conceptual realism is incompatible with Hegel’s thought, since the Jena Phenomenology, understood as a “way of despair,” includes a critique of the philosophical framework upon which conceptual realism relies. Finally, I offer the Hegelian critique of Brandom that results from these textual infidelities.     

When being far away is good: Exploring how mortality salience,regulatory mode,and goal progress affect judgments of meaning in life

Research indicates that death‐relevant thoughts (mortality salience) have a nuanced effect on judgments of life's meaningfulness. Thoughts of death diminish meaning in life only among people who lack or do not readily engage psychological structures that confer meaning. Building on this past research, the current research examined how an important source of meaning, long‐term goal progress, affects the ways that death‐relevant cognitions impact judgments of life's meaning. In Study 1 (N = 118), mortality salience decreased perceptions of meaning in life only among participants who were induced to feel closer to (vs. farther from) completing a long‐term goal. Study 2 (N = 259) extended these findings by demonstrating the moderating influence of individual differences in locomotion. Mortality salience again decreased perceptions of meaning in life among participants who felt closer to accomplishing a long‐term goal, but it only did so among people who do not quickly adopt new goals to pursue (i.e., those low in locomotion). The implications of these findings for better understanding how people maintain meaning in the face of existential concerns and how aspects of goal pursuit affect these processes are discussed.     

Predicting Suicide Intent: The Roles of Experiencing or Committing Violent Acts

According to the interpersonal theory of suicide (Joiner, 2005), repeated exposure to painful or provocative experiences is associated with lethal or nearly lethal suicide attempts. However, suicide research often focuses on suicide ideation or attempts, rather than intent. Using data from the Collaborative Psychiatric Epidemiological Surveys, we examined traumatic experiences, with a focus on repeated exposure to traumas, in individuals who described their suicide attempts as a strong intent to die versus a cry for help. Only repeated acts of committing violence were associated with high suicide intent, suggesting that individuals who engage in violence are at heightened risk for suicide.     

What Factors Influence the Decision to Share Suicidal Thoughts? A Multilevel Social Network Analysis of Disclosure Among Individuals with Serious Mental Illness

Nondisclosure of suicidal thoughts limits suicide risk management. Consistent with disclosure models for other stigmatized statuses, understanding suicidal disclosure requires accounting for features of the discloser (individual factors) and the discloser–recipient relationship (relational factors). In a sample of 30 adults with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depressive disorder (Level 2) who nominated 436 social network members (Level 1), we examined disclosure patterns and identified individual and relational correlates of disclosure intent. Most individuals disclosed in the past (77%; n = 23) and all intended on disclosing (100%; n = 30). Disclosure was highly selective, with 14% (n = 62) of network members identified as prior confidants and 23% (n = 99) identified as intended confidants. Multilevel modeling indicated that relational factors were more central to disclosure than individual factors. Network members who were prior confidants and who provided social support were attractive targets for intended disclosure. Our findings suggest that “targeted” gatekeeper training may be a promising strategy and reveal relational characteristics to identify “high‐probability confidants.”     

H. Richard Niebuhr's Reading of George Herbert Mead: Correcting,Completing, and Looking Ahead

In this essay, I reconstruct H. Richard Niebuhr's interpretation of George Herbert Mead's account of the social constitution of the self. Specifically, I correct Niebuhr's interpretation, because it mischaracterizes Mead's understanding of social constitution as more dialogical than ecological. I also argue that Niebuhr's interpretation needs completing because it fails to engage one of Mead's more significant notions, the I/me distinction within the self. By reconstructing Niebuhr's account of faith and responsibility as theologically self‐constitutive through Mead's I/me distinction, I demonstrate Niebuhr's deep yet unacknowledged agreement with Mead: the self is constituted by its participation in multiple communities, but responds to them creatively by enduring the moral perplexity of competing communal claims. I conclude by initiating a constructive account of conscience that follows from this agreement. Conscience is more ecological than dialogical because it regards our creative participation in multiple ecologies of social roles oriented by patterns of responsive relations.