The effects of post-encoding stress on recognition memory: examining the impact of skydiving in young men and women

Prior studies have indicated that post-encoding stress can protect memories from the effects of forgetting, and this has been taken as evidence that stress facilitates memory consolidation. However, it is not known whether stress acts by directly influencing the strength of the underlying memories or whether it influences the generation process that plays a critical role in tests such as free recall. To address this issue, we examined the effects of stress produced by skydiving on recognition memory for negative and neutral pictures. Relative to a non-stress control condition, post-encoding stress in males was found to increase recognition memory for neutral pictures. However, stress was not found to improve recognition for emotional pictures, nor was it found to influence recognition memory in female participants. Additional analysis of recognition performance suggested that stress increased familiarity-based recognition rather than recollection. This study indicates that stress can improve familiarity-based recognition, thus showing that stress directly increases the strength of the underlying memories.     

What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler

Tamar Gendler argues that, for those living in a society in which race is a salient sociological feature, it is impossible to be fully rational: members of such a society must either fail to encode relevant information containing race, or suffer epistemic costs by being implicitly racist. However, I argue that, although Gendler calls attention to a pitfall worthy of study, she fails to conclusively demonstrate that there are epistemic (or cognitive) costs of being racist. Gendler offers three supporting phenomena. First, implicit racists expend cognitive energy repressing their implicit biases. I reply, citing Ellen Bialystok’s research, that constant use of executive functioning can be beneficial. Second, Gendler argues that awareness of a negative stereotype of one’s own race with regard to a given task negatively affects one’s performance of that task. This phenomenon, I argue, demonstrates that those against whom the stigma is directed suffer costs, but it fails to demonstrate that the stigmatizers suffer cognitively. Finally, Gendler argues that racists are less competent when recognizing faces of other races than when recognizing faces of their own race because, in the first instance, they encode the race of the face (taking up cognitive space that could have been used to encode fine-grained distinctions), whereas in the second instance they encode no race. I argue that in-group/out-group categorization rather than racism is the cognitive cost. I conclude that Gendler has failed to demonstrate that there are cognitive costs associated with being a racist.     

Resolving the theory of planned behaviour's ‘expectancy-value muddle’ using dimensional salience

The theory of planned behaviour is one of the most widely used models of decision-making in the health literature. Unfortunately, the primary method for assessing the theory's belief-based expectancy-value models results in statistically uninterpretable findings, giving rise to what has become known as the ‘expectancy-value muddle’. Moreover, existing methods for resolving this muddle are associated with various conceptual or practical limitations. This study addresses these issues by identifying and evaluating a parsimonious method for resolving the expectancy-value muddle. Three hundred and nine Australian residents aged 18–24 years rated the expectancy and value of 18 beliefs about posthumous organ donation. Participants also nominated their five most salient beliefs using a dimensional salience approach. Salient beliefs were perceived as being more likely to eventuate than non-salient beliefs, indicating that salient beliefs could be used to signify the expectancy component. The expectancy-value term was therefore represented by summing the value ratings of salient beliefs, an approach that predicted attitude (adjusted R ²?=?0.21) and intention (adjusted R ²?=?0.21). These findings suggest that the dimensional salience approach is a useful method for overcoming the expectancy-value muddle in applied research settings.     

Applicant Faking,Social Desirability,and the Prediction of Counterproductive Work Behaviors

Recent studies have pointed to within-subjects designs as an especially effective tool for gauging the occurrence of faking behavior in applicant samples. The current study utilized a within-subjects design and data from a sample of job applicants to compare estimates of faking via within-subjects score change to estimates based on a social desirability scale. In addition, we examined the impact of faking on the relationship between Conscientiousness and counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs), as well as the direct linkage between faking and CWBs. Our results suggest that social desirability scales are poor indicators of within-subjects score change, and applicant faking is both related to CWBs and has a negative impact on the criterion-related validity of Conscientiousness as a predictor of CWBs.     

Toward a ‘Catholic’ Reading of Kierkegaard

Historically, some Catholic readers have been suspicious of Kierkegaard's writings; viewing him as an irrational Protestant irreconcilably at odds with Catholic thought. Nevertheless, the unexpected yet favorable mention of Kierkegaard in John Paul II's Fides et Ratio is an indication that Kierkegaard's writings are not so easily dismissed. One may be justified in asking: what account can be given to explain such a shift in how the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard changes from a polemical rejection to a papal endorsement during the 20th century? In this review essay, I will explore some recent Kierkegaard research that provides – or at least, provides some of the groundwork for – a positive ‘Catholic’ reading of Kierkegaard. Space does not permit an exhaustive exposition of each book, so I will highlight the salient features of each to underscore a new trend that is emerging in Kierkegaard studies.     

Saccadic output is influenced by limb kinetics during eye-hand coordination

In several recent studies, saccadic eye movements were found to be influenced by concurrent reaching movements. The authors investigated whether that influence originates in limb kinematic or kinetic signals. To dissociate those 2 possibilities, the authors required participants (N = 6) to generate pointing movements with a mass that either resisted or assisted limb motion. With practice, participants were able to generate pointing responses with very similar kinematics but whose kinetics varied in a systematic manner. The results showed that saccadic output was altered by the amount of force required to move the arm, consistent with an influence from limb kinetic signals. Because the interaction occurred before the pointing response began, the authors conclude that a predictive signal related to limb kinetics modulates saccadic output during tasks requiring eye-hand coordination.     

Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections

It is widely recognized that people sometimes use theory-of-mind judgments in moral cognition. A series of recent studies shows that the connection can also work in the opposite direction: moral judgments can sometimes be used in theory-of-mind cognition. Thus, there appear to be cases in which people's moral judgments actually serve as input to the process underlying their application of theory-of-mind concepts.