An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength

Self-affirmation seems to enable an individual to objectively evaluate information that would otherwise evoke a defensive reaction. If this objectivity reflects freedom from self-evaluative concerns, affirmation should sensitize people to central cues of a persuasive message, like argument strength. If affirmation simply induces agreeableness or trivializes the issue, affirmed participants should not particularly heed argument strength. Affirmed and non-affirmed participants rated the persuasiveness of pro- and counterattitudinal arguments that varied in strength. Among participants who rated their attitudes as personally important, self-affirmation decreased bias and increased sensitivity to argument strength, as predicted by self-affirmation theory.     

Examining antisocial behavior through the lens of the five factor model of personality

The current study attempts to provide greater precision in understanding how personality is related to antisocial behavior. Specifically, we examined the relations between the facets (subordinate traits) from three domains (superordinate dimensions): Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, of the Five Factor Model and five outcome variables: stability of conduct problems, variety of conduct problems, onset of conduct problems, aggression, and antisocial personality disorder symptoms. These relations were examined in a community sample of 481 individuals. These three personality dimensions were chosen for exploration due to their consistent relations, at the domain level, with antisocial behaviors. The results from this study suggest that the facets from the dimension of Agreeableness are the most consistently related to all five outcomes. However, the facets from all three domains made significant contributions. Overall, three personality traits stood out as being the strongest and most consistent predictors: low straightforwardness, low compliance, and low deliberation. Implications for prevention and intervention are discussed. Aggr. Behav. 29:497–514, 2003. © 2003 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Locke and Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent

Hume's account of belief has been much reviled, especially considered as an account of what it is to assent to or judge a proposition to be true. In fact, given that he thinks that thoughts about existence can be composed of a single idea, and that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. Nonetheless, Hume was extremely proud of his account of belief, discussing it at length in the Abstract, and developing it in the Appendix. Furthermore, he claimed several times that his account was new. It was not just a new answer to an old question, but an answer to a new question as well. Why did Hume think he was raising, and answering, a new question? Is his answer really so appalling? Why did he define belief in terms of a relationship with a present impression? In this paper, I propose answers to these questions. The answers emerge by contrasting Hume with Locke. Locke thought that belief was a pale imitation of knowledge, and that the assent we give to propositions is constituted in the very same act as forming those propositions. Hume saw the problems such a theory faced concerning existential beliefs. By ceasing to treat existence as a predicate, Hume was confronted with the issue of what it was to judge something to be true, or to assent to something. This issue had to be solved independently of the question of what it was to conceive something, or understand the content of a proposition. Hume thought this problem was new. He should be looked at, not as giving a bad answer to an important question, but rather as being the first in the early modern period to recognize that there was an important question here to be answered.     

Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength

Many contemporary accounts of normative reasons for action accord a single strength value to normative reasons. This paper first uses some examples to argue against such views by showing that they seem to commit us to intransitive or counterintuitive claims about the rough equivalence of the strengths of certain reasons. The paper then explains and defends an alternate account according to which normative reasons for action have two separable dimensions of strength: requiring strength, and justifying strength. Such an account explains our intuitions in the cases that make trouble for single-value views. The justifying/requiring account is compared with two other solutions that have been offered to justify and explain our intuitions about these sorts of cases. These other solutions appeal to the notions of incommensurability of reasons, and to second-order normative entities called `exclusionary permissions'. It is argued that the justifying/requiring distinction provides a superior solution.     

The Convergence of Ministry,Tenure, and Efficacy: Beyond Speculation Toward a New Theory of Pastoral Efficacy

In recent years there has been increased interest in understanding the cultivation of effective pastoral ministry. Many theories have been postulated based on individual experiences, but what has been lacking is a robust body of comprehensive and rigorous research regarding the issue. The purpose of this study was to explore the lived experience of long-tenured senior pastors of Christian churches with an eye toward the insights participants’ experiences could offer to pastoral education. Final analysis of the data affirmed current research on resiliency in pastoral ministry and extended previous research through the discovery that participants understood the convergence of ministry, tenure, and efficacy as a cyclical process sustained by the interconnected experiences of fidelity to the pastoral call and the cultivation of authenticity in community. This understanding forms the basis of a new theory of pastoral efficacy.     

Updating metacognitive control in response to expected retention intervals

In five experiments, we investigated whether expected retention intervals affect subjects’ encoding strategies. In the first four experiments, our subjects studied paired associates consisting of words from the Graduate Record Exam and a synonym. They were told to expect a test on a word pair after either a short or a longer interval. Subjects were tested on most pairs after the expected retention interval. For some pairs, however, subjects were tested after the other retention interval, allowing for a comparison of performance at a given retention interval conditional upon the expected retention interval. No effect of the expected retention interval was found for 1 min versus 4 min (Exp. 1), 30 s versus 3 min (Exp. 2), and 30 s versus 10 min (Exps. 3 and 4), even when subjects were given complete control over the pacing of study items (Exp. 4). However, when the difference between the expected retention intervals was increased massively (10 min vs. 24 h; Exp. 5), subjects remembered more items that they expected to be tested sooner, an effect consistent with the idea that they traded off efforts to remember items for the later test versus items that were about to be tested. Overall, this set of results accords with much of the test-expectancy literature, revealing that subjects are often reluctant to adjust encoding strategies on an item-by-item basis, and when they do, they usually make quantitative, rather than qualitative, adjustments.     

Within-subject covariation between depression- and anxiety-related affect

Studies find a strong positive relationship between the affective components of anxiety and depression. However, most research thus far has examined the between-person correlations among these constructs, while ignoring how changes in these two types of affect covary over time within a person. Within-person correlations could differ meaningfully from how anxiety- and depression-related affect relate across individuals. Further, individuals may differ in terms of how highly these constructs covary over time. The current study aimed to (1) compare between- and within-person correlations between anxious and depressive affect, (2) examine lagged effects between anxious and depressive affect over time, (3) test whether individuals differ in their within-person correlations between these two types of affect, and (4) examine whether the mean level of affective intensity moderated these individual differences. These questions were explored using college undergraduates (N?=?50) who rated their depression- and anxiety- related affect six times a day for two weeks. A higher average correlation was observed between anxious and depressive affect in between-person compared to within-person analyses. Significant bidirectional lagged effects were observed between these constructs. Individuals with higher average levels of anxious affect experienced stronger within-person correlations between anxious and depressive affect.